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
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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
I.—MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND ITS POSTULATES. BY HASTINGS	
RASHDALL	1
II.—THE LINE OF ADVANCE IN PHILOSOPHY. BY HENRY	
STURT	29
III.—SELF-INTROSPECTION. BY W. R. BOYCE GIBSON	38
IV.—VALUE FEELINGS AND JUDGMENTS OF VALUE. BY	
J. L. MCINTYRE	53
V.—SOME CONTROVERTED POINTS IN SYMBOLIC LOGIC. BY	
A. T. SHEARMAN	74
VI.—THE PERSONAL ELEMENT IN PHILOSOPHY. BY CLEMENT	
C. J. WEBB	106
VII.—THE METAPHYSICAL CRITERION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.	
BY H. WILDON CARR	117
DISCUSSION—Criticism by S. H. Hodgson ; Reply by	
H. Wildon Carr	130
VIII.—IDEALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND	
EXISTENCE. BY G. DAWES HICKS	136
ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE	
TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION	179
REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE	181
FINANCIAL STATEMENT	182
RULES	183
LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE TWENTY-SEVENTH	
SESSION, 1905-1906	186

PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY, 1904-1905.

I.—MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND ITS POSTULATES.

By HASTINGS RASHDALL.

I.

A CURIOUS revolution seems of late to have taken place in the attitude of the higher speculative Philosophy towards Morality. There was a time when all idealistic or spiritualistic Philosophy, whatever its attitude towards Religion and Theology, was regarded as the unswerving ally not merely of practical Morality but of what may be called the theoretical claims of the Moral Law. Kant used Morality to build up again, as he thought on firmer foundations, the spiritual structure which the critical Philosophy had speculatively overthrown. The idealistic Philosophers who followed him, amid all divergencies, were agreed in this—that Morality is rational and moral obligation no mere subjective experience of the human mind. Even Hegel, though his attitude towards evil, his thoroughgoing vindication of things as they are—from the Universe at large down to the Prussian Constitution in Church and State—paved the way for moral scepticism, still believed that Religion, as he conceived it, was the ally, the natural complement and crown, of Morality, and he did not quarrel with the Christian teaching about the love and goodness of God. Still more intimate was the association of an enthusiastic belief in the Moral Law with a philosophical Theology in the minds of more or less Hegelian English Idealists like Green. At the present day there are many

indications of a revolt against this attitude of mind. We have Mr. Bradley demonstrating the non-morality of the Absolute and (though it may be in a moment of not too serious petulance) vindicating the existence of human error on the ground of the diversion which the spectacle of it affords to an Absolute who is not human enough to love though he is human enough to be amused. By not a few speculative writers the claim of Morality to be a revelation of the ultimate nature of things is treated with something like contempt, while Religion receives a somewhat patronizing recognition just on account of its alleged superiority to mere Morality, even if our new Idealists do not (like Professor Taylor) actually repudiate the old claim of Morality to be rational and talk of placing it upon a purely psychological foundation—that is to say, in plain words, reducing it to a particular kind of human feeling: while if we turn to an entirely different philosophical quarter, we find Morality wounded in the house of its friends. Professor James, the avowed defender of the position that we may believe whatever we find it edifying to believe, still makes Morality consist merely in feeling. Of writers more decidedly inclining to Naturalism, like Höffding and Simmel, it is of course only to be expected that they should treat Morality as merely a peculiar kind of human feeling of little or no objective or cosmic significance.

In this state of philosophical opinion I trust it will not be unsuitable to attempt, in the sketchy and inadequate way which alone is possible in an hour's address, to discuss these questions—(1) Whether Morality is essentially rational; (2) what we mean by its being rational; (3) what implications this rationality, if accepted, carries with it as to the ultimate nature of things.

II.

I have not time here to defend the position that the ultimate moral judgment is a judgment of value. Particular judgments

as to what it is right to do are, it seems to me, ultimately judgments as to the means to be adopted with a view to some end that is judged to be essentially good or intrinsically valuable. And if the action is really right, it must tend towards the realization of the greatest good that it is possible for a given individual under given conditions to promote. The idea of value is an ultimate conception or category of human thought. Like other ultimate conceptions, it cannot be defined or explained in a way which shall be intelligible or satisfactory to minds destitute of the idea. "The absolute end," "the end which it is reasonable to pursue," "that which has value," "that which it is right to promote," "that which has intrinsic worth," and "that which we approve," are synonyms for the term "good." The clearness with which he expresses this idea of the unanalysable character of "the good" is one great merit of the late Professor Sidgwick's ethical writings, and that idea has recently received an impressive restatement in Mr. Moore's *Principia Ethica*—all the more valuable on account of Mr. Moore's repudiation of Hedonism; though I can only describe as preposterous Mr. Moore's claim that the idea of an indefinable good was an original discovery of Henry Sidgwick. Certainly it is the last claim he would have made for himself.

How can we prove that the judgment of value is essentially rational, and is not merely a mode of feeling? The task is as difficult as that of meeting the argument of a writer who should contend that the ideas one, two, three are mere feelings. The contention could only be met by a thorough examination of the whole fabric of knowledge; in short, by a refutation of Sensationalism in all its forms from the time of Heraclitus to that of Hume or of Professor James. The best way of meeting the contention in a limited space will be simply to try and make plain what we mean by the assertion that Morality is rational: and this may perhaps best be done by asking what difference it makes whether we regard moral judgments as truly rational, or put them down as mere modes

of feeling, and then going on to remove some of the misconceptions which have prevented the recognition of this truth.

(a) Feeling is essentially a subjective thing. When I say that a doctor's gown is red, and a colour-blind man says that it is green or grey, neither of us is in the wrong. It really is as much a fact that it is green to him as that it is red to me and other normal-sighted persons. If, therefore, the proposition "this is right" means merely this gives certain persons a particular kind of feeling called a feeling of approbation, the same act may be right and wrong at the same time. A bull-fight excites lively feelings of approbation in most Spaniards, and lively feelings of disapprobation in most Englishmen. From the "moral sense" point of view neither of them is in the wrong. True, you may insist with the Moral Sense writers on the specific, *sui generis* character of the idea of moral approbation; but (since Hume) it ought to be evident that the merely specific character of a feeling can be no ground for assigning it a superiority over any other feeling. It may give me a disagreeable twinge of the Moral Sense to tell a lie, but, if I happen to prefer putting up with a feeling of disapprobation to the pains of the rack, no possible reason can be given why I should not follow my own bent and accuse an innocent man to the relief of my own pain. The only kind of objectivity which a Moral Sense theory can give to the ethical judgment is by an appeal to public opinion. You may mean by a bad act an act which causes feelings of disapprobation in the majority. From this point of view it becomes evident that (as Hume explicitly taught*) acts are not approved because they are moral: they are moral because they are approved. And from this position it must follow that a man who is in advance of public opinion is, *eo ipso*, immoral. Of course constructive Moralists of the Moral Sense School, like Hutcheson, would not accept this conclusion. They really

* Cf. Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, p. 150 sq.

regarded the Moral Sense as a feeling which merely recognised a quality in good action which is really there independently of the individual's feeling about it. But if I know that the moral sense feeling is intrinsically superior to the feeling of a whole skin and easy nerves, it is not the feeling to which I am really appealing, but a judgment about the feeling which claims universal validity, which asserts something more than the fact of the feeling, and which cannot be got out of the feeling as such. I imply the existence in my mind of an absolute ideal which, though its materials are derived from experience, is not simply created by experience. It is not because I have a feeling of approbation in doing a kind act that I judge it ought to be done, but because I judge that such a feeling is one which I ought to have and to respect.

Now, is it not the fact that our moral judgments do claim this universal validity? When I pronounce an act right or wrong, an end good or bad, do I not mean something more than that I happen to approve it? The very core of the moral consciousness is the conviction that things are right or wrong in themselves, whether I, or even any number of human bipeds, think so or not. I mean that moral laws possess objective truth just like the laws of Mathematics or the physical laws of nature, and that anybody who thinks them to be other than what they are is in error, just as much as the man who thinks that fire does not burn. If anyone likes to say that this idea is a delusion, there is no final answer to this or any other kind of scepticism; but there is as much reason for thinking that the distinction between good and evil is part of the ultimate nature of things as for thinking that two and two make four, or that for every change there must be a sufficient reason. We have no means of proving the validity of any part of our thought except by showing that we cannot help thinking so.

(b) What then are the misunderstandings which hinder the recognition of so obvious a truth over and above those general sensationalistic arguments to which Kant and his followers are

usually thought to have constructed an unanswerable reply? One of these misunderstandings is of so naïf a character that I am ashamed of having to point it out. It is astounding to find an eminent teacher of Ethics like the late Professor Gizycki insisting that, if ethical truth were a matter of the intellect, the most intellectual man would be the best man, as if the man who knew what was right necessarily did it, or as if there were no variety or specialisation in intellectual capacity.* Just as there are eminent classical scholars who are incapable of understanding a proposition of Euclid, so there have been men of genius who have been almost destitute of the ideas of good and evil, right and wrong; while persons of small intellectual capacity in other respects may have this particular side of their intellectual nature highly developed.

(c) Another misunderstanding is that to claim objective validity for the moral judgment is to claim personal infallibility for the individual moral consciousness. When I maintain that this act is right, I may be wrong unquestionably; I may have grave doubts about the matter myself. But I do mean that, *if* I am right in asserting it to be right, you cannot also be right in maintaining that it is wrong. The diversities of ethical ideal no more destroy the objectivity of the moral judgment than the fact that a boy may do a sum wrong undermines the objectivity of the multiplication table, or than history is proved to be a merely subjective affair because the earlier chapters of our Greek histories are re-written every ten years or so.

(d) A more serious line of objection is reached when we come to the plea that the moral judgment is closely connected with feeling and emotion, that people seem to fail in moral discrimination as well as in moral practice, not so much from want of an abstract category of thought or the power of

* *Student's Manual of Ethical Philosophy*, adapted from the German by Stanton Coit, Ph.D., p. 87.

employing it, as from want of sympathy, feeling, emotion of one kind or another. I think it ought to be admitted that ethical Rationalists have very inadequately stated the closeness of the connection between ethical judgment and various modes of feeling. In the first place, ethical Rationalism has been discredited by Kant's attempt to make not merely the form but the content of the moral law *a priori* or independent of experience. If the moral judgment is essentially a judgment of value, I must have experience not merely of the means which will promote a certain end, but of the end itself, before I can pronounce whether that end is good. No experience could tell me whether an end is good if I had not the category of good or value. Feeling assures me that sugar is pleasant, but sensation will not tell me that pleasure is good, as is shown by the fact that some people who know very well what pleasure is deny that it is good. But I must have the experience before I can pass the judgment, though the judgment asserts something more than the fact of the experience. I cannot tell whether listening to the music of Wagner is good until I have heard enough of Wagner's music to know what sort of music it is. Not only is experience necessary to pronouncing the moral judgment, but, though I do not hold that feeling (abstracted from will and from knowledge) is the only thing which possesses value, I do think it may be maintained that some kind of feeling must be an element in any state of consciousness to which we can assign ultimate value. Undoubtedly feeling is an element in all states of consciousness, and it seems to me as unreasonable to attempt to make abstraction of the feeling side of consciousness in pronouncing upon its value, as to make the opposite mistake of attending to nothing but feeling. Sometimes the feeling which I judge valuable may be a mere ordinary feeling of pleasure and pain. I cannot judge that it is wrong to stick a pin into my neighbour unless I know that pain is bad, and I cannot judge that without some personal experience of what pain is. It would be impossible to convince

a feelingless intelligence that the act was wrong. I might say "it is wrong because it hurts": such an intelligence would reply—"Hurts! what is that?" And this question would admit of no reply. But sometimes the feeling which constitutes the value of an act is not mere pleasure or pain, but some particular kind of emotion; and here the judgment will not be made by a man who had not experienced that emotion, or something sufficiently analogous to it, to enable him to understand what it is. We judge infanticide to be wrong in part because it checks those feelings of humanity and family affection to which we attribute a high value. A man who had never experienced any such feelings could not assign value to them, and consequently could not (apart from authority) judge that infanticide is wrong. It is here that the Moral Sense position seems nearest to the truth. Its mistake lies, as it seems to me (as regards this particular class of judgment) in not distinguishing between the feelings which may be excited by an act or result from it, and the judgment that such feelings have value.

The arguments which I have used in support of the idea that the moral judgment is the work of Reason and not of feeling are old and threadbare enough, but they seem to me never to have been satisfactorily met by the numerous writers who are now trying to place Ethics upon a "purely psychological" foundation. I do not understand what this means if it does not mean the reduction of moral judgments to modes of feeling. At bottom the whole movement represents merely a recrudescence of the old Moral Sense theory—a recrudescence for which no doubt the exaggerations and one-sidedness of ethical Rationalists and metaphysical Moralists are largely responsible. But in one respect the recent psychological Moralists do exhibit an advance upon the older and cruder school of naturalistic Ethics. Writers like Höffding do admit as a psychological fact the existence of a distinctive idea of moral obligation, and do not attempt to reduce it to a mere fear of ancestral ghosts or the like. Professor Simmel, the

most original of recent ethical writers, even calls the idea of duty a category, though he treats the content of the category as derived wholly from psychological—that is to say, non-rational—processes. This seems to me as impossible a position as to contend that we have indeed a category of number, but that we are absolutely incapable of counting correctly. To insist upon the enormous extent to which our ethical judgments are in point of fact swayed by custom, passion, prejudice, and a thousand non-rational influences—a task which Simmel has performed with extraordinary penetration—does not show that those influences can never be corrected by deliberate efforts at ethical thinking, any more than the objectivity of our mathematical judgments is brought into question by the undoubted fact that the estimate which a reporter will form of the numbers present at a political meeting may be materially swayed by the extent of his sympathy with its objects.

III.

What, then, may we infer from the existence of these objective ethical judgments as to the constitution of the Universe? What, in other words, is the relation of Ethics to Metaphysics? Are there such things as metaphysical postulates of Ethics? I believe that there are.

I should not fall behind any champion of what is sometimes called in a polemical sense “ethical thought” in asserting the “independence” of the moral judgment. The judgment “this end has value, therefore I should promote it” is a judgment which does not by itself contain any explicit reference to any particular belief about the Universe, or its origin, or its destiny. It is assuredly made, to some extent understood, and unreservedly acted upon, by persons of the most diverse theological or metaphysical creeds, or of none. But it does not follow that what is implied in that judgment can justify itself on reflection, or that the validity of the judgment can be defended without making certain assumptions. Even physical

science has its metaphysical postulates, though distinguished men of science may be ignorant of them or deny them.

I will not insist on the implications of the moral judgment as to the nature of the self. That we are capable of self-determination, that action really does spring from character, is a proposition which is hardly likely to be denied by anyone who professes to attribute objective validity to the idea of moral obligation or moral value. At all events I have no time to dwell on that side of the matter. But it is otherwise with metaphysical postulates about the ultimate nature of the Universe in general. There are persons who appear to think that the idea of an absolute objective validity in our moral judgments can be reconciled with any view, or with the absence of any view, as to the ultimate nature of the world; though at the present day such a position is rarely defended by professed Metaphysicians. Those whose metaphysical creed does not supply the requisite basis for the assertion of such an objective validity have for the most part frankly given up the idea, however unwilling they may be to admit that such a surrender need have any injurious effect upon practical morality.

The question which I wish to raise, then, is what are the metaphysical postulates of that belief in the objectivity of the moral law which appears to me to be a clear and unmistakeable datum of the moral consciousness. Now, with regard to matters of ordinary scientific knowledge, there are undoubtedly metaphysical positions which really destroy the objective validity of our scientific beliefs, but that tendency is for the most part not apparent to those who hold those positions.* No one (be he Materialist, Sensationalist, Empiricist, or what not) is likely to admit that he feels any difficulty in distinguishing

* I am not now thinking of writers like Mr. Bradley, who avowedly deny, in an ultimate metaphysical sense, that any part of our knowledge reveals the true nature of Reality. Such views do not either practically or logically affect their attitude towards ordinary human knowledge of matters of fact.

between objective truth and his private ideas. Interpret it how we like, we all of us have to recognise that there is an objective world, and that our ideas are true or false according as they do or do not correspond with that reality. If a man supposes that he can "cloy the hungry edge of appetite with bare imagination of a feast," the refutation of his error is not far to seek. He tries the experiment, and he is hungry still; he persists, and he dies. But it is not so with moral reality. The very heart of our ethical belief is that there is such a thing as moral reality, but such a reality unfortunately can be and is both speculatively denied and practically ignored. But if our moral ideas are to possess any objective validity, there must be such a thing as moral reality. And yet what sort of existence has this moral reality? If a physical law may possibly (though the supposition is by no means free from difficulty) be supposed to reside *in* material things—in things as they are apart from knowledge,—a moral law surely can not. A moral law, dealing wholly with the question what we ought to think, can hardly be supposed to exist except in and for a mind. In what mind then does the moral law reside? Our moral ideals differ, and in no human mind now existing upon the earth can it be supposed that the true moral ideal in all its fulness has taken up its abode. If the moral ideal is not to be reduced to a mere aspiration, a mere creature of the imagination, it must be shown to spring from the same source or have its being in the same ground as all other reality, and that can only be if Reality is ultimately spiritual. No theory of the Universe can give an adequate account of this moral objectivity except one that is idealistic, or, at the least, spiritualistic. Personally I cannot understand a non-materialistic view of the Universe which is not idealistic in the fullest and most thorough-going sense of the word; but I admit that, for ethical purposes, all that we want is that Reality should be present to and willed by a universal Mind, even if we do not go on to say that the part or aspect of the Reality which we call physical is constituted by

its presence to that mind. I must be content with this bare sketch of the old-fashioned arguments which support the old-fashioned position that the existence of God is a postulate of Morality.

It seems, then, that we have as much right to assume that our moral ideas must be valid for God as well as man, as we have for assuming that for God as well as man two and two make four and two straight lines cannot enclose a space. Our moral ideas like our other ideas must be regarded as more or less adequate revelations of the divine standard of values—just as our ideas about Nature are true when, and in proportion as, we see Nature as God sees it. And if so, we must regard them as expressing the ultimate end towards which the whole course of Nature is directed. While the term “moral” is no doubt generally used to express goodness in the form which it assumes for a being in whom there are conflicting impulses at variance with the good, there will be no real objection to describing God as moral. At all events He is good, and when we call Him good we use the word in the same sense in which we use it when we apply the term to a good man. We mean that he wills ends which have value, and wills them in proportion to their value.

IV.

I will now glance, in the utterly inadequate way for which alone I have time, at some of the objections which have been raised to the view which I have taken as to the relation of God to Morality. In some quarters the expression “super-moral” applied to God or the Absolute (for by the writers I have in view God and the Absolute are usually identified) means simply that Morality indicates goodness in the form which it assumes for a being in whom the good will has to struggle with conflicting tendencies such as we cannot reasonably suppose to exist in God. In that sense Kant distinguished between a moral and a holy will, though he never hesitated to

call God a moral being. But in many writers of the present day this phrase means something much more than this. It is used to imply that we are not justified in thinking of God in terms of our highest moral ideals at all; that we cannot call God morally good, or assume that his ends are those which we pronounce good; that what we call evil is merely apparently evil, and that from the point of view of the Absolute—that is to say, the point of view of true and absolute knowledge of the Universe as a whole—it would be seen that qualities of character and kinds of action which we condemn as bad are really in their place (that is to say, in the measure and degree to which they actually exist) conducive to the goodness and perfection of the whole, just as much so as the qualities and actions which we call good, so that a sin or a pain the less would make the world less perfect. I must not now stay to distinguish between the different senses and shades of meaning which are given to this doctrine by different writers. I will only say that in all its forms it seems to me to involve one fatal difficulty. Either we are entitled to trust to our moral judgments, or we are not. If we are, it is meaningless to say that what we condemn as cruelty and baseness are really, if we could only see it, as much contributions to the beauty and perfection of the whole as the love or the truthfulness which we approve as good. If we are not entitled to trust to these judgments, what is the meaning of calling God or the Absolute good? To say that the evil of the world is the necessary means to a greater good, and that there could not be so much good on the whole if the evil were not there, is a proposition which I can understand; but all the same, if we are to trust to our judgments of value, the world would be still better without those evil elements—the pain and the sin and the ugliness which are actually there. To pronounce that cruelty in its place is good is as much a judgment of value as my judgment that the world contains some things which are bad, though they may be means to a greater good. To take the abstract category of good and

declare that this has absolute and objective validity, while all the particular judgments in which the category is employed in our actual thinking are merely subjective, appears to be as unreasonable as it would be to say that the category of Quantity was absolutely valid, but that in the Absolute there are wholes which are not greater than their parts. It is a particular instance of that tendency to make the reality of things consist in an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories," which in other directions is now for the most part abandoned.

Of course, our conception of the absolute end is inadequate. The Universe may have many ends of which we know nothing. There might be for beings differently organised a form of Art which is neither Music nor Painting nor Sculpture nor Poetry, nor any other form which our present experience can suggest. Our judgments of value are not discredited because we cannot pronounce upon the value of forms of experience which we do not know. Of course, too, our judgments of value must be often wrong in detail. We can no more say to what extent they are inadequate than we can say how far any other judgments of ours fall short of absolute truth. Through ignorance of the means we may judge particular actions to be wrong (*i.e.*, not conducive to the greatest attainable good on the whole), which fuller knowledge would show to be really right. Even as to ends, the ideal of any individual is, no doubt, inadequate; our judgments as to the relative value of ends is probably only an approximation to the truth, as is suggested by the actual differences between the ideals of good and enlightened men. But in proportion as our judgments become more general, more confident, more unanimous, more self-consistent, we have as much right to think them valid for the Absolute as we have to hold that the best established results of Science represent—in spite of the necessary abstraction involved in all scientific thought—truth about the ultimate nature of things. There may be a sense in which the law of universal gravitation can be called abstract and one-sided;

in that sense our moral ideals may be imperfect and abstract; but to say that in the Absolute our judgment that nothing can possibly make cruelty and pain good must be reversed and contradicted, would be like saying that in the Absolute the denial of Universal Gravitation is as true as its affirmation.

This line of argument seems to me to apply to all forms of the doctrine of a super-moral sphere. I must now briefly notice one or two of the special arguments employed in favour of it by particular writers. And in the first place there comes Mr. Bradley's famous doctrine of the contradiction involved in our actual moral judgments. It requires some courage to say—and yet I do not think my profound respect for Mr. Bradley's brilliant work should prevent my saying it—that to my mind this allegation turns mainly upon the neglect of a very simple distinction. Our moral ideals, we are told, are riddled with contradictions because our moral consciousness pronounces that self-sacrifice and self-realisation are both good, and yet sometimes—no matter how seldom—we cannot pursue one of these ideals without running counter to the other. Now this allegation seems to me to turn upon a neglect of the important distinction between the right and the good. If our Moral Consciousness did, indeed, pronounce that self-realisation and self-sacrifice were both right for the same individual in the same circumstances, it would no doubt be self-contradictory enough. But it involves no contradiction to say that both of them are good—even if we said that *all* self-sacrifice and *all* self-realisation are good, though it is quite clear to me personally that, unless the words are understood in some very artificial sense, some kinds of both are bad. To say that two things are good, though sometimes you cannot have both, involves no contradiction; for what our practical Reason tells us is not merely to promote good but to promote the greatest good on the whole. If by self-realisation is meant realisation of the good capacities of human nature, a limit to self-realisation is imposed by the value of the good of which other men are

capable, and that limitation both imposes some sacrifice on the individual and limits the extent to which such self-sacrifice is reasonable. To say that it is always right to produce the greatest good on the whole involves, so far as I can discover, no contradiction whatever.

It will be suggested, no doubt, that I am here overlooking that doctrine of degrees of Truth and Reality by which the doctrine of the non-morality of the Absolute is qualified. I will not deny that that doctrine might possibly be stated in such a way as to admit the principle for which I am contending. But I am quite clear that that doctrine, as interpreted by Mr. Bradley, does not remove the objections which I have urged. Mr. Bradley admits that to say that the Absolute was immoral or bad would be more untrue than to say that he is moral or good. And there are many strong assertions of the goodness of the Absolute side by side with the denial of his or "its" morality. I ask on what Mr. Bradley's handsome testimonial to the goodness or perfection of the Absolute is supposed to rest, when the verdict of our own moral consciousness is discredited? To say that our moral judgments fail to some extent to correspond with the moral judgments as they are in the Absolute* is one thing; but to say that we can correct their deficiencies is another. And it is the last that Mr. Bradley attempts to do when he pronounces what we call evil to be really good. To admit the probability that our ideals are defective is one thing: to attempt their correction by directly contradicting them is another. To declare that the judgment cruelty is bad must in the Absolute be transformed into the judgment "cruelty to the exact extent to which it actually exists is good," is not merely to pronounce that our moral

* Mr. Bradley, of course, will not admit there are judgments at all in the Absolute. This is too wide a subject to discuss here; but, at all events, he will admit that we cannot think about the Absolute without talking as though there were.

judgments are inadequate and are "somehow" transcended in the Absolute, but dogmatically to say that they are false and that others, which are admitted not to commend themselves to our actual moral consciousness, are true. Any inadequacy, or doubt, or invalidity that may cleave to the former judgment must cleave surely *a fortiori* to the last.

And on what does the supposed intellectual necessity for this reversal of all our canons of value turn? Upon an ideal of our thought. Why should this intellectual ideal of self-consistency or harmony be regarded as a safer guide to the true nature of things than that ideal of Morality which claims in us to be of absolute and objective validity, and so to represent the true end of a rational will? There can be no real "harmony" or "perfection," or absence of contradiction, in any picture or ideal or system of the Universe in which our highest ideals of value are flatly contradicted.

The only way in which, as it seems to me, Mr. Bradley could escape the force of these objections, would be by absolutely giving up the use of the terms good and evil in thinking of the Absolute, and cancelling all that he has said about the goodness of the Absolute, and, I must add, all that he has said about the intrinsic reasonableness of the Universe; for a reasonable Universe means a Universe which realises ends that are intrinsically good, and it is only from our judgments of value that we know anything about goodness or indeed about ends. And on one side of his thought Mr. Bradley certainly goes very near to an avowed adoption of this position. When Mr. Bradley pronounces the Absolute good, we naturally suppose him to mean something by the assertion; but eventually, in the last paragraph of his book, he comes near to admitting that he means nothing by it. For there he tells us that "the Reality is our criterion of worse and better, of ugliness and beauty, of true and false, of real and unreal. It, in brief, decides between, and gives a general meaning to,

higher and lower."* If, then, the real is our sole criterion of worth, if a thing is good in proportion to the amount of real being in it, the assertion that the Absolute is good means no more than the assertion that the Absolute is real. Now for us it is quite certain that the word good does not mean the same as real, unless Mr. Bradley chooses, by definition, to make the word real include our idea of good. If it be said that in the Absolute this difference is to be transcended, at all events our idea of good must be allowed to represent as important an aspect of the Absolute as our idea of real. It must not be simply cancelled, as is done when it is suggested that in or for the Absolute cruelty is good.

V.

But whatever reply the doctrine of degrees of Truth and Reality may be supposed to contain to such criticisms as I have ventured to make on this doctrine of a super-moral Absolute, that qualification is entirely absent from the treatment of the subject in Professor Taylor's *Problem of Conduct*,† a work of which I desire to speak with sincere respect.

There the contradiction between the human and ethical point of view and the super-moral or absolute point of view is treated as absolute and unmitigated. From the point of view of the Absolute sin and wickedness, pain and wretchedness, are not simply good: they are, it would appear, *as good as* pleasure and goodness. Virtue was never lauded in a pæan of more enthusiastic eloquence than that in which Professor Taylor sings the praises of wickedness.‡ Against such a position the objections on which I have insisted seem to me to tell with their full weight. If our moral judgments are not merely

* *Appearance and Reality*, p. 552.

† I refer here only to *The Problem of Conduct*. In his more recent *Elements of Metaphysic* the doctrine of degrees upon which his whole metaphysical position is based is to some extent brought into connection with ethics.

‡ *The Problem of Conduct*, p. 473.

(as they are to Mr. Bradley) riddled with contradictions, and so very inadequate and untrustworthy presentments of Reality, but purely and unmitigatedly subjective, what reason has Professor Taylor for pronouncing that the Universe as a whole is perfectly good? Mr. Bradley has never denied that moral judgments are rational; he has not even denied them a kind of objectivity; Professor Taylor has reduced them to modes of feeling. This seems to follow from the declaration (p. 104) that our moral judgments are simply "feelings of approval and disapproval," while it is further admitted that "to say that I approve such and such an action or quality is in fact to say that when I imagine its entrance into the course of my future experience my state of mind is a pleasant one" (p. 124). Yet if the idea of value is not a category of thought, what can be meant by the judgment that the world is perfectly good on the whole? What can "good" in such a connection mean? For Professor Taylor it ought only to mean that it excites a particular kind of feeling in the genus homo or some of its members. But Professor Taylor admits that it does not excite this feeling in him, for to him as a man sin and pain appear bad. On what ground then can he pronounce that for the Absolute or in the Absolute they appear good? If goodness be merely a feeling, why should we suppose that the Absolute shares the peculiar mode of human feeling which we style moral; or if we do think that the Absolute shares these human emotions, or something analogous to them, why should we suppose that they are excited in Him by different courses of action to those which excite them in us? To oppose to our deliberate judgments of value an *a priori* construction about the requirements of absolute harmony and the like in a perfect or absolute or "pure" experience, seems to me to put mere intellectual aspirations in place of the rational interpretation of actual experience. Two further criticisms may be made against Professor Taylor's argument which cannot be urged against Mr. Bradley:—

(1) He does not share Mr. Bradley's view that all self-realisation and all self-sacrifice are good. Nobody has criticised this side of Mr. Bradley's doctrine with more acuteness than Professor Taylor himself. He does not deny that in ordinary cases the moral consciousness is quite equal to the task of pronouncing that here self-sacrifice would be right and there wrong. His denial of objectivity to the moral judgment is apparently based solely on the existence of hard cases in which no one will trust very confidently to his own solution of the casuistical problem, or severely condemn those who solve it differently. The existence of such cases no more shows that there is not a solution which would commend itself to a perfectly rational intelligence endowed with perfect knowledge of the facts, than the higher Mathematics are proved to be a purely subjective affair by the existence of mathematical problems which no one could solve but the late Professor Cayley, and of others which await the solution of future Cayleys.

(2) Another difficulty of Professor Taylor's is that the details of human duty—the Seventh Commandment for instance—depend upon the physiological structure of human beings, and could not be supposed to be the same for a being of different constitution. I really think Professor Taylor might have given his opponents credit for having contemplated and dealt with so simple an objection. The objectivity of our moral judgments even in detail is not destroyed by the fact that duties are relative to the constitution of the species, just as they are relative to the circumstances of individual persons. When I say that the Seventh Commandment possesses objective validity, I mean that every intelligence which thinks truly must recognise that it is the right course of action for beings physiologically and psychologically constituted as we are. Moreover, these details of duty must in the last resort be dependent upon general principles of action or canons of value which are valid for all beings and all circumstances. The

proposition that the love of husband for wife in an ideal marriage is one of the noblest things in the Universe is not shaken by the fact that the lower animals are incapable of it, and that superior beings (to say nothing of God himself) may be above it. And this particular judgment depends upon the judgment which asserts the supreme value of love in general—a judgment which, I should contend, is of objective validity and quite independent of the structure of particular individuals or of the societies to which they belong.

I quite recognise, of course, that in taking up the position which I have criticised, Professor Taylor has no intention of practically disparaging morality and moral obligation. Mr. Taylor has, indeed, a practical insight into ethical questions not always found in Moral Philosophers. But after all man is a rational being, and I do not believe that this sharp conflict between what a man believes as a man and what he believes as a philosopher is one which can permanently be kept up. Of course, we have always the assurance to fall back upon that in the Absolute all is perfect harmony and order. The whole of Professor Taylor's system is based upon the necessity of satisfying an intellectual need for harmony: what I submit is that that system conspicuously fails to satisfy one of the most imperative of intellectual needs—the demand for objective validity in our moral judgments, the demand that some sort of harmony shall be established between our ethical judgments and our beliefs about the Universe.

In justice to Mr. Taylor I ought to say that the attitude which he adopts towards morality in his *Elements of Metaphysic* seems to me materially different from that taken up in the *Problem of Conduct*. He is there willing even to accept (doubtless with reserves and apologies) the idea that one side of the Absolute's nature may be expressed by the word Love, and generally appears—not merely in his character as a man, but also as a Philosopher—to interpret the nature of the Absolute

in terms of our moral ideals. How he reconciles these assertions with the position taken up in his earlier work I am at a loss to discern. I will only add (because it has a bearing upon a problem on which we have not yet touched) that the optimism of the former work seems to be much qualified. It would now appear that reality is only "good on the whole," and that it is not better, because that would be impossible. These propositions, with which I for one should not be disposed to quarrel, seem to me quite different from the through and through perfection which, in the *Problem of Conduct*, is ascribed not merely to the world as a whole, but to everything in it.

VI.

I will briefly notice one more form assumed by the doctrine of a super-moral sphere. I do so especially because in this form the doctrine is not merely not identical with the views which we have been examining, but constitutes the best of all possible replies to those views.* Von Hartmann believes in a super-moral sphere, but no one has ever grasped with more clearness or asserted with more vigour the idea of an objectively valid Morality. He sees that the very meaning of "moral" is "conducive to the true ultimate end of the Universe." He recognises, therefore, that, though the acts which we call moral are different, in detail and even in principle, from those willed by the Absolute Will, they do really (in the circumstances of human nature) make for the true end of the Universe. Morality is no deception or delusion, as it practically becomes in the more exaggerated of Professor Taylor's statements, and as (in spite of all his protests to the contrary) it tends to become in some of the many phases of Mr. Bradley's thought. When the Absolute makes us think that a bad act of ours will hinder the attainment of the good, he is not (according to von Hartmann)

* These views are expressed partly, of course, in the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, but more fully in *Das sittliche Bewusstsein* and the shorter and more recent *Ethische Studien*.

in any sort or sense deceiving us. The Absolute is telling us what is absolutely and strictly the truth. A bad act may, no doubt, in some cases and to some extent, promote the absolute end, but not so much as a good act would have done in the like circumstances. Von Hartmann has thus no difficulty in answering that question to which no consistent Optimist has ever succeeded in providing a satisfactory answer: "If no bad act of mine can in the smallest degree diminish the perfection of the Universe, if that deed, just because it is actually done, is shown to be conducive to that end, why not continue in sin that grace may abound?" The arbitrariness of von Hartmann's position appears only when he assumes that for the Absolute the true end must be something so very different from that which we think it to be. Hedonism has no more vigorous and no more reasonable critic than von Hartmann, so long as he is dealing with the end for man, and the end for man is a means to the ultimate end. And yet the end for the Absolute is merely Well-being hedonistically understood; but, since consciousness necessarily involves pain, Well-being for the Absolute must mean simply the cessation of this pain, and with it of consciousness. How our moral struggles are going to appease the pain of the Absolute, von Hartmann has never (so far as I can find) succeeded in explaining; nor do I see why we should go on toiling and suffering to relieve the sufferings which the Unconscious Absolute caused by that great crime or blunder which it (in von Hartmann's view) committed by the creation of the world, and with it of a consciousness in which pain necessarily predominates over pleasure. But these are the difficulties not of von Hartmann's ethical theory, but of his Pessimism and of his peculiar view of an Absolute who is not merely super-moral, but actually, though only occasionally and at rare intervals, irrational. Von Hartmann professes to admit the objective validity of our moral judgments, and yet he does not consistently carry out his own creed. If our ethical judgments are true, the true end of the Universe must be one

that satisfies our moral ideal. To relieve the sufferings of an immoral Absolute who (it might be contended) suffers no more than he deserves, does not present itself to me as a worthy or rational end of action. If a frank acceptance of that principle of ethical objectivity on which von Hartmann insists cannot be reconciled with his metaphysical system, it is that system, and not the doctrine of ethical objectivity, or, to put it in popular language, absolute moral obligation, which ought to be modified.

I am not a Pessimist, but I have much sympathy with von Hartmann's polemic against the unqualified Optimism which is generally fashionable in philosophical circles. I have already indicated, however briefly and inadequately, the reasons for my belief in a God who wills the same ends which our moral consciousness reveals to us—inadequately, imperfectly, no doubt, but still not in a fundamentally erroneous or misleading manner. Why, then, does human life, as we know it, not come up to those ideals? I see but one answer, which is really the answer of all the Theologies and all the Theodicies, except those which flatly invalidate and contradict our actual moral judgments—and that is lack of power in the Will that wills the Universe to attain the good without some measure of evil. Even to believe that the Universe is good on the whole, that it attains more good on the whole than evil—enough good to justify its existence,—imperatively (to my mind) demands the postulate of a future life in which the ideals of Goodness and Beauty, Knowledge and Happiness, so imperfectly realized here, may be more fully attained. But even that belief will not alter the fact that the Universe is less good than it would have been had the good been attainable without the evil. That no better Universe was possible does not alter that fact. You will say this is limiting God. In a sense it is, but only in a sense in which, avowedly or unavowedly, all Theologies, orthodox and unorthodox, have limited Him, except those by which good is interpreted to mean simply that which a powerful will decrees. It is not

limiting God from the outside. He is limited only by his own nature. He is infinite, if you like, because He is limited by nothing outside Himself except the beings which owe their beginning and their continuance from moment to moment to an act of his own will, and who with him constitute the system which we call Reality, or if you like it, the Absolute. But in one way or another you *must* limit God; either you must limit His goodness or you must limit His power, wholly inadequate as a term like Power may well be to express the full truth of the matter. The hypothesis of a God of limited goodness but unlimited power is refuted, to my mind, by the existence of our Moral Ideals. I admit that the idea of a God who makes the world or his own appearances in order that he may enjoy the fun, or if you please the high æsthetic pleasure, of witnessing our generally blundering and futile efforts to realize ideals which he sees through, hardly admits of speculative refutation. I can only say that it seems to me merely a form of arbitrary and gratuitous scepticism. The natural inference from our actual ideals and our actual experience is the belief in a God who wills the good (as we inadequately and imperfectly know it) but does not wholly attain it. That is the natural inference from the deliverances of our moral consciousness; and, if I am to doubt the evidence of my own moral consciousness, I do not see what ground I have for believing anything else, including the Philosophies which discredit it. And, therefore, to the other postulates of an objective Morality I should like to add this one—the negation of an unqualified Optimism. Morality is a delusion if it is not true that a good act of mine furthers the true end of the Universe, while a bad one really retards it or forwards it less than a good act, if such had been possible, would have done.* In the words of von Hartmann, “ohne Objectivität, keine Moral.”

* Sometimes Mr. Bradley appears to admit this, sometimes to deny it. Doubtless he would say that both statements were aspects of the truth. The question is whether they can intelligibly be held together.

The pages of recent Philosophies are full of the praises of a Religion which transcends, contradicts, proclaims its splendid indifference to "mere Morality." That such kinds of Religion have existed, and do exist, I do not doubt. They existed in the days of Lucretius, and he was not far wrong in the estimate he formed of them. That Religion of this kind has at times really invaded the Christian Church I do not dispute, though more frequently it has merely coloured the rhetoric of devotional writers. It is not the existence but the truth and the value of such Religionism that I dispute. That Theologians as well as Philosophers have sometimes landed themselves in an anti-moral Optimism through their fondness for paying empty and unmeaning compliments to God or to the Absolute, I do not deny. But I do maintain that the Philosophers simply travesty the religious consciousness, both in its normal and in its highest forms, when they represent it as proclaiming that evil has already for the religious man no existence, and so on. The heart of the religious faith in all ages, as I understand it, is the belief that "good shall be the final goal of ill." To my mind that is a more stimulating faith than the other as well as a more reasonable one.

VII.

I am quite aware how incomplete such a paper as the present must be in the absence of a metaphysical discussion of that question as to the relation of knowledge to Reality which lies at the root of the whole matter. On that supreme question I will only make one remark. That all our human knowledge is inadequate to express the whole nature of the ultimate Reality will be universally admitted by Metaphysicians of all schools. The only question must lie in the kind and the degree of the inadequacy, and in the answer that is given to the enquiry how far it is possible to arrive at any clearer and more adequate knowledge of Reality by denying and seeking to "transcend," as the phrase is, distinctions which are

admittedly inherent in the very nature and constitution of human thought. Whatever may be the success of such an attempt in other directions, it has been my contention that in the ethical region at least the attempt has conspicuously failed—that the very writers who startle us with their discoveries about the non-moral character of Reality and the absolute or relative beauty of sin and misery, really employ in their thought about the relation of the real to Morality the very conceptions and ideals which they profess to discredit, and that they are arbitrary and inconsistent in using them up to a certain point and no further. The attempt to transcend, as they have made it, really involves actual contradiction, and if our moral judgments express as much of the true nature of Reality as any human judgments can do, we shall not get nearer to that nature by such contradiction.

There is one particular source of imperfection in our knowledge to which a momentary reference must be made. It will, doubtless, be contended that my argument has assumed the absolute validity of our ideas of Time. Here, too, the real problem is as to the amount and kind of inadequacy which is involved in this particular condition of human thought. What I should contend, if I had the opportunity, would be that our time-distinctions must express, however inadequately, the true nature of Reality, and that the attempt to think of Reality as out of time or timeless is certain to lead us further astray from the truth than the assertion that time-distinctions are valid, though we cannot tell in what way they present themselves to God or how far they express the full truth about Reality as a whole. If the position that Reality is out of time makes it impossible to ascribe objective validity to our judgments of value, compels us to distort and virtually contradict the ethical part of our thought, and forbids us to give its proper weight to that side of our nature in our speculative construction of ultimate Reality, that is one further objection to such theories. The doctrine of a timeless Reality makes the world's history

unmeaning and all human effort vain. The Buddhists, to whose Creed our modern believers in a timeless Absolute so often appeal, at least have the merit of admitting that corollary of their system, however much inconsistency and contradiction there may be in the anti-social ascetic's effort to escape from effort. The Western who uses this language about the vanity of all that is temporal neither believes it nor acts as if he believed it. Time and its distinctions, as we know them, may not express the whole truth about the Universe and the ultimate spiritual ground of it, but at least they must express more of it than a to us meaningless negation like timelessness. If there be any meaning in the idea of transcending time-distinctions, that meaning must be something other than that of merely negating and abolishing them, and it is only on the assumption that from the point of view of absolute knowledge time-distinctions are simply negated and abolished that the temporal character of our moral thinking can be used as an argument for denying its objective validity and the postulates which that objective validity carries with it.

II.—THE LINE OF ADVANCE IN PHILOSOPHY.

By HENRY STURT.

IT will seem unusual and perhaps even presumptuous to attempt to indicate the line along which philosophy is to develop in the immediate future. In the past thinkers have made advances without any clear notion whither they were going; and it has been left for historians to point out the logical connection of one stage with another. But I do not see why philosophy in this more self-conscious age should not advance self-consciously—why it should not choose a definite line and try to get further by it. It is rather characteristic of contemporary thinking to make such a deliberate choice, well aware that the standpoint chosen is neither all-comprehensive or final. The old philosophers were haunted by the phantom of finality; each great system-maker dreamed that his system was the term in which the human mind would at last find rest. We have flung away finality. We confess, indeed desire, that our synthesis, into which we put our best just now, may have its chief use in leading on to the ampler syntheses of the future.

The line of advance which I should like philosophy to take, and which I believe it actually will take, consists primarily in recognising more fully than hitherto the importance of striving in human experience. If this be so, the philosophy of the future will be a form of Voluntarism, but it will differ not inconsiderably from the forms of the past. The striving I have in view is not the impersonal cosmic striving of Schopenhauer and his followers, but the personal striving which is known to us by introspection and by common observation of the people around us. So far from being a blind irrational force, it has the

consciousness which belongs to human purpose, and it grows in rationality as our purposes grow clearer. And on another side the line of thought I advocate differs from a subjectivist voluntarism like that of Fichte in its view of the objective world. It accepts the scientific position that we live in a world of forces which act upon us, some of which we strive to direct to the furtherance of our own purposes.

The establishment of a philosophy of striving would amount to a revolution of English thought, because the philosophy still dominant among us is based on principles which ignore the kinetic and dynamic element in nature and man. The tendency still exists to speak of nature as though it were statical in essence, however mutable it might appear. In early thought such a tendency can be easily explained. Science is based on the discovery of uniformities in the flux of phenomena; and this predisposed the early thinkers to concentrate attention upon the uniformities, to emphasise them as the true realities, and to speak slightly of the mutable concrete facts as unreal. No less statical in reality, though in appearance recognising movement, is the dominant conception of the human spirit. We have, it is true, got rid of the wax-tablet theory which left man no function in forming his own thoughts. But are the current principles any real improvement? Professor Bosanquet's favourite phrase, the self-determination of thought, seems to countenance the Hegelian doctrine of category spinning itself out from category by an inherent necessity or immanent dialectic. Mr. Bradley's doctrine of the self-realisation of ideas seems to make the mind a mere playground for alien creatures, called ideas, to disport themselves in. Is it possible to ignore more completely the most important features of man, of his environment, and of the relation between them?

When we once have grasped the principle, so indispensable for science, that there are permanent, or at least persistent, uniformities in material nature, there is no need to shrink from recognising that, in its concrete presentation, it consists

of things constantly in motion and charged with force. Natural forces are constantly impinging on us: they destroy us if we do not react against them, and they are capable of being diverted to serve our ends. And the self, on the other hand, is not an impressionable wax-tablet or an empty playground or a chain of categories. It is a creative force, different in kind from material forces, yet capable of interacting with them: and it develops not merely logically but practically (if such an antithesis is possible) by conative interaction with the material environment and with other selves. This characteristic of striving never entirely ceases in each man's life, so long as he is fully himself: and every important concept, every important function of his nature, is penetrated by it through and through.

It is in developing the significance of striving over the whole field of thought that the advance I anticipate will be accomplished. To enunciate a wide-reaching general principle is easy enough; the great achievement is its application in detail. If Voluntarism were applied in detail it would change everything that the dominant school of thought now takes for granted. The effect of such a change would be, as I believe, to bring philosophy much nearer to reality, and to dispel that unfortunate air of paradox which has clung to philosophy for ages, but of which few understand the secret.

It may clear up still further the import of this form of voluntarism if I mention what I regard as its philosophic antecedents. The first is Idealism, as that term has been understood in Oxford for the last 40 years or so. Fluctuating as its meaning is, I think that this term means to most of us who use it nothing more dogmatically definite than that the world is to be interpreted by spirit rather than by matter. I do not use it to imply any "cheap and easy" reduction of matter to spirit; but I do imply that, if we are to have a monism, it must be spiritual, not materialistic like Haeckel's. Taking this view, I would be understood to concur with the

main points of T. H. Green's defensive argument against the naturalism of his day, by which he shows that the higher human activities in knowledge and morality exhibit a principle incapable of being resolved into what, in his language, is "merely natural." I may remark in passing that the importance of Green's work in this direction lay, not so much in providing a set demonstration of a spiritual world-view, as in dissipating the prejudice in favour of materialism which is inevitable in an age preoccupied with material science. Such a prejudice is always strong in men whose habit of thinking in material categories has not been corrected by philosophic training; but it tends to disappear when men have been trained to introspection and have come to see that material categories are inadequate to mind.

The other antecedent to which I would attach myself is the scientific doctrine of Development, with its biological formulæ of adaptation to environment, struggle for existence and survival of the fittest. The naturalists have taught us that the forms of life are not persistent, but mutable like all other mundane things; and that their mutability, though partly due to the external pressure and selection of nature, is due also to the striving of living things to maintain and extend their life. From biology the doctrine of Development has been extended into anthropology; and the extension is justifiable, since far-sighted purpose and the higher activities generally do not count for much in the sum total of savage life. But the doctrine of Development may be applied to the most spiritual elements of our life, provided always we remember that we are on a plane above biology, and that the striving which is the mainspring of the development is here far-sighted and purposeful.

To those who hold firmly both to Idealism and scientific Development, a form of Voluntarism is certainly the best solution of obvious difficulties. The late Professor Ritchie's attempt to exhibit Hegel as the "truth" of Darwin only shows

more plainly the impossibility of reconciling the non-dynamic, self-contained thought-development of Dialectic with the dynamic interaction of self and the world postulated by Science. If we take modern science seriously we must either hold that the self is the product of its selfless environment, or we must hold that the self makes its own characteristic contribution to the sum of experience. The first alternative is forbidden by Idealism, and if we accept the second we have implicitly accepted Voluntarism. The self must be regarded as a force able to play its own part in striving with the world; and, as it grows, its striving must exhibit more and more the characteristic qualities of its own nature; in other words, it must grow increasingly self-conscious and purposeful.

In philosophy, as in cookery, the proof of the pudding is in the eating; or, to return from culinary metaphor to military, the justification of a line of advance is the conquest which results from it. Now, in a short anticipatory paper like the present, conquest is not to be thought of; and my argument must therefore lack its proper proof. Nevertheless, enough work has been done recently to give an indication, however scanty, of the direction that a philosophy of striving will take.

In metaphysics I can instance the work done by Mr. Canning Schiller in his essay "Axioms as Postulates," and in certain of the essays in his *Humanism*. When Mr. Schiller says, "The world, as it now appears, was not a ready-made datum; it is the fruit of a long evolution, of a strenuous struggle . . . it is a *construction* which has been gradually achieved" (*Personal Idealism*, p. 54), he is, I believe, enunciating a principle which is true and fundamental; though opinions may differ as to the way that principle is to be carried out in detail. In logic I may refer to my own essay, "The Logic of Pragmatism" (in the third volume of these *Proceedings*, N.S.), where I have attempted to show by examination of our chief logical functions and concepts "that the logician must take due account of the active side of life if he would interpret knowledge aright." In

ethics, so far nothing of the kind has been done; and therefore I may be pardoned if I try to indicate, so far as can be done in a few sentences, the general direction which a voluntarist theory of conduct would take. In the first place it would recognise the connection, for which evolutionary moralists have contended, between morality and biological survival. Good morality has been valuable in the struggle against nature, and still more so for purposes of social co-operation. Were it otherwise it is hard to see how morality, as we know it, could ever have developed at all, or how it could maintain itself even now. But important as this is, it is hardly of the essence of the matter; for this is biological striving, not moral. It would be for the voluntarist moral philosopher to show that striving enters into the very essence of morality; that moral sentiments are kept alive only so far as they are brought into effective operation; that ideals are made by the person who has them, that they represent his working principles of conduct and change with his spiritual growth or decay; that maxims, customs and institutions bear a similar relation to the moral consciousness of society; that the end itself, the richer and better experience which morality affords, is an active energetic experience, not a quiescent blessedness; and that, in sum, the best moral life is not an affair of passive obedience, but is as much an individual creation as good poetry.

The hostile influences that oppose voluntarism may be termed comprehensively the Passive Fallacy; by which I mean the tendency to ignore the kinetic and dynamic aspect of the world and of man. To trace the rise and development of the Passive Fallacy would need a separate dissertation, but one may say shortly that it has been fostered by everything which has separated the life of study from the life of action. Normally, study and action are mutually indispensable, and the normal case of study is the attention we give to an object in preparation for operating on it. In primitive society we can hardly imagine study divorced from action; but with the rise of education and

an educating class a noticeable separation takes place. The Passive Fallacy might, indeed, be described as a disease of education. To enumerate fully all the causes of this disease would take too long, but among them may be mentioned the tendency of educators, in checking the natural precipitancy of the young, to forget that, though action should be made to wait on study, it is really the end of study; the mere professional prejudice of educators which makes them forget the subordinateness of their own speciality; the tendency of educational methods to grow obsolete, and therefore useless for practice; the difficulty of ill-educated laymen in checking educators and making them keep their teaching abreast of current utility; the preference of educators for obscure, difficult and uselessly recondite subjects as an easy mode of impressing pupils; the over-praise of docility in pupils due to the inability of educators to realise that their views can be superseded; the desire of educators to found schools of thought, due to the same tendency which makes religious thinkers desire to found churches; the minute specialisation of educators; their pre-occupation with technique; their exaggerated estimate of the historical or "record" side of knowledge (as opposed to inventiveness and originality), because it is more tangibly estimated; the liking of pupils for the same, because it is more quickly rewarded; the reaction of educators against the philistinism of the world of action, more particularly its commercial side. All these causes, more especially the last half-dozen, are intensified by the concentration of education in academic societies; but we can trace their operation even from the days of Plato, and they finally result in a most unfortunate tendency to regard the life of study or contemplation as quite distinct from and superior to the life of action.

We find the influence of the Passive Fallacy in certain wide-reaching principles which admit or encourage an anti-dynamic interpretation of the world. Of these the most notable is Intellectualism, which, beginning with a general

emphasis on the thought-element of our nature, to the neglect of the rest, culminates in Panlogism, or the reduction of every side of our nature to some form of thought. Hardly less famous, and certainly more conspicuous just at the present moment, is Absolutism, which denies that the world can change because it is divine and perfect, and merges human individuality and activity in the One-and-All, thus degrading all motion and activity to an unreal appearance of an essentially passive Absolute. A third principle of the same tendency is Subjectivism, culminating in Solipsism. It is true that some subjectivist or solipsistic thinkers, like Fichte, have emphasised strongly the active side of experience, but it is certain that they occupy an inconsistent position. For without independently real objects on which to direct our activity we must beat the void without effect; and, moreover, all the stimulus which comes from interaction with the environment—indispensable to activity as we know it—is lacking. In Hegel all three principles are combined; it is, in fact, to Hegelian influence that the Passive Fallacy mainly owes its predominance among us.

In the present position of thought and of social conditions in general there is much to favour the recognition of the Philosophy of Striving. If it be true, as I have tried to prove, that it requires the combination of Idealism with the scientific doctrine of Development, we could not have had it till those streams of thought were ready for fusion. In the days when Green's influence was predominant at Oxford they flowed like rivers that join but will not intermingle. Those who began philosophy in the eighties will remember how, in passing from, say, the *Data of Ethics* to the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, they seemed to pass into another world, and how impossible it was to bring into one focus treatises which professed to deal with the same material. The idealists had no knowledge of or sympathy with science; and the scientific men had no philosophical training. And years had to elapse before the

deficiencies on both sides could be made good. Probably this would have been effected much earlier but for the rising influence of Hegelianism, which for a time carried men's minds off in quite another direction.

And apart from the philosophic position there is in the general social condition of the time much to encourage the line of thought which I am advocating. There is a Passive Fallacy in practical conduct as in speculation, and anything that encourages us to discard the one suggests the discarding of the other. Now I hope I shall not lay myself open to the charge of optimistic exaggeration if I express the belief that the life of action is worth more and has a better chance of success just now than at most epochs in the past. The best form of striving is the realising of a fine ideal, and the chances of ideals are better than they used to be. Formerly they were Utopias, beacons lighted in a dark land, Republics that stimulated enthusiasm and imagination but never had the smallest chance of getting realised. Such ideals have a valuable, indeed a priceless, function; but even more encouraging to exertion are ideals which can be realised, of which, in the spheres of religion, politics and social improvement, there are no despicable number at the present time. And hence it results that practice, so to speak, is getting more and more mixed with ideality. A philosophy of striving is likely to be increasingly acceptable to a society in which striving for good objects is common and has no small chance of success.

III.—SELF-INTROSPECTION.

By W. R. BOYCE GIBSON.

"Cogito, ergo sum."—DESCARTES.

"This principle of experience carries with it the unspeakably important condition that, in order to accept and believe any fact, we must be in contact with it ; or, in more exact terms, that we must find the fact united and combined with the certainty of our own selves. We must be in touch with our subject-matter, whether it be by means of our external senses, or, else, by our profounder mind and our intimate self-consciousness."—HEGEL, *Logic* (Tr. Wallace, 2nd ed.) p. 12.

"For Kant, the moral consciousness . . . is a consciousness of ourselves as universal subjects, and not as particular objects."—E. CAIRD, *Hegel*, p. 118.

AMONG psychological problems none is more fundamental than the problem of Introspection. Observation is the beginning of knowledge, and the character of the latter will be essentially determined by the character of the former. It is, therefore, of supreme importance that we should keep clearly distinct in our mind three radically different ways of observing, and endeavour to realise for ourselves the true significance of each. We may, firstly, observe objects in their relations with each other ; this is the form of observation characteristic of all the natural sciences. This form of observation we might suitably term sense-perception. It is our habitual mode of observing the world in which we live and move. Secondly, we may observe objects in their relation to ourselves as observers. This form of observation we may call Sensory Introspection. In Sensory Introspection I am interested not in the object perceived, and its objective behaviour, but in the object *as* perceived. This point of view is habitual with the Artist, for instance, and with the Psychologist as analyst of his own sensations. From the point of view of sense-perception, our friend when he stands at the door is the same in every respect as

when, in the same attitude still, he stands at our side. From the point of view of sensory introspection of the visual kind, he is enormously increased in size, and this perspective effect the artist would of course recognise and do justice to in any picture that he drew.

In sensory introspection we observe not only sensation-qualities but images as well. But in both cases what we observe is something which is by its very nature the object of a subjective activity of attention, so that we are able to study it naturally as an object presented to our perception.

We have now to ask ourselves the further question: How are we to observe our subjective activities, the attention, the interest, the felt pleasure, the will to know and to do, our desires and strivings; in a word, the Self as knower, the Self as experient? That there is a difficulty here is generally felt and recognised in Psychological manuals. But the essence of the difficulty is ignored, whilst paramount importance is attached to the subsidiary though related question as to whether such introspection is immediate or retrospective. Can we seize an act of attention and observe it as it is actually in operation? And the answer given is usually to the following effect:—That this is impossible, for to observe the act of attention we must of course observe it as an object, the object of another and a different act of attention; but the original act of attention as experienced was a subjective activity having an object of its own: it was not experienced as an object. Hence we cannot observe the act of attention in the form in which it was experienced; its very nature as a subjective activity prohibits us from ever observing it whilst it is actually active. We can only observe it (let alone study it) in retrospect, through memory, and as an object of a further act of attention.

Now, if we grant that to "observe" and to "observe objects" means precisely the same, that, in fact, there is no form of observation other than the observation of objects, whether in sense-perception or in introspection, we must

perforce acquiesce in what to Psychological Science appears the one inevitable conclusion: we must observe and study our mental activities as best we can in retrospect and as objects, for there is no other way of studying them.

Accepting this position provisionally, let us see what it is precisely that thus presents itself for observation. What are we to understand by "the mental activity as object"? What are we to understand, for instance, by "an emotion as object," or by the "self," or "the knower" as object? The true consistent answer is, in effect, given by Professor James. I call it consistent in reference to the assumption that "observing" and "observing objects" means precisely the same thing. "To the Psychologist, then, the minds he studies are *objects*, in a world of other objects. Even when he introspectively analyses his own mind, and tells what he finds there, he talks about it in an objective way . . . and if this is true of him when he reflects on his own conscious states, how much truer is it when he treats of those of others?" (*Principles*, i, p. 183.) James, therefore, accepts the postulate in question as fundamental and final for Psychology.

We have now to consider the logical consequences of accepting this postulate as final. "It is difficult for me," says James,* "to detect in the activity (*i.e.*, in the feeling-consciousness I have of my own central active self) any purely spiritual element at all. Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning round quickly enough to catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head." . . . "In a sense," he adds, "it may be truly said that, in one person at least, the 'Self of selves,' when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat." †

* *Principles*, i, p. 300.

† *Ibid.*, p. 301.

"I do not for a moment say," he goes on, "that this is *all* it consists of, for I fully realise how desperately hard is introspection in this field. But I feel quite sure that these cephalic motions are the portions of my innermost activity of which I am most distinctly aware. If the dim portions which I cannot yet define should prove to be like unto these distinct portions in me, and I like other men, it would follow that our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked."

What Professor James thus tentatively urges as his own conviction might have been absolutely laid down as the necessary result of the postulate he starts from. The "self of selves," to be psychologically observed, must be observed as an object, as an object of some subjective activity of attention. As such it cannot, therefore, be a subjective activity. Hence since, by hypothesis, our whole knowledge is logically restricted to a knowledge of objects, we can have no psychology of the Self except as an object among other objects.

It may be argued that it is surely not necessary to apprehend the self-object as a complex of sensations, though this may seem the natural thing to do; that we may have an innate feeling-consciousness of thought-universals, for instance, as well as of sense-particulars, and that sensory Introspection is only the more obvious form that Presentational Introspection, as we may more generally call it, takes. There is no reason, it is said, why this immediacy of direct contact with an object should be restricted to a sense-immediacy. Professor Bailie himself asks the question, "Why should not an ideal be immediate as well as a feeling"? But even if we grant this and admit, in addition to sensory Introspection, this other form of the introspective observation of psychical objects, we have really gained nothing, so long as we insist that awareness of anything must be awareness of it as an object. For the thought-universal as an object is not a living thought. It is

examined *post mortem* for the very reason that it is examined as an object, and for the very same reason we can study it only from the outside. Hence if the self as object does not reduce itself to a complex of sensory experiences, it must be reducible to a complex of thought-abstractions, which is rather the worse fate of the two. But how a thought-abstraction can be recognised as a subjective activity, and so represent it in any way, remains a blank mystery to me. I do not, of course, say that this is the way in which we actually *do* represent ourselves to our own reflective observation. For our observation is habitually of ourselves *as* subjective activities and not as objects. I shall return to this point presently in connection with the problem of self-retrospection. My contention is simply this, that if we lay it down as a canon of observation that we can observe nothing except as an object, then we are logically cut off from self-knowledge in any true sense of the term. Self can logically mean to us nothing more than a complex of sensations or abstractions, *i.e.*, a not-self. That the self *does* mean something more than this is the sure indication that the assumption we started from is unsound, and our result may be regarded as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Psychology of Self-consciousness founded upon it. Nor can the intrinsic limitations of a psychological enquiry be urged in defence. No experience that is personal in its nature can, *quâ* personal experience, be altogether ignored by Psychology, least of all when the experience in question is the most central and vital of all. Psychology is the science of personal experience and not a mere *method* or *point of view*, destined to perish with the inadequacy of its method or the instability of its standpoint. Personal experience, *quâ* experience, is its subject-matter, and if one method is not enough for its purposes, it must try another, and not faint helplessly away into the arms of Metaphysics.

This unnatural abdication on the part of Psychology appears quite peculiarly ridiculous when the Metaphysics that usurps its office proceeds upon the very same assumption.

The Kantian philosophy, for instance, labours under this very disability. When consciousness of objects through the Categories ceases, no further knowledge is possible. Such is the conclusion of the Critique of Pure Reason. And the Self or Knower for Kant, is knowable only as a logical pre-supposition, as the logically indispensable unifying centre of experience.

Indeed, the logical answer to the question whether mental activities can as such be known at all, is, on the assumption in question that to be known at all they must be known as objects, simply this: They are unknowable. Here, again, we find Professor James, with admirable consistency, endorsing the inevitable result of his own postulate. "It seems as if consciousness as an inner activity were rather a postulate than a sensibly given fact, the postulate, namely, of a knower as correlative to all this known" (*Elementary Text-Book of Psychology*, p. 467). A recent writer and apologist of the assumption, himself a member of this Society, has most effectively stated this same conviction in the following terms:—"In knowing we never know our mental states, as mental states, any more than in seeing we see the organ of sight Mental states are not facts of which we are aware, but ways or modes in and through which we become aware." This view we may briefly sum up as follows:—"Knowledge of a world is possible. Knowledge of self is not possible." But how in that case we can know that the world is presented to a self, as we habitually suppose, remains an enigma. The very statement appears to me to be self-contradictory: the "we" should surely be cut out, and mental states described as ways or modes in and through which awareness, as an objective fact, takes place.

An attempt has been made to abide doggedly by the assumption in question and to elude at the same time its inevitable consequences. We cannot *know* our mental activities, it is still argued, but, it is added, they are not therefore inexperienceable, for we can experience what we cannot possibly know at all.

With this ingenious evasion short work can be made. It is quite true that experience is more than knowledge: it is also feeling and action, but it is equally true that there can be no *experience* without at least some rudimentary knowledge or awareness. Hence we cannot experience what is intrinsically unknowable, and this is what we are asked to do.

There is, therefore, no choice but to accept Mr. Bradley's contention that we may and do experience our subjective activities *quâ* subjective activities.

As Mr. Bradley properly insists, this view simply endorses the obvious facts of Self-Knowledge as an introspective process. "In desire and conation," he says, "the felt presence of a self, which is not experienced wholly as an object (at any rate), seems, really, when we reflect, to stare us in the face."

And yet there seems an ingrained objection, on the part of most people, to bow down to the inevitable. The prejudice, fostered so long by the non-introspective character of our ordinary observation, that the observed must be an object, is so deep-rooted that the plainest facts seem unable to overthrow it. Not only is the whole method of the sciences of observation based upon it, but the whole practice of our ordinary consciousness as well.

We must, therefore, make an effort to present this fact of self-consciousness to ourselves in as simple a light as possible.

The thesis I desire briefly to maintain is, that there can be no true Psychology of Self-Consciousness unless the point of view of the experient himself is frankly and fully adopted. The essential differentia of this point of view is that it observes subjective activities in their own true nature as subjective activities; and the form of observation characteristic of this point of view is simply Self-Consciousness in its immediacy. Such Self-Consciousness is the consciousness of self as self. It is Self-Immediacy in the only true sense in which that word "Immediacy" can be used when consciousness of subjective activities is in question. Such self-immediacy is referred to

both by Aristotle and by Hegel as the thought of thought, in that sense of the expression in which thought is its own object. The real meaning of these masters of mind is clear enough, but the expression is unfortunate. For we saw that when such reflection upon itself in objective form was attempted the thought observed was no longer a real living thought, but, logically, a dead abstraction or else the mere sensory husk of itself; the thought of thought must be conceived as a form of self-realisation. And this is, I think, practically admitted by Mr. G. E. Moore when he says that to be aware of the sensation of blue is "to be aware of an awareness of blue; awareness being used in both cases in *exactly* the same sense." (*Mind*, "Refutation of Idealism," p. 449.)

Self-consciousness, then, as the true and ultimate form of psychical observation, is the self's observation of itself as such. Such observation may very well be retrospective. It is incontestable that we may profitably study an emotion *quâ* subjective emotion, or an interest-process as conative, by reviving it in memory. And the true significance of this Self-Retrospection is not easy to grasp. Still, I am very strongly inclined to think that the one simple and right solution here is that just as Self-Introspection is realisation, so Self-Retrospection is—with diminished "warmth and intimacy" perhaps—a re-realisation, a re-realisation, of course, under new conditions. In other words, not even in self-retrospection do we as a matter of fact set the self before us as an object—view it as a sensory complex, *i.e.*, or as an abstract activity that is neither us nor ours—but must re-realise our past self in order to introspect it. Sensory Retrospection, as a process, is undoubtedly, as Dr. Maher pertinently insists in his *Psychology*, always a present act of introspection; it is only the time-label of the content studied that is the differentia between Intro- and Retrospection. And it seems to me that as regards the distinction between Self-Introspection and Self-Retrospection, this again, as in Sensory Introspection, is the only differentia.

In both cases the mode of Observation through *Realisation* remains the same. For to re-realise is still to realise.

The statement that I *am* my own mental activities and am, therefore, immediately aware of them, not as an object, but as myself, may not appear at first sight to be very illuminating. And yet it expresses the fundamental truth of the oneness of thought and being in its most radical, vital, concentrated, though least developed form. For in the dictum of self-consciousness as above enunciated we have an awareness that is not the awareness of anything that stands in any external relation whatsoever to itself. It is an awareness which is at the same time a realisation—a consciousness in which one is conscious not of, nor yet through, merely, but in and through, in intimate company with, one's own existing self. Self-consciousness, in fact, or consciousness of one's own mental activity in any form, is not a relation between subject and object, but the existential oneness of the subject that knows and the subject that is. It is self-realisation in its immediacy. Or, to put it in a slightly different form, whereas in sensory Introspection the sensory content, be it sensation or image, is *presented* to the introspecting subject, in self-consciousness the spiritual or active content is *present* to the introspecting subject, present to it as itself. This spiritual or active content may be very suitably referred to as "subject-matter." That the term "subject," as in "subject of discourse," should have become so interchangeably confused with "object" both in philosophical and in popular language is, I fancy, significant testimony that contents of consciousness may be either subjective or objective.

The bearing of this central distinction on the meaning of "experience" may here be briefly referred to. When experience is conceived as consisting essentially in a relation between Subject and Object, we can have in view only that experience which is limited to a consciousness of objects, including the so-called "self" known as an object. This we may call

Conscious Experience, and define it as consisting essentially in a relationship between subject experiencing and object experienced. Self-conscious experience, on the other hand, is from the point of view of the introspecting experient, primarily and radically a relationship between subject and subject. As such it resembles the experience which consists in a consciousness of objects in this, that it is a relation between thought and being, but it is not a relation between Subject and Object, "Thought and Being" is, therefore, a relationship which includes that between Subject and Object as a special case or stage in its development.

Finally, it may be worth while reminding ourselves that the mutual relations between experienced objects are not for us who observe them a form of experience at all. In studying these relations, as science does, we are not studying experience, but nature.

BEARING OF THE FOREGOING ANALYSIS ON THE STARTING-POINTS OF DESCARTES AND OF HEGEL.

Descartes' own detailed account, on the lines of an auto-genetical method, of the way in which he won the central truth of his philosophy, and of the significance which that truth had for him, may be familiar enough. I believe, however, that it is only when we clearly realise that self-consciousness means awareness of subject as subject, the immediate oneness of the self that knows and the self that is, that we can claim to have realised afresh for ourselves what was so vividly present to Descartes when he wrote the *Discours* and the *Meditations*.

Descartes' first pre-occupation, through the whole course of that methodical doubt whereby he eliminated from his belief whatever could even be fancied or imagined as untrue, was to reach an *inconcussum*, an unshakeable certainty which should lie beyond the possibility of doubt. We know how, when doubt could doubt no longer because it had nothing more to doubt, Descartes drew forth the certainty he was seeking from the

very activity of scepticism itself. All objects we can possibly think or imagine—so his argument substantially runs—may be illusion; but, he adds,* “from the very fact that I am conscious of doubting everything, it follows with the greatest evidence and certainty that I exist,” *i.e.*, my consciousness of myself as doubting is my consciousness of myself as existing. So again,† “so long as I am conscious of being something, no amount of deception can rob me of my being,” *i.e.*, “I am,” and “I am conscious that I am,” mean the same thing.

It is important to notice that neither in the *Discours*, nor in the *Meditations*, nor in the *Principles* does Descartes base his insight on the principle of Contradiction. He does not argue that the very denial of reality is in itself an affirmation of it *quâ* act of denial, and that to deny this is to stultify the original denial that anything was real; seeing that we then deny reality to everything and yet admit that this denial may be itself illusory, and therefore that real to which we have already denied reality. Nothing is real in short, yet all may be real, and this is self-contradictory. This is the modern consistency-logic which threatens to reinstate on its old pedestal, though in other guise, the formal logic of Scholasticism. I am personally convinced that, when taken as our sole guide, it cannot lead us beyond the dreary conclusion—which cannot be gainsaid, but produces scant conviction—that appearance and reality are correlative terms, or that illusion pre-supposes reality in one sense or another. It has a subordinate negative function of great value. But it cannot justify our direct intuitions. Experience and positive knowledge based upon experience can alone do this. Criticism cannot take the place of philosophical construction.

Descartes, the mathematical rationalist, realises this quite clearly, for he avoids any pretence of basing his conclusions on the principle of self-contradiction. He appeals to the intuition

* *Œuvres de Descartes* (ed. Jules Simon), *Discours*, p. 22.

† *Meditations*, p. 72.

of self-consciousness.* "After having thought long on the subject and carefully tested everything, I find that I am bound to affirm that the proposition, "I am, I exist," is true whenever I conceive it in thought or express it in words." To think of my existence, *i.e.*, is *eo ipso* to exist. So again,† "We are unable to suppose whilst we doubt the truth of everything that we are non-existent, for we feel such repugnance in conceiving that that which thinks does not truly exist whilst it thinks that we cannot help believing that this conclusion, 'I think, therefore I am,' is valid."

With Descartes then the proof that his own Thought and Being were identical was a matter not of argument but of immediate experience, and the only guarantee he can offer of its certainty is the clearness and distinctness with which he intuitively apprehends the fact.

Now this immediate realisation of the oneness of his thinking and his being is certainly conceived by Descartes as a unity of subject thinking and subject existing, and not as a unity of subject and object. Let us carefully consider this point. When Descartes says, "I think, therefore I am," he is using the word "think" in its most general sense, as equivalent to "I am actively conscious. (*Cf. Principles*, section 9, where he defines "thought" as the immediate experience of self-activity in any of its forms.) Now it has been objected to Descartes' statement here that it is elliptic and should have read, "I am actively conscious of an object, therefore I exist." I cannot see the justice of this criticism, for in so far as we are actively conscious of objects, we are absorbed in the object and do not realise our existence as thinkers with any particular explicitness. I should rather fulfil Descartes' dictum as follows:—"I am actively self-conscious, therefore I really exist." In order to see more clearly that Descartes' *cogito, ergo sum* means for him the founding of Philosophy on the rock of Self-

* *Meditations*, p. 72.

† *Principles*, p. 53 (ed. Brochard).

consciousness, let us suppose that it simply meant for him that it was in clearly setting his thinking self before him as an object of reflection that he became aware at last of something that he could not doubt. The suggestion is absurd. This object, like all other objects, might well be an illusion, and would be swept away as untrustworthy, together with all objects or possible objects. Moreover, Descartes' discovery is of the nature of a realisation, of a spiritual intuition; his appeal is to what is inmost in experience. His whole contention is that in and through this intuition he sees clearly revealed to him the true nature of spirit, and this contention would be meaningless if the consciousness he were considering were being considered *against* nature, as an object.

We seem bound to conclude that through his *cogito, ergo sum* Descartes took the great step of identifying modern philosophy with a philosophy of self-consciousness, rooted in the felt immediacy of thought and being, leading men to knowledge in all its fulness through the gates of Self-Introspection.

Of the many limitations and inadequacies of Descartes' own development of this point of view it is not our business here to speak. Hegel's own criticism of Descartes in the fifth chapter of the *Encyclopædia-Logic* goes essentially to the root of the distinction between the standpoints of Descartes and himself. The discussion which deals with Immediate or Intuitive knowledge is levelled primarily at Jacobi's *Philosophy of Faith*, but to Hegel Jacobi was only a weak reflection of Descartes.

"The language of Descartes," * writes Hegel, on the maxim that the "I" which *thinks* must also at the same time *be*, "his saying that this connection is given and implied in the simple perception of consciousness—that this connection is the absolute first, the principle, the most certain and evident of all things, so that no scepticism can be conceived so monstrous as not to admit it—all this language is so vivid and distinct

* *Logic*, p. 128.

that the modern statements of Jacobi and others on this immediate connection can only pass for needless repetitions."

It might seem misleading to assert that the Cartesian and Hegelian philosophies spring from one and the same common root, and yet I believe that this is the strict truth of the matter. Both are philosophies of self-consciousness. The essential difference between them is that what to Descartes is an *inconcussum*, having vast value in itself, and leading at once to a dualistic doctrine of substance, is to Hegel the first suggestion of a dialectical movement whose whole value consists in its systematic articulation. Admitting with Descartes that the immediacy of self-consciousness is the great fundamental of philosophy, he would go on to define a fundamental as that the whole value of which lay in the nature of the superstructure it found itself adequate to support. Or to change the metaphor somewhat, the convictions of immediacy, he would hold, must be tested through their power of self-development. Not that this dialectic removes us in any way from the immediacies of self-consciousness. Hegel contends vigorously that the immediacies of developed self-knowledge are far more vitally immediate for thought than are the blank immediacies of self-consciousness. Indeed if self-consciousness does not proceed to self-knowledge through self-alienation and self-return it can do no more than idly reiterate its own satisfaction with itself. In a word—for method is the key to principle—Descartes' method is mathematical with axiomatic starting-points; Hegel's method is dialectical, and its starting-point is never more than the first germ of which the whole developed system is the fruit and established truth.* "The apprehended idea of the whole is no more the whole itself than a structure can be said to be complete when only its foundations have been laid. When we want to see an oak tree with its mighty trunk, its spreading branches and its thick foliage, we are not satisfied when in its

* *Phenomenology*, p. 10.

stead we are shown an acorn. In the same way, the completion of science (*Wissenschaft*), the crowning achievement of mind, cannot be found in its first beginnings." Each stage of the growth, each movement as it were away from the first inspiring vision, reveals truth, not less, but more completely.* "The bud vanishes when the flowers break forth, and one might say that the former was negated by the latter, just in the same way as the fruit declares the flower to have been a false existence and steps into its place as the truth. These forms are not only distinguished from each other, they crowd each other out as mutually incompatible; yet their fluent nature determines them at the same time as moments or stages of the organic unity in which, so far from contradicting each other, they are one as necessary as the other; and it is in and through the equally necessary character of all the stages that the life of the whole is first constituted."

Waiving, however, this essential difference in method, we return to the essential similarity in starting-point which characterises the two philosophies. Hegel's conclusion as to the essential nature of that perfect experience with which the *Logic* starts,† and of which it is the systematic articulation is identical both with that of Descartes' *Cogito, ergo sum* and with that which we reach through a psychological analysis of self-consciousness. It is, as Hegel repeatedly puts it, that form of experience in which thought is at home with itself, since its object is felt to be unreservedly one with itself. And surely only one meaning can be given to this unreserved absolute oneness of subject and object. It is that unity in which the so-called object of thought is really no object at all, a content *present* indeed to the experiencing self but not presented to it. It is that immediate oneness of thought and being in which self-realisation consists.

* *Phenomenology*, p. 4.

† This oneness of thought and being is, as we have said, presupposed (not asserted of course), in the very first page of the *Logic*.

IV.—VALUE-FEELINGS AND JUDGMENTS OF VALUE.

By J. L. MCINTYRE.

THERE appears to be a conviction widely-spread among students of all branches of philosophy that a new classification of mental facts or phenomena is called for,—one that shall do justice to a fundamental feature of psychical life, found in all concrete mental activities,—the fact of “appraisement” or “valuation.” For example, Groos suggests that there are two chief phases or aspects of consciousness to be distinguished:—The *Presentative*, including sense-data, memory images, associations and assimilations; and the *Valuative* (if the term may be allowed), in each of the three sub-divisions of which, emotional (and æsthetic), voluntary (ethical), and logical valuation, the distinctive phenomenon of “polarity” is found—pleasant, painful; beautiful, ugly; good, bad; true, false. In all actual processes of consciousness the two phases or aspects are present, although, in some, *one* aspect predominates, in others another. Judgments of value have played a conspicuous part in theological controversy, as in that between the school of Ritschl and their opponents; in psychological theories as to the basis of Economics; while in ethics, æsthetics, and metaphysics generally the claim has been pressed in different ways that our conception of the universe, as a whole, of man’s place within it and of his destiny, “must rest in the last resort upon a judgment of value.” On the other hand, theologians and philosophers of more rationalistic tendency indignantly repudiate the attempt to reduce the objects of religious faith, the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty to postulates of “merely subjective” judgments of value, or to deprive

theoretical knowledge of her rights as the only source of objective truth.

In the present paper I have tried, in the hope of throwing some light upon these ultimate questions, but without seeking to offer any substantive contribution towards their solution, to give a psychological description or analysis of the value-phenomenon, and to consider its relation to the processes,—feeling, desire and presentation,—with which it is most closely connected.

Value and Feeling.—Perhaps the most natural starting-point for our consideration is the relation of value to *feeling*. If in every human experience there may be distinguished the three phases—presentation, feeling-tone, conation—and if, as is obviously the case, value has reference both to an object valued (“object” being taken in the widest possible sense), and to an activity resulting from the valuation, then it appears almost self-evident that the value-element is the feeling-tone, which somehow intermediates between the presentation and the striving. And so, in fact, we find some writers (*e.g.*, O. Ritschl, Kreibig) holding that all feelings are feelings of value, positive value corresponding to pleasure-feeling, negative value to pain. The greater the pleasure which an object is capable of giving, or does in actual experience give, the higher its value; and as pleasure-feelings, in themselves, differ only in the measurable characters of intensity and duration, we secure through the feelings a test by which the relative value-coefficients of different presentations, or representations, may be determined. In the case of complex presentations and ideas, a more delicate measuring-apparatus is necessary;—the interaction between ideas or systems of ideas, their strengthening or inhibiting of one another; the relation of the feeling-tone of the resultant system of ideas to the feeling-tones of the elementary presentations which enter into or constitute the whole;—these and other factors must be considered in any attempt to appreciate the feeling-value of any

possible but as yet unrealised situation. Underlying this view and the elaborate calculus which has been built upon it, is the conviction that feeling alone is at once the motive-force and the goal of activity; that it is the nature of pleasure to be pursued and of pain to be avoided. But no feeling as such ever points beyond itself, it is essentially a self-dependent, passive, inert experience or feature of experience. The correlation of feeling with striving is a construction upon experience; an action *does* habitually succeed upon a feeling of a certain degree of intensity, but there is no necessary connexion between the one and the other, except that both are parts, abstractly separated from each other, of a single continuous psychical event.*

Feeling and Presentation.—Neither is there any necessary connection between a presentational element or complex and its feeling-tone. Not only would it be impossible to say *à priori* of a new sense element, supposing such were given, that its tone would be pleasant or unpleasant; but it is clear also that many of the constituents of our ordinary experience might have had quite different feeling co-efficient, without our existence being thereby imperilled to any appreciable degree. Many feel as unpleasant certain colour-shades or groupings, certain tone-qualities or intensities or sequences—not to speak of more complex systems of colours and tones—which to others are pleasing. It would be difficult to prove in such cases that the presentation or its object is fraught with any further danger to the subject than is contained in the fact that it is unpleasant, therefore inhibitive of his activity mental or bodily. It is injurious because it is unpleasant, not unpleasant because it is injurious. Perhaps the majority of our feelings, as of our convictions, are conventional, habitual or traditional, rather than grounded in the nature of things: it is a platitude that objects continue to please long after they

* Eisler, *Studien zur Wert-theorie*, 1902.

have ceased to be advantageous, if they ever were so. In other cases again it is easy to point to an advantage which the pleasurable object brings to the individual or race, but it is at the same time quite clear that this advantage had no part in determining the feeling. Thus the pleasure which many of the lowest savages take in vermin as delicacies for the palate is in strong contrast with the attitude of the cultured European. Nor is it likely that the latter would feel the taste pleasant, even if he were able to overcome his prejudice sufficiently to try. The utility of the practice of consuming vermin can hardly be denied, but it is one which might easily have been secured by any one of several less drastic means.

Feeling and Need.—It would seem to follow that the connection between feeling-tone and presentation is mediated through some third thing: and this can only be a need or a want: that which satisfies a need, blind or conscious, *becomes* pleasant: that which negates or inhibits the satisfaction of a need *becomes* painful. Later, both in the individual and in the race-life, the object remains pleasant or painful even although its relation to the satisfaction of needs has been inverted or modified. Conversely, in our complex human life, a need may persist which has become habitual, although its satisfaction neither brings advantage to the individual or the race, nor is fraught with pleasure; both the states of unsatisfied need and of satisfied need are marked by a negative feeling-tone. Supposing that at the moment of yielding to such a desire there is full realisation of how much the yielding involves, we can only assume that the painfulness of the unsatisfied state is greater than that (hypothetically realised) of the satisfied. A subject's activity is here as always towards a relatively positive value. The object of desire or of want has still positive value, although the realisation brings not pleasure but pain: it is, therefore, clear that positive value is not coincident with positive feeling-tone, nor negative value with negative feeling-tone. "Everything that brings satisfac-

tion or fulfils a need has value. Sometimes we only become aware through a satisfaction that our existence had a gap in it; sometimes this gap is marked beforehand and causes a want or begets blind striving and desires."* It might seem that a further question has to be answered—that as to why the satisfaction of desire, the fulfilling of a need should give pleasure, not pain or a neutral tone: but on this view pleasure is itself the satisfaction of desire, pain (apart from the sensation of physical pain) is the failure of a desire to secure satisfaction: the terms have an identical meaning. To say that I pursue pleasure as an end is to say that I pursue what I desire or want.

Feeling and Object.—But normally desire is satisfied through an object—whether a physical object or a person or a mental state or activity,—and to this object the feeling-tone is transferred, associatively or otherwise, so that in the future the recollection of the object has correlated with it, perhaps indissolubly bound up with it—for that subject—the feeling-tone of satisfying desire. The feeling is now *objectified*—it becomes a character or quality of the object, rather than a determination of the subject in relation to the object. The object seems to have meaning, not only in the sense of meaning for thought, significance, but also in the sense of meaning for practical experience, *value*. Thus the value-phenomenon does not strictly occur at the stage of simple presentation-feeling-reaction, but only at that of perception and higher stages, to which on the emotional side more than a mere feeling attaches, and of which the issue is not a blind reaction, but an activity characterised by a consciousness, more or less clear, more or less intense, of the end pursued. Not every feeling therefore is a value-feeling; those only are such which enter into, or which form the purely subjective phase in, an emotion.

Value and Emotion.—The attempt to explain value by simple presentations, feelings and impulses is analogous to the

* Höfding, *Philos. Probleme*, p. 85.

attempt to explain knowledge by simple ideas and their associations. Just as no mere sum, nor any other mathematical function, of simple contents of presentation would by itself give a fact of knowledge, so no mere multiplication of feelings, even when taken in conjunction with the complex presentations or ideas to which they are "attached," would give a fact of value. In order to have value, a feeling or series of feelings must have "meaning," must have a bearing upon or significance for the activity of the biological subject, and the significance must be consciously apprehended, with at least *some* degree of clearness and intensity. The value of an object therefore is its relation, whether merely felt or reflected upon, to the activity of the individual as a whole—a relation which may lie anywhere between the poles of furthering the activity to the highest possible extent, and destroying it altogether. When a simple feeling enters into a valuation, it ceases to be a simple feeling, just as a sensation when it becomes a constituent of a perception, ceases to be a sensation. The most elementary instance of value in this sense is the simple emotion, of joy, sorrow, fear, or the like. It is true that emotion has been "explained" as consisting in a number of simple organic feelings, which correspond to the changes directly produced in the organism by the object of the emotion. The organic "feelings" of course combine presentational elements with those of feeling proper. I need not here state the objections to this theory: even if its account of the content of the emotion is complete, it fails to explain the peculiar nature of emotion itself. The same elements enter into different emotions, the same emotion may be excited by very different objects, or different emotions in the same person at different times by the same object, and the thought or idea of an object may recall an emotion with even greater intensity than the direct perception of the object brought forth. These things suggest that the emotion is rather a generic or abstract function than a mere sum of elements (which ought in every case to be the same): it may appear, and be recognised,

with quite different organic feelings, feelings of different intensities, durations, &c., just as a melody is recognised, although the tones at different times may differ in absolute quality, in intensity, and the rest. It is only in certain *relations between* the constituent feelings that there is constancy—relations of intensity, of duration, or of rhythm. These relations form among themselves what has been called a “dynamic constant,”* which gives the character of sameness to the different appearances of the given emotion, much as the relations of the notes constitute the identity of the melody. So the moods, it may be said, are higher constructs of feeling, built up upon the emotions. Absolute intensity may be reduced to a minimum, and the presentational elements may become wholly indefinite or vague without the motive force whether of emotion or of mood losing anything of its strength. It is unnecessary to carry out the analogy to perception and constructive thought: the relations in question are fixed in the first instance by the meaning or significance of the presentational whole for the life of the subject: they embody the value of the given situation, real or ideal, for the given subject: or to put this in other words, the judgment of value merely expresses in language what is already implied in the emotional attitude towards the situation: emotions are the only true value-feelings.† The “sentiments” also, including the “sense of beauty,” the sentiment of duty, and others, are of the nature of generic feelings, and they also constitute determinants of value. The feeling of regret or of remorse corresponds to the sense of loss—the loss of a value which it is perceived would have more fully satisfied the whole self

* v. Urban, *Logic of the Emotions*, Psychol. Rev., viii.

† Cf. Kreibitz, *Psych. Grundlegung e. Systems d. Wert-Theorie*, 1902, p. 12. Value in general is the “*import* which a content of sense or thought has for a subject by reason of the feeling, actual or potential, united with it either directly or associatively.” The realisation of a positive value is, psychologically, the awakening or furthering of a psychical activity.

than the particular value which was actually pursued, together with the reflected sense of one's own depreciation in the mind of "the social self."

The Judgment of Value and Existence.—Great variety of opinion seems to prevail as to the implications of existence in the judgment of value. According to Ritschl, in the class of value-judgments to which those of religion belong, we determine or characterise the objects presented to our thought in their value for our life as personal beings. Through pleasure or pain-feelings which arise in consequence, the will is set in play for the appropriation of what is good, or the rejection of the contrary. Thus the knowledge of God or of Christ is *possible* only through judgments of their value for us; knowledge of sin is possible only through the measurement of its non-value by the measure of the perfect good.* It might seem that the meaning of this is the comparatively harmless one that we can only secure personally intimate acquaintance with Christ on the ground of trust or faith in his relation towards us. But in intention, as the opposition with which it has met goes to show, the theory means much more. It is that the existence of an object of religious faith, whatsoever it may be, is inferred, or at least is guaranteed for our conviction, on the ground of a judgment of value, of which the logical subject is the ideal presentation of the religious object. An existence is suggested,—whether from tradition, authority, or a personal vision;—in mental experiment the influence of such a being, if he really exists, is tested, and on the ground of the consequences which would ensue, the advantages which I, or other men, or the universe as a whole would derive, I judge of or assent to the existence of the object of value. Thus the judgment of value in this sense is strictly a judgment of *existence* upon the ground of a feeling of value. Against this view it is naturally argued that we cannot *value* an object of the existence,

* Reischle, *Werturteile und Glaubensurteile*, 1900, p. 13.

or at least the realisable existence, of which we are not already convinced. In the case of objects the existence of which is independent of our will, we must first know of their existence before we attach any value to them; and, of course, eternal objects—if the term may be forgiven—would obviously belong to this class. The so-called “value-judgments,” or rather the judgments of existence based upon them, are, accordingly, no more than postulates, on the ground of experience—*i.e.*, without the validity of which certain features of our experience would remain inexplicable. The charge of “subjectivity” is avoided by a distinction, familiar in other spheres, between contingent and necessary judgments of value, the latter being bound up with the “self-certainty of our personal existence,” based, therefore, upon an inward experience of the personal subject which he cannot reject without denying himself, and exercising accordingly a kind of inward compulsion upon him:—in this sense they are necessary, and universally valid.*

Meinong's Theory of the Relation of the Value-Judgment to Ideas of Existence.—Quite different is the problem of existence in Meinong's conception of it. It is characteristic of all value-feelings that they refer to what exists: what I do not think of as existing can have no value for me. On the other hand, of course, the non-existence of a thing may have value for me—the removal of an existing evil. And the direct condition of the feeling of value, attaching to an object, is not the object itself,—which may stand in no direct relation to my thought,—but my conviction, belief, or, in other words, my judgment as to the *existence* of the value-object. Even when the given object directly causes a positive feeling (*e.g.*, a fire causing a pleasant feeling of warmth on a cold day), the feeling of value involved is not the pleasant feeling itself that directly results from the fire, but one which passes beyond the sensation to the object

* Reischle (p. 17) refers to Lipsius for this distinction.

itself that is judged to exist. If it is true in this extreme case, it is true also of all other cases, that the feeling of value, which is expressed and made clearer by a judgment of value, is based upon a judgment of existence,—not *vice versa*, as in the theological school. The dependence of the feeling of value upon the scarcity or quantity of the object at disposal is a further proof. For neither the utility nor the pleasure-producing capacity of the object is thereby altered, but only my judgment about it.* The law of *marginal utility* (*Grenznutzen*), or as Ehrenfel's prefers, that of marginal advantage (*Grenzfrommen*) appears to apply here. I test the value of a good, not by its existence alone, but by the amount of loss which would accrue to me if it were non-existent; *i.e.*, I mentally assume it non-existent, and experiment within myself as to the consequences that would follow. In the case of things of which a large quantity is at my disposal, as air, water, or self-regarding feelings, the value of any given unit is determined rather by the infinitesimal loss that would occur if it were non-existent, than by its actual utility. And as Meinong has afterwards to admit, there are also the psychical facts to be considered of the fatigue and blunting of feelings which are frequently repeated. We do not attach so high a value to old friendship, or to bodily health—that is, we do not feel their existence so keenly—as we do to a recent friendship or to an access of wealth; because we are habituated to them, as we are also perhaps to air and water; but we can always test their “true” value by imagining their non-existence. Meinong accordingly suggested as a formula for measuring value $V = C I + C' I'$, where I is the intensity of the appreciation of existence, I' that of the appreciation of the non-existence of the object, C and C' being constants.† Meinong's difficulties with the problem of existence were many, perhaps none more striking than those arising from

* Meinong, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 16–24.

† Meinong, *Wert-haltung und Wert*, *Arch. Syst. Phil.*, i (1895).

judgments of value referring to the past or the future. Thus to take Ehrenfels'* illustration, the value which a nobleman of the present day attaches to the martial qualities of his ancestor of a few centuries ago would really belong to the ancestor himself, or to the qualities as the ancestor possessed them. The value characterises that to which it is attached, and with the existence of which it is bound up, but the ancestor's qualities have not *present* existence, they existed only in the past, therefore their past reality is the subject of the value-judgment.

The Subject of Value.—None of these difficulties could have arisen had not the attention of value-philosophers been mainly devoted to the *objects* of value rather than to the subject in whom the valuation-phenomenon has its real place. Value is never a character or quality of an object, but always a relation between an object and a subject.

Value and Feeling.—To what phase of the subject's mental life does the value-phenomenon belong? To the presentational, feeling, or conative side? It is well-known that the protagonists of the value-theory differed upon this, Meinong holding with Lotze that feeling, Ehrenfels that desire is paramount. On the one hand no object, however spiritual, can be valued, it is said, unless I have somehow experienced its power of causing pleasure; only so does it become an object of desire. On the other hand, the value of a thing is said to consist in its being desired, and many objections are pointed out to the assumption that the feeling-tone and value-feeling or value-judgment show any consistent parallelism of variation. "What immediately determines us to mark things as valuable is their relation not to passive states of pleasure or pain, but to our active wishing, striving, willing—in short, to our *desire*. 'This or that is valuable to me,' means 'this or that is object of my desire.' Value is the relation, erroneously objectified, of a thing

* Ehrenfels, *Van der Wertdefinition zum Motivationsgesetze*, Arch. Syst. Phil., ii, p. 103.

to a human desire directed upon it." It is not necessary here to consider the relation of feeling to desire or will, more especially as the later writings of both Meinong and Ehrenfels have brought the two views more into harmony one with another, although whether this has not been done at the expense of the consistency of each with itself may be questioned. It is clear that the feeling of value frequently in actual experience precedes conscious desire, as in the instinctive reactions of the child; and it involves difficulties of terminology to speak of *desiring* an object which is already in our possession, although, *per contra*, we may attach a very high value to and derive a feeling of keen satisfaction from our possession of the object. What we desire is, no doubt, its continuance in our possession, or the like, but the *feeling* appears even then to be primary. Does it follow either that everything which is felt as valuable *has* value, or that subjective feelings alone determine value, or again that whatever does not *now* excite feelings of value has actually no value? * The fetish of the primitive savage, for example, is felt and judged to be valuable by him: we know that it has not for us the value which he attributes to it. On the other hand, the friendship of an individual may be valuable to me, although I have no knowledge even of its existence. Such puzzles as these lead to the same step as was historically taken in English Utilitarianism, the transition from the actually to the potentially pleasing, from the desired to the desirable. "Value depends," Meinong writes, "not on actual appreciation, but on potential appreciation, and for this we must assume sufficient knowledge, favourable circumstances, and a normal mental and emotional state." † Or as Ehrenfels suggests, "it is not exclusively actual desire that determines value, but also possible desire, or (which is the same thing) a disposition to desire." So far as these

* Ehrenfels, *Vierteljahrschrift für Wiss. Phil.*, 1893. Cf. Reischle, p. 27 ff.

† Meinong, *Untersuchungen*, p. 24.

modifications suggest any external or impersonal norm of value, the objections tell against them which we have to bring forward against all such norms." But they do not really mean so much as this: man is a complex being, and his desires are variable, and dependent both upon his immediate environment, the given situation in which he finds himself for the moment, and on his past history; therefore he is apt to take up an attitude at one moment towards an object, which he later feels to have been "erroneous," and to have failed to secure the expected advantage. The "objective value" of an object is strictly a compromise between these different factors:—"The value of an object represents the motivation-force which attaches to it partly through its own nature, partly through the constitution of the environment, and partly through that of the subject concerned. The thought or idea of value has arisen out of the necessities of desire, and thence it derives the inner unity and naturalness which otherwise we should be at a loss to find in it."* In a later article Ehrenfels also modifies his description:—"Value is the relation, erroneously objectified in language, of an object, O, to the desire-disposition of a subject, S, according to which O *would* be desired by S, in so far as, and so soon as S did not possess, or ceased to possess the conviction of the existence of O."† Thus Meinong yields towards desire, Ehrenfels towards feeling, neither seeing that he is at the same time introducing a wholly different criterion of value, an objective one, whether erroneously assumed or not, which is independent largely of the *actual* desires or feelings of the subject at the moment. Neither "the desirable" nor "the potentially pleasant" belongs to the feeling or willing side of the mental nature, but to the cognitive, or more accurately, to the individual as a whole with his practical interests, his past history, his conviction of a future destiny.

* Meinong, *Wert-haltung und Wert*, *Arch. Syst. Phil.*, i, p. 341.

† *Arch. Syst. Phil.*, ii, p. 104.

Value and Experience.—There can be no doubt that the value-phenomenon really emerges as a reflection upon a feature of daily and hourly occurrence in our experience, the fact that changes occur in the presentational field, or in the situation presented or thought at any given moment, which are felt to be mediated through a change in the subject, or, if so preferred, in the subject-part of the total presentational field. The

formula* is
$$\begin{array}{c} S-S' \\ \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ E \quad \quad E' \end{array} .$$
 The subject S in a given environment

or situation E undergoes a change S', whereby the situation itself is altered to E'. In the simplest possible case, a burning object for example touches my hand and I draw it away: here, so far as there is any mental action at all, the felt pain in the subject conditions or mediates the change in the situation—the hand in a new position. The new position is relatively of higher value than the former position, the earlier relatively to the later has therefore a negative value. In this case the nature of the new situation is indifferent; the original position is absolutely valued—in the negative sense—that is, it is not one in which we could remain; therefore *any* subsequent position has relatively a positive value. The volition or desire goes merely towards change, how far the new state shall differ from the old depending on causes which lie without the will. In more complex activities these subordinate factors come more and more within the determination of the subject, as in instinctive behaviour, in intelligent and in rational action.

Possibility of Error.—It is in their regard that the possibility of error in a judgment of value chiefly lies. On the view that value is determined by the feeling of the subject, error would appear to be impossible. *De gustibus non disputandum* would apply to moral and religious as well as to æsthetic values. But while there can be no doubt as to whether a given starting-point of environment or situation does or does not satisfy the subject,

* R. Eisler, *Studien zur Wert-theorie*, 1902.

there may very well be error as to what end-point of action may relieve the feeling, or fulfil the need which arises. Although it is posited as relatively higher by the very fact of its being adopted, yet it may, when the experience is fully realised, be found relatively lower. The subject may have been ignorant of the real nature of the object desired, may have been misled as to his own capacities of enjoyment, or may have failed to foresee the further consequences of his attainment of the desired object. As already pointed out, a need may grow more imperative with repeated satisfaction, with habituation to recurring circumstances, and with loss of the power to form new habits, while coincidently the capacity for enjoying the satisfaction of the need may grow proportionately less. The critical instance is where two courses present themselves as possible developments of the given unsatisfactory situation, each realisable through the action of the subject, but not both. There are then two mutually-exclusive positive values, as when the urchin with his penny halts between the sweet-shop and the baker's. We have then a competition or conflict between values, each offering itself as capable of satisfying a need of the subject. The need will correspond to some partial system—disposition, tendency, interest, or what not,—within the biological subject: when there is real deliberation and choice, as opposed to blind selection of the first alternative that comes with any strength of feeling, the subject mentally assumes that each value is realised, while the other is excluded, or while all other values, possible at the given moment, are excluded. He “lives himself into” the imagined situation as if it were a dramatic *rôle* set him to play, more or less vividly enjoys its experience, while pitting against its pleasures the lack of the other values. Thus, so far as there is deliberation, he consciously goes through a comparison of situations, weighing the positive against the negative values of each, and decides accordingly. If his imagination is at fault he may, of course, decide wrongly; the pursued course may not bring him a

higher degree of satisfaction than the other would have brought him had *it* been chosen.

General or Universal Judgments or Value.—Are there any rules by which the subject may be guided, empirical or otherwise? Are there any objects which he *ought* always to prefer, when they enter into competition with others? An extension of the value-judgment, as we have hitherto considered it, is possible in several ways. (1) There may be *collective* judgments of value, as when a group of individuals, a family, a tribe, a nation, pursues an end which can be achieved only through the co-operative action of the members of the group, and by which it is assumed the needs (physical, ethical, or religious) of each member, or of the majority of members, are satisfied. (2) There may be *general* judgments of value, grounded on scientific study of the common physical or mental nature of men, and of what does, as an empirical fact, give satisfaction to them—as in the statements that ventilation, pure water, temperance are valuable: these are not felt as directly valuable, they are of the nature of what Ehrenfels called *Wirkungswerte*, or Instrumental Values*—valued in the *first instance* not for themselves, but for further values which they bring with them. The value of the effect is transferred, by a well-known psychical process, to the known cause, which may *then* become valued for itself. The experiences of the race, and the experience of each individual, have laid up a store of these Instrumental Values, the knowledge of which is handed down from generation to generation. So far as they represent values instrumental to other values of which every member of the race or group is susceptible, their statement becomes a general judgment of value. It is clear that several theories of the moral judgments, and one or two theories—Paley's, for example—of the religious judgments of value, would attribute to these no higher rank than this. They are empirical general

* Mackenzie, *Mind*, N.S., iv.

rules, which it is safer to trust than not.* (3) Still another class of general judgments of value is possible, however.† The life of a child is made up of a more or less disconnected series of impulses at the back of which lie appreciations of value in different degrees of clearness and intensity. So presumably with the life of most of the lower animals. So far as they are conscious, they must have a sense of value, and their actions aim like our own at the realisation of values. But each moment seems to suffice for itself; a value emerges, is pursued, and realised: then another and another: there is no continuity in the inward life, no conflict even of values with values. The observer, on the other hand, knows that these discrete actions have really a point of unity or convergence, in their common tendency to preserve the life of the individual animal or of its species. In the higher animals there are wider views; the dog is able through past experience to foresee the consequences of certain actions, and refrains from certain direct values in order to secure others of the same quality but a higher degree, or to avoid others of the opposite quality. In however vague a form there is here the conception of a value the realisation of which extends over a portion of the imagined life of the individual, as opposed to one of which the realisation is immediate but momentary. It is easy to pass to the conception of more and of less comprehensive values—*i.e.*, values which satisfy to a greater or less degree the needs not of any partial constituent of the subject's nature, but of the self or ego as a whole—the *Gesammt-Ich*. This is not, of course, the pure Ego of metaphysics, but the biological individual, conscious indeed of a few of its tendencies and of its vital interests, but with dispositions which lie back in the blind depths of its bodily being, and imaginations of a future in which it projects itself beyond its bodily existence. This "total-self" is far more than the sum of its momentary

* Reischle.

† Cf. Jonas Cohn, *Zeitschr. f. Phil.*, Bd. 110, pp. 219 ff.

tendencies, desires, feelings, and thoughts. It claims an existence beyond the satisfaction of each and all of these, not only in comprehensiveness, but also in "protensiveness." Its interests may, and usually do, extend beyond itself altogether, whether or not the individual imagines himself to continue in existence after the bodily death,—as in the interest which leads anyone to save (*i.e.*, to give up possible immediate pleasures) to secure comfort to someone else after his own death. Even in the present life, however, the interest of the Total-ego may be held by what is other than itself. The suggestion that the Ego can pursue only its own pleasure hardly needs criticism at this date, except that it might possibly be argued against any theory which doubts the validity of universal judgments of value that it ties down the theorist to purely subjective values, and that these must be the pleasures or pains of the individual subject. Pleasure in the abstract may, of course, become an object of value—as it does in a high degree to the *blasé* man of the world,—but it is not usually so, except to a very limited extent. Pleasure in the concrete is pleasure already realised, and therefore cannot as such become a motive of will. On the other hand, the pleasure of another person, his satisfaction, his virtue, &c., may just as readily be valued by me as my own pleasure, satisfaction, virtue:—nor does the fact that they are so valued, and so desired, involve any contradiction of our theory, which has found the origin of the value-phenomenon in the transition from one situation to another mediated through a change in the subject himself, a change of the nature of voluntary activity. For after all the *alter*, as a biological individual, is also part of my environment. The possibility of desiring, and therefore valuing the good (in whatever sense "good" is taken) of another is no more contradictory, if no less contradictory, than the possibility of knowledge itself. Rather the experience of everyday life would show that what is valued directly is hardly ever the pleasure or even the advantage of the

individual: that that *is* valued may be taken for granted, but perhaps the majority of actual strivings refer beyond the individual to the realisation of values in which he can have no share. No doubt there is always pleasure to the individual in the realisation or in the activity, but *this* pleasure is not that which is valued. It is unnecessary to develop this familiar fact further. I return to the *Gesamt-Ich*, with its system of outward-striving dispositions and tendencies, of inward memories and expectations; when these different partial-systems come into conflict one with another, as they do, what decides as to which shall be satisfied, which left unsatisfied? Any number of conditions or circumstances may in actual fact decide, but in the long run, and in the case of a normal human being normally placed, the more comprehensive systems will tend to realise their values at the expense of less developed, more detached interests. And this comprehensiveness may extend, as has been pointed out, beyond the individual's own personality. The Total-ego may include other selves, those of the family, the Church, or the State, with which different interests of the Ego have come to be identified. Here also, in the long run, the more comprehensive interest comes to secure a predominance over the less comprehensive.

In such a system as that which we have found the self to be, the whole is not merely the sum of the parts: the partial-systems entering into the whole are thereby modified just as they in their turn modify it. They are no longer therefore independent systems, and their value is transformed. What holds of the presentational holds also of the valuative side of consciousness:—"Whole and parts mutually determine each other. There are no quite isolated concepts which allow themselves to be bound up into judgments: . . . Consciousness and personality cannot be explained as products of elements already given, any more than organic life can be explained as a product of inorganic elements. On the other hand the nature of Consciousness and Personality reveals itself like

that of organic life as a continuous transformation into itself of elements given, not originally produced by it."* Every life is, or strives to be, a whole: and so far as it is successful it modifies, subdues, perhaps converts into their opposites the individual values with which it sets out. Some one interest, now relatively constant, now changing, will always be the dominant one, and will "in a higher or lower degree impress its stamp on all the elements of consciousness and give them their direction." It has already been indicated how these interests may come to consciousness: the series of valuations and impulses that in the lower animal subserve the taking in of food, although their union towards this end is not at all before its mind; a further series of which the issue is the building of the nest, the production and care of the young: each of these series becomes at a higher stage consciously systematised into a whole, of which the correlative is a more or less permanent "interest." They give rise accordingly to different categories of "values" which may at any given moment enter into competition one with another, until they on their part become merged in still higher syntheses of interest and value. But we cannot take the position of external observers towards our own activities or value-judgments: we cannot say that our limited and still subjective valuations are instrumental to some higher, more comprehensive end, posited not by us but for us, just as the end of life-preservation and the continuance of the species is one imposed upon the animal from without. At least, if analogy suggests that there is such an absolute end, we cannot say *what* it is: nor if we could, would it be necessarily binding upon us to pursue it. It is impossible *à priori* to say that it would appear an object of value to us: that is at most a judgment of faith, a value-judgment in Ritschl's sense, not a judgment capable of scientific demonstration, or of being regarded as a postulate

* Höfding, *Philos. Probleme*, p. 11

either of theoretical or of practical reason. As von Hartmann agrees, although with a different end in view, there can be no objective or absolute end where there is no objective value. He holds that there *is* an objective value: "values are what they are, in and for themselves; they do not require recognition in order to become values. Values are made known to us through feelings (of pleasure and pain), but neither their existence nor their value depends on their being known to us *as* values." This is because with von Hartmann the essence of value lies in the *idea* or *content* which determines the will towards its realisation: the feeling which the content excites is merely an index of its *value* for the furtherance of the will's ends. An objective value thus attaches to the objective ideal system of ends which is realised by the objective will.* But no such objective system enters into our experience, and the whole conception of an objective will realising an objective system of truth is in direct contradiction with the value-experience in particular, which emerges always as we have seen in the reactions of the living individual upon the world about him.

* Wertbegriff und Lustwert, *Zeit. f. Phil.*, 106, i.

V.—SOME CONTROVERTED POINTS IN SYMBOLIC LOGIC.

By A. T. SHEARMAN.

By any person commencing the study of Symbolic Logic it is not unnaturally soon concluded that there exist several "systems," marked off from one another by fundamental differences. Such systems he is inclined to describe according to the character of the view that the founder entertained as to the import of the proposition. Thus there is the compartmental view, the predication view, the mutual exclusion view, and so on. But subsequent study enables the reader to perceive that, in adhering to such a conception, he is hiding the points of likeness and magnifying the points of difference between the proposed methods of treating the subject, and he is thus led to look rather at the net result of the different efforts. That is to say, instead of continuing to speak of several isolated systems, he proceeds to study the calculus that is now available, and to the construction of which most symbolists are seen to have contributed.

The interest of the subject then gathers round such questions as to whom we are most indebted for those rules of procedure that may be said now to constitute the calculus, what important differences of opinion have arisen as the subject has been gradually thought out, and which of the conflicting views do we find it correct to adopt. Our business in this paper is with the second and third of these questions. In other words, we shall be occupied not so much with an historical sketch of the progress of the subject as with a critical account of certain points that have arisen as the work has proceeded.

SYMBOLS AS REPRESENTING CLASSES AND PROPOSITIONS.

We cannot do better than to commence with the question as to whether the symbols operated upon in the calculus should refer to classes or to propositions. There are here three considerations that must be kept quite distinct if the subject is to be profitably discussed. In the first place, it is possible to affirm that symbols may under one set of conditions represent terms, and under another set of conditions represent propositions, and then it has to be decided which of the two available uses it is expedient primarily to adopt. Secondly, it may be held that it is a matter of indifference whether symbols stand for terms or for propositions. And, in the third place, the opinion may be maintained that only one of the two should be symbolized—on this view it is generally to designate propositions that symbols are exclusively utilised.

As regards the question of expediency, it has been affirmed that we should commence with the symbolization of propositions, for then, firstly, our procedure throughout will be analytical; and, secondly, we shall avoid the "confusion" that is introduced through the identification of the "physical" combination of propositions into a system with the "chemical" combination of subject and predication into a proposition.*

The former of these reasons is undoubtedly a strong one, but I am inclined to think that the common method of beginning with the consideration of classes, and the operations that may be performed upon them, is the better one to employ. For one thing, the latter procedure is of a simpler character than the other. But a stronger reason than this is that during the process of considering the manner in which the analysis of propositions modifies the form of the synthesis, it is necessary to point out that the letters representing predications obey the simple laws of propositional synthesis;† it is, therefore,

* *Mind*, vol. i, N.S., p. 6.

† *Ibid.*, p. 352.

desirable to be able to refer to an earlier discussion of terms and the operations that may be performed upon them.

With respect to the confusion that it is alleged is likely to arise from our allowing letters originally to represent terms, it is, I think, apt to be exaggerated; indeed, a careful analysis of what really happens during the employment of literal symbols in the two spheres will show that there is no good reason for confusion in any degree. The fact that contradictories are not the same in both regions has been declared to be a likely source of error. Now it is certainly true that the contradictories in the two cases are different, but this should not involve any uncertainty in the application of the old formulæ to the new use. All that is necessary is that we make allowance for the change in the character of the contradictory, *i.e.*, we must not admit that propositions are sometimes true and sometimes false.

Again, it has been said that those who utilise the old rules for the new subject-matter will be led actually to confuse a class with a proposition, inasmuch as on the class view the contradictory of x is the class \bar{x} , but on the propositional theory the contradictory of the proposition x is the affirmation " \bar{x} is true."* But this criticism loses its force if the distinction is drawn between the truth of a proposition and the statement that the proposition is true. When the old formulæ are applied to the new case, the correct procedure is to make the letter symbol represent the truth of a proposition, while such an expression as $x = 1$ is used to denote that such a proposition is true. Hence the contradictory of the truth of x does not leave us with a proposition, but simply with the truth of \bar{x} . There is thus a perfect analogy between this case and the case where the letters represent classes. And, just as the class \bar{x} may be declared to exhaust the universe, so it is possible to state that the truth of the proposition \bar{x} is the only possibility. In other words, in both cases we may say that $\bar{x} = 1$.

* *Mind*, vol. i, N.S., No. 1, p. 17.

When writers, who start by making letters stand for classes, come to make such letters stand for the truth of propositions, there is no serious alteration involved, except the one already noticed, in the logical rules that have been established: there is merely another method of interpretation put upon the literal symbols. Such logicians argue that the logical machinery may be put to uses other than those for which it was originally intended. For instance, the symbol 1 from meaning the totality of compartments comes to denote the only possibility, and 0 receives the meaning of no possibility.

Where the symbolic framework, as elaborated from the point of view of the class, does not apply to the new case, the fact is due, as Venn shows, to the circumstance that we have no longer any place in the contradictory for the word "some." In dealing with classes, when it is said that $x + \bar{x} = 1$, it is meant that both x and \bar{x} contribute to the total, but on the proposition interpretation, the admission of x excludes absolutely the admission of \bar{x} . Hence, if xy is declared false, we can only say that one of the three $x\bar{y}$, $\bar{x}y$, $\bar{x}\bar{y}$ is true, while, if xy is declared true, then $x\bar{y}$, $\bar{x}y$, $\bar{x}\bar{y}$ must all be false. That is to say, of the formally possible propositional alternants only one can be true.

But there are some writers who maintain that it makes no difference whether symbols represent terms or propositions. These logicians have to attempt to show that the characters of the contradictories do not vary in the fundamental way that I have just mentioned. Mrs. Ladd-Franklin, for instance, endeavours to deal with this question by asserting that a proposition may be true at one time while it is false at another,* but, as Mr. Johnson remarks, propositions that relate to different times are different propositions. Mrs. Ladd-Franklin asks, "Why exclude from an Algebra which is intended to cover all possible instances of (non-relative) reasoning such propositions as 'sometimes when it rains I am pleased and some-

* *Mind*, vol. i, N.S., No. 1, p. 129.

times when it rains I am indifferent?" But I am not aware that any symbolist wishes to exclude such propositions. Supposing we regard this statement as consisting of two propositions—in contradistinction for the moment to the way in which Mr. Johnson argues, namely, that the particle "and" implies that we have really only one—then the symbolist will, of course, say, "Let x equal the proposition 'sometimes when it rains I am pleased,' and y equal the proposition, 'sometimes when it rains I am indifferent.'" Here, if these two propositions are true, we shall have $x = 1$ and $y = 1$ respectively; while if x is not true, *i.e.*, if $x = 0$, the verbal rendering will be "It is not true that sometimes when it rains I am pleased," and similarly with the rendering of $y = 0$. Mrs. Ladd-Franklin argues as though x were made by the symbolist to stand only for such a proposition as "I am always pleased," but, of course, the symbol may stand for any proposition (or rather, truth of any proposition) whatever.

But though the symbolist can deal with such propositions he will not in consequence proceed along the lines that Mrs. Ladd-Franklin thinks Schröder should have followed. She argues that it is not justifiable to regard $x < y + z$ as requiring fundamentally different treatment according as x , y and z stand for terms or for propositions. Schröder had maintained that, when the letters represent propositions, it is not possible, as it is on the view that we are dealing with classes, for x to be divided up between y and z . To this his critic says that in material consequences, such as "if it rains, either I stay in or else I take an umbrella," the proposition is satisfied if there are some instances in which I stay in and some in which I take my umbrella. She fails to observe that the introduction of the word "instances" does away with the special character of the sequence, and reduces the problem to one of class implication. So long as propositions as such are retained, Schröder is undoubtedly correct in saying that x cannot be divided up between y and z .

Again, Mrs. Ladd-Franklin points out that there is a close resemblance between what she terms logical sequence and the case where the left-hand member of the subsumption stands for a singular subject. But this is not any reason for regarding the question whether we allow literal symbols to stand for terms or for propositions as one of indifference. Such a statement as "she is either a queen or a fairy" is one of those limiting cases for whose investigation in general we are so much indebted to Dr. Venn. It is quite correct to say that "there seems, in fact, to be a close relationship between the logical sequence between propositions, and the sequence between terms when the subject is singular," but Schröder's general argument is not thereby invalidated: the original formulæ must be modified to suit the case of the proposition with singular subject and disjunctive predicate, just as there must be modification to meet the case where terms stand for propositions. Mrs. Ladd-Franklin's answer to Schröder, when he asks what can possibly be meant by $(a - < b) = \bar{a} + b$ on the supposition that the letters stand for terms instead of for propositions, appears to me to be quite sound. She says that the verbal rendering will naturally be as follows:—"All a is b " is-the-same-thing-as "everything is either non- a or else b ." But all that is hereby demonstrated is that the letters in a certain equation may have two different readings: there is here no argument to prove that it is a matter of indifference, so far as rules of application are concerned, whether our letters in a problem stand for terms or for propositions.

In stating the facts of the case we have, therefore, to avoid two extremes. On the one hand it is incorrect to say that all the rules apply equally well for both classes and propositions, and on the other hand we need not go so far as to state that the rules are different in the two regions. The former statement is erroneous, the latter suggests more disparity between the two procedures than actually exists.

It has been mentioned also that writers sometimes maintain that symbols should be employed exclusively to represent propositions. Mr. MacColl takes this view of the case. But I can see no valid reason why symbols may not designate now classes and now propositions. The only thing to be remembered is that the rules of procedure are not quite the same in the two cases. If we are to be restricted to one only of the two uses, then I think that Venn is justified in saying that symbols should stand for classes rather than for propositions. As regards the question of economy of space in the solution of problems, the evidence seems to show that the class interpretation is to be preferred. Certainly this is the case so far as the representation of the syllogism—after all an important form of reasoning—is concerned. I do not lay much stress upon the argument based on space-economy. At any rate, we ought not to judge systems by the amount of working that has been offered when the exponents were dealing with certain well-known problems, because as a rule the symbolist could, if he had so chosen, have made his solution much more compact than he did. Still, seeing that symbolism is an aid to thought, we need not despise brevity, if thought is thereby rendered the greater assistance.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC AND MODALS.

In close connection with the subject as to whether Symbolic Logic deals primarily or exclusively with propositions, is the question as to the kind of propositions to which in any case it must confine itself. The symbolist can deal with assertorics only. It has, however, sometimes been held that certain other propositions fall within the scope of his treatment. For instance, he is said to be able to manipulate propositions that are "probably true." I think he has nothing to do with such material, for the simple reason that it does not exist. Mrs. Bryant, in her suggestive paper on "The Relation of

Mathematics to General Formal Logic,"* still holds to the view that it is a legitimate subject of inquiry when we ask concerning a proposition "how often is it true relative to the total number of cases its occurrence in every one of which would constitute its unconditional truth?" Two considerations show that this question is not an intelligible one. In the first place, it is a mistake to speak of a proposition as being *often* true, for on each supposed occasion of its truth there would be a new proposition. In the second place, though unconditional truth may well be established from certain true propositions, this establishment is due simply to the fact that such propositions are true, and not to the fact that they are *always* true. Mrs. Bryant escapes the mistake of speaking of degrees of truth, but she falls into an equally serious error in holding that a proposition may more or less frequently be true. She is quite correct in saying that "a proposition is the assertion of a joint event," but when this assertion is once made it is either true or it is false: it cannot be probably true. It may be more or less probable that the events ought to be joined in the way asserted by the proposition, but such probability is a matter to be taken into consideration before the assertion is made. The error in question arises apparently through the confusion of proposition with event. The probability of an event is certainly measured "by the ratio of the number of cases in which it occurs to the whole number of cases considered," but the probability of the truth of a proposition has no meaning. We may not, as she would allow us, write "proposition" for "event" and "is true" for "occurs."

Nor can the symbolist manipulate propositions respecting probabilities, unless he recognises that he is dealing with an affirmation of the relation in which a thinker stands to a certain statement. That is to say, the symbolist will still be engaged upon assertoric propositions. Mr. Johnson has made

* *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, vol. ii, N.S., p. 121.

this quite clear. As he expresses it, 'these assertions about the probability that a predicate is to be attached to a subject relate to a different plane from the one with which pure Logic is concerned. They refer to the obligation under which the thinker finds himself to accept a statement of an assertoric kind, but the propositions that engage the attention of the logician are these assertorics themselves.

And in the same way that the symbolist cannot without the use of new terms deal with propositions asserting probabilities, so, unless the same procedure is adopted, he must consider as outside his province many of the kinds of propositions that are mentioned in the very ingenious system that has been elaborated by Mr. MacColl. This logician holds that the symbolist, besides classifying propositions into true and false, may make other classifications according to the necessities of the problem. Thus, in addition to the probable, improbable and even propositions already mentioned, there are those that are certain, impossible or variable, those that are known to be true, known to be false, and neither known to be true nor known to be false, and so on. The objection to this procedure is based on the fact that the considerations according to which such classifications are reached all refer to the relation in which the thinker stands to the proposition, and not to the proposition itself. All such facts as Mr. MacColl has in view can be dealt with in Symbolic Logic, but it is in their case necessary to introduce new terms. Thus, take the case of a proposition A , which we will suppose to be false. We have then symbolically $A = 0$. Now, suppose we introduce the conception involved in the words "it is known," the proposition that we shall have to deal with will be "that it is known that A is false is true." It will still be a case of truth or falsehood, but the propositions that are declared true are not the same. Mr. MacColl is, therefore, incorrect in stating that his $A : B$ is *stronger* than $A < B$: it is not a matter of strength, it is a matter of an entirely different proposition.

It will be seen from these considerations why it is that the same writer's recent explanations of his views are unsatisfactory.* He maintains, for instance, that his formula $(A : x) + (B : x) : (AB : x)$ is true, but that he could not use the formula $(A : x) + (B : x) = (AB : x)$. He grants that the latter is true when $A : x$ means $(\bar{A} + x)$, but not when we have the meaning that he assigns to $A : x$, viz., $(\bar{A} + x)^e$, i.e., "it is certain that A implies x ." In unfolding his view, Mr. MacColl takes an illustration, in which the chances that A is x are 3 to 5, that B is x are 3 to 5, and that AB is x are 1, and his demonstration that under these circumstances the former of the above formulæ alone holds good is doubtless sound. But he is not justified in constructing formulæ upon this plane. At any rate, those that he here constructs form no part of pure Logic, for in this the force of the proposition consists in the definite erasure of certain compartments. If Mr. MacColl wishes to deal with the data he mentions he should introduce new terms. Pure Logic can take account of the uncertainties that such data occasion, but the propositions dealt with will then denote not the relation of the respective letters to x , but the relation of the thinker to each implication.

And here I may perhaps in passing notice the argument advanced by Mr. MacColl in his criticism of the ordinary employment of 1 and 0 in propositional Logic.† His object is to show that such usage leads to absurdity. To do this he commences by affirming that since 1 and 0 denote true and false propositions respectively, these symbols represent two mutually exclusive *classes* of propositions. Hence the definition $0 < 1$ should assert that every false proposition is a true proposition, which is absurd. My reply to this is that it rests on a misunderstanding. For 1 and 0 never do represent true and false propositions, and consequently two mutually exclusive

* *Mind*, N.S., No. 47, p. 355.

† *Ibid.*, p. 357.

classes of propositions. The symbols denote respectively the only possibility and no possibility: we do not refer to a class at all. The introduction here of the definition $0 < 1$ is, therefore, altogether unjustifiable.

SYMBOLS OF OPERATION.

Next as regards the method of connecting the term-symbols. For a long time it was thought to be absolutely necessary to use symbols of operation, but Dr. Keynes has shown that the most complicated problems may be solved with the greatest ease without such use. The words "and" and "or" are amply sufficient in his hands for the connection of the term-symbols, while to connect the subject-group with the predicate-group he needs not to depart from the customary "is." Still, as Mr. Johnson points out, Keynes has hardly developed a logical calculus, for this is characterized by the mechanical application of a few logical rules.

But I may say that there is a difference of opinion among logicians as to the best manner in which to describe the advanced work that has been done by Dr. Keynes. On the one hand it is said that he has hardly developed a calculus, and on the other hand the question is asked whether his methods can fairly claim to belong to the Common Logic.* Venn thinks that these methods would never have been reached without a training in the earlier symbolic systems, for "the spirit of the methods is throughout of the mathematical type." And Venn, in the second edition of his *Symbolic Logic*, which appeared after the publication of Keynes' work, repeats the statement made in the first edition to the effect that the want of symmetry in the predication view of the proposition forbids its extension and generalisation.† Thus, if

* See Venn, in *Mind*, vol. ix, p. 304.

† *Symbolic Logic*, 2nd ed., p. 29.

Keynes' work is not a calculus and does not belong to the Common Logic, it is a little difficult to know how to classify it. My own view is that it is what he claims it to be, a generalisation of (common) logical processes. There are no symbols that are suggestive of Mathematics except the bracket, and none suggestive of earlier symbolic work except x for not- X . The distinction between subject and predicate is observed, and the use of the copula is retained. There is generalisation of the various forms of immediate inference commonly recognised, as well as of mediate arguments involving three or more terms. Whether the processes can be readily described as a calculus is perhaps doubtful. Certainly Keynes does not reach his conclusions from the mechanical application of a very few fundamental laws, but the rules that he does employ are after all not very numerous, and with a little practice can be applied with almost mechanical facility. I agree with Venn that it is difficult to suppose that such methods would have been reached without study of existing symbolic systems, and there is a distinct resemblance between certain parts of Keynes' treatment of the subject and that given in Schröder's *Operationskreis*, to which work frequent reference is made in the notes of the *Formal Logic*. Still, whatever may have been the history of the growth of the subject in the writer's mind, now that the methods are thus presented I think that they should be regarded as a generalisation of the common logical processes.

Most writers on the subject of Symbolic Logic have undoubtedly introduced symbols of operation, and the four following, as is well known, have frequently been used:— $+$, $-$, \times , \div , to denote respectively aggregation, subduction, restriction, and the discovery of a class which on restriction by a denominator yields the corresponding numerator. Of course, other symbols might have been used to designate precisely these operations, and it may be well to ask whether, seeing that these symbols are employed in a special region of

thought, it is well to have them employed in both regions. If they had first been used by the class logician, would the thinker who deals with numbers have done wisely in adopting them in his science? There is no reason, of course, in the nature of things why they should not have been employed in Logic first of all, but they were in use long before the logician began to look around him for some symbols suitable for the operations he had to perform. Did Boole, therefore, act wisely in making use of these symbols in his solutions? In some respects he did wisely, and in some he did not. He did wisely because there is some analogy between certain processes of Mathematics and those of Logic; for instance, the commutative and associative laws are applicable in both regions. And, even in cases where most of all it may be said that the adoption of mathematical symbols is likely to mislead, there is little risk of error if we regard the symbols as "representing the operation, and merely denoting the result."*

Thus, $\frac{0}{a}$, which in Mathematics denotes zero, might, regarded solely as a result, be taken in Logic to stand for "nothing"; but, when we remember that the symbol also points to an operation, no confusion need arise. It becomes obvious, that is to say, that we here have the result of finding a class which upon restriction by a gives 0, which class is immediately seen to be \bar{a} .

Boole did wisely also—though perhaps somewhat unconsciously—in that by employing these symbols he directed, as Mr. Johnson has remarked, far more attention to the study of Symbolic Logic than the subject would otherwise have received.

On the other hand, it may be doubted whether the analogy between the two sets of processes is sufficient to justify the application of the same symbols. The law that $xx = x$, for instance, is largely operative in the logical region while being

* Mrs. Bryant, *loc. cit.*, p. 108.

almost entirely inapplicable in Mathematics. Moreover, had Boole not adopted these symbols there would have been avoided the many disputes concerning the propriety of using them. Without doubt, out of all the controversy on the subject some truth has emerged, but it is probable that, had the relations of classes or of propositions received the attention that the disputants gave to a comparison of the mathematical and logical processes, Symbolic Logic would have made more rapid strides than it has done. The wonderful mathematical structure was erected without reference to what the logician was doing, or whether he was doing anything, and it may be that the logical structure would have been more imposing if the builder had concentrated his thought upon his own work instead of casting side glances to see what was occupying the attention of the mathematician.

Much discussion has arisen concerning three of these four symbols of operation, and it is stimulating to thought to weigh the arguments that have been advanced in connection with them. First, with regard to the sign $+$. Boole always used this sign on the understanding that the terms so joined are exclusives. It was his special merit, so it has been affirmed, to improve on the common vagueness. That is to say, if "or" on the popular view means anything from absolute exclusion to identity, then the logician is called upon to improve on the ordinary view when he states his premises in symbolic language. It has also been maintained that there is a very great advantage in adopting the exclusive notation, inasmuch as there is then rendered possible the introduction of inverse operations. That is, before ab can be subtracted from an aggregate of terms, it must be known that the aggregate contains ab —if the matter were left open there could be no subtraction. Similarly with division. If a class is to be found which on restriction by a denominator is to yield the numerator, then there must be no indefiniteness as to what this numerator is.

On the other hand, it is maintained that, for the purpose of expressing the premises in symbolic form, much economy of space and time is effected if the non-exclusive method is adopted. Further, on this plan it is possible to arrive at the contradictory by a very simple process. The demonstration of this is one of the most original parts of Schröder's work.* He showed in the *Operationskreis* that the contradictory of $(a b)_1$ is $(a_1 + b_1)$, and that of $(a + b)_1$ is $a_1 b_1$ —in the *Vorlesungen* the proposition appears as No. 36. Of course, Jevons had previously argued that the individual does often think in the non-exclusive fashion, but this is no reason why such notation should be adopted in the logical calculus. It was for Schröder to point out that by the adoption of the method in the calculus problems could be solved more easily than on the Boolean plan; and not only would the process be easier, but, what Schröder thinks to be still more important, each step would be intuitively obvious, and justifiable on purely logical grounds. As a result of the long debate, the non-exclusive notation has undoubtedly found favour, and Venn in his second edition adopts it, having come, as he says, to recognise its "brevity and symmetry," but still holding to the view that the question is one of method rather than of principle. Having thus changed his opinion, Venn has, of course, either to reject all inverse processes, or else to revert to the exclusive notation when dealing with them.

The confusion which has been stirred up by many of those who have discussed this question is greater, perhaps, than is to be found in any other part of Logic. It is very common to find no distinction made between (1) what actually takes place in disjunctive thinking, (2) what is the treatment of the disjunctive judgment in the text-books that discuss the elementary rules of formal logic, and (3) what way of dealing with the disjunctive is the most serviceable for a generalised logic.

* See Adamson's excellent critical notice in *Mind*, vol. x, p. 252.

These three points of view were made clear by Dr. Venn long ago, but they are quite neglected even now in some discussions. For instance, Mr. Ross set out recently * "to try to determine the import of the disjunctive judgment, and to find out the exact place which it occupies in the connected whole of logical thought." He then proceeds to criticize Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet (who are, let it be observed, talking about the manner in which we are thinking when we are thinking disjunctively) by appealing to considerations based on common logical usages. But obviously the practices of the logician can never define the actual form of the judgment. Somewhat later, when Mr. Ross advances "other considerations which go to show how inexpedient it is to treat the disjunctive judgment as necessarily exclusive," it becomes particularly noticeable that he fails to distinguish between two entirely different questions, one of fact and one of convenience. He actually proposes to show how *inexpedient* it is that alternatives *are* (in Bradley's view) exclusive of each other!

To put the matter in the simplest possible form, when Boole meets with some premises involving alternatives, he asks whether he is to regard the alternatives as exclusives or not. Then, if the answer is in the negative, Boole will write down $x\bar{y} + \bar{x}y + xy$, where x and y were the original non-exclusive alternatives. If Schröder meets with the same premises, he will, of course, also want to know if the alternatives are exclusives, and when informed that they are not, he will write down $x + y$. Then each symbolist may go to work with his special rules, and each may obtain the correct solution. Thus it is the person supplying the problem who places the symbolist in a position to commence the solution. I should not have put the matter in such an elementary form as this were not the many confusions that still exist a sufficient justification. The word "should" has misled Mr. Ross. It

* *Mind*, N.S., No. 48, p. 489.

may mean, "How ought I to describe the actual facts in the mind of the individual who is thinking a disjunctive judgment?" Or it may mean, "How ought I to put down in words or other symbols the facts that constitute the disjunctive thought?"

It is relevant here to notice also Mr. Bradley's treatment of the subject of alternatives. He wishes to show that alternatives are exclusives, and his procedure is to refer to the state of things when they are *not* exclusives.* Evidently, therefore, alternatives can as a matter of fact be either. To put the same thing in other words, Mr. Bradley says that when alternatives are not exclusives we are thinking slovenly. But slovenly thinking is still thinking, though we may readily grant that it is not "always safe." Mr. Bradley seems to have been led to this argument through a confusion of the kind we have just mentioned. He sees difficulties in the way of reasoning if we state the premises symbolically in the non-exclusive manner, and so he argues that those premises must have been given in the exclusive manner. But obviously they may have been given in either form, though we must know which before we can put them down in symbols. When information upon the subject is forthcoming, we can adopt either the exclusive or the non-exclusive method of representation. It has been pointed out that Mr. Ross attempts to show the inexpediency of the fact that alternatives are (in Mr. Bradley's view) exclusives. We now see that Mr. Bradley was led to regard alternatives as exclusives by reflecting how inexpedient it would be if they are not.

Concerning the employment of the sign (—) some difference of opinion has also arisen. In the first place, it has been pointed out that the sign is not absolutely necessary, since subduction may always be expressed symbolically as restriction. But, though this is true, the reply has reasonably been made

* *The Principles of Logic*, p. 124.

that it is frequently more convenient to employ the minus sign, and that no logical considerations render such employment illegitimate. But it is to be noted that only as denoting subduction is the use of the sign appropriate. If the attempt is made to designate negative terms by prefixing $(-)$ to the positive, only error can result. For, as Venn points out, the tendency then becomes almost irresistible to transfer a term with changed sign to the other side of the equation, and this will mean that a statement is made concerning a class about which the premises give no information.

So far all is clear concerning the use of the minus. But sometimes it is employed where the calculus is based on the intensive rendering of propositions, and the use in this way deserves some consideration. Castillon has carried out more consistently than any other writer the development of Symbolic Logic on intensive lines, and I shall restrict my remarks here to his treatment of the sign in question. What he means by $(-)$ becomes evident when we observe his symbolic representation of the universal negative and of its converse. This proposition appears as $S = -A + M$, by which he means that the attributes embraced under S are not co-existent with those embraced under A , but are co-existent with those embraced under M .^{*} Then he affirms that such proposition may be converted thus: $A = -S + M$. Clearly, then, what Castillon means—and he says as much—by the $(-)$ is the mental act of keeping apart, of analysis. But as he has thus far been criticized,[†] he is supposed in the original proposition to assign to S two aggregates, consisting respectively of negative and positive attributes. But this is what he distinctly avoids doing. When such infinite judgment, as he calls it, is to be designated, he employs the form $S = (-A) + M$.

^{*} *Sur un nouvel algorithme logique*, p. 10.

[†] Venn, *Symbolic Logic*, 2nd ed., p. 466.

Moreover, if he had meant what Venn thinks he did, the converse of the universal negative would, of course, have been $(-A) = S - M$. Is, then, Castillon justified in converting in the way he does? Obviously not. For to proceed from $S = -A + M$ to $A = -S + M$ is to conclude that A is co-existent with M , a statement which is at variance with the original proposition. So that on intensive lines, as these are laid down by Castillon, it is not in general allowable, any more than it is in extensive Logic, to transfer letters with changed sign to the other side of the $(=)$.

The last sign that need claim our attention is the one corresponding to the (\div) of the mathematics of quantity. Has this inverse process any rightful place in Symbolic Logic, or is it a survival of merely historical interest? I hold that for two reasons the process ought without hesitation to be retained. In the first place, the mental exercise involved in arriving at the comprehension of what is implied in the performance of such inverse operation is, as Venn maintains, of the greatest utility. And, in the second place, the operation is capable of yielding absolutely reliable results. It may be stated in reply to this that, in the performance of the so-called logical division, we utilise symbols that are from the logical standpoint quite meaningless, and that such a procedure is not warrantable; that, in other words, we should follow on the lines which Schröder has laid down, who makes all intermediate processes intelligible. But in answer to this it is to be noted that a calculus is a mechanical contrivance for arriving at results that cannot be intuitively reached. Having given our premises we state them in symbolic language, then manipulate this in accordance with a few simple logical laws, and so reach our conclusion. Whether or not the intermediate results are intelligible is of no importance whatever. Thus even if the intermediate processes in Logic were unintelligible, as is often affirmed, the inverse operations quite reasonably find their place in the calculus.

But, as a matter of fact, the stages between the statement of the premises and the arrival at the conclusion are not meaningless. Certainly Boole never attempted to assign them a meaning, but Venn has carefully examined all the various forms that arise as a result of "division," and he has shown that they have a perfectly intelligible logical signification. The words of explanation that are given by Mrs. Bryant as to how imaginary results arise are not therefore required in the strictly logical realm. It will be remembered that she says, "Whenever a subject is reduced to symbolic expression, imaginary results may be expected to appear, and this happens because the operations of thought which the combining symbols represent extend in application beyond the possibilities of the subject-matter." * No doubt that sentence throws light on a difficult question. But as Boole's forms have all been assigned a strictly logical explanation by Venn, it cannot be asserted that in Logic there are unintelligible expressions that call for consideration. There appeared to be such when Boole published his results, but that was only because he did not perform the task of explicitly stating the logical significance of the forms in question.

To reject inverse processes, as does Mrs. Ladd-Franklin, for instance, is deliberately to throw away useful instruments for solving problems. At the same time, she is undoubtedly correct in showing how important is that interpretation of alternatives which will allow of our reaching the contradictory with ease. The most satisfactory conclusion of the whole matter is that which Venn has formed, namely, to adopt as a rule the non-exclusive rendering, so as to profit by the simple rule for contradiction; but to change to the exclusive notation at times, in order that the advantages to be derived from the employment of inverse operations may not be lost.

* *Loc. cit.*, p. 131.

THE PROVINCE OF THE LOGIC OF RELATIVES.

Perhaps there is no term in Logic which the reader is likely to find so perplexing as the term "Logic of Relatives." He not unreasonably supposes when he comes to this part of the subject that he is going to consider all those expressions whose subject and predicate are not connected by the copula "is," but by the many other words or phrases that frequently join these fundamental portions of a proposition. Such general treatment of copulæ is undoubtedly what the term in question suggests to the mind, and this is the extension that De Morgan at any rate had in view. But in modern logical works this investigation is given up as hopeless, and instead of it we are introduced to the subject of multiple quantifications. Of course, such alteration in the subject-matter need not have involved any confusion, and some writers have made it perfectly clear to their readers that the problem investigated is no longer the wider one. But Mr. Peirce calls the new enquiry by the old name "Logic of Relatives," and such a procedure is very misleading.*

The important question at once arises whether the larger investigation is bound to be fruitless, and, if so, why such is the case. I think that a general treatment of copulæ cannot be undertaken by the logician, because we need in every case to have a piece of special information given us beyond the propositions that form the premises. Such information is necessary whether the conclusion is reached syllogistically or intuitively without the use of syllogism. That such additional proposition is required before the reasoning can be brought under the rules of syllogism is very clear. Take the case mentioned by Jevons. He says: "If I argue, for instance, that because Daniel Bernoulli was the son of John, and John the brother of James, therefore Daniel was the

* Johns Hopkins' *Studies in Logic*, p. 192; *American Jour. of Math.*, vol. iii.

nephew of James, it is not possible to prove this conclusion by any simple logical process"; we need also to be informed that the son of a brother is a nephew. Again, to take a case mentioned by Venn: "If the distance of A and of B from C is exactly a mile, that of A from B (the relation desired) may be anything not exceeding two miles"; here the additional proposition would have to contain information concerning the angular measurements of the triangle made by joining the points occupied by the three persons, and to declare in general terms what, under such circumstances, is the distance between two persons situated as are A and B. In still more indefinite circumstances of relation we should have to possess a still more complicated piece of information along with the original statements. Hence we must undoubtedly reject the doctrine that was once frequently held on this subject, viz., that such an argument as "A equals B, B equals C, therefore A equals C," is, when put in another form, an actual case of syllogistic reasoning. The opponents of such a view were quite right when they argued that this putting into another form involves a *petitio principii*. De Morgan, for instance, made this rejoinder, and Keynes is in agreement with him. Before, then, all possible premises of the kind in question can be dealt with syllogistically there will be needed an infinite number of such special pieces of information, and this amounts to saying that a general treatment of relatives is impossible. If, on the other hand, the validity of such arguments as we are considering is declared not to be established by means of syllogism, but to be as intuitively evident as the validity of *Barbara* itself, the statement means, I take it, that in each case there is involved a separate dictum, corresponding to the dictum of the syllogism. Since, however, the number of such cases is unlimited, there will be an infinite number of dicta in our Logic, which again is impossible.

The way out of the difficulty appears to be the following. It must be admitted that such propositions as the above are not susceptible of being so manipulated that they shall be put into

sylogistic form. Also it is absurd to suppose that we have at our disposal an infinite number of major premises or of dicta. Hence the general treatment of copulæ is impossible. But what we can do is to admit an arbitrary number of general propositions other than the *dictum de omni*, and the propositions thus admitted allow of our dealing with a limited number of arguments like the above. There is a special group of such statements of great importance, and they occur in the region of quantitative mathematics. I regard the axioms of Geometry as being among the assumptions that are necessary in order to allow of the application of sylogistic reasoning to propositions of that science. It is a verbal matter whether we call the additional information, that is required, by the name of dictum. I should say that it may be so called when the same information is required in a large number of instances, as is the case, for instance, with the so-called axioms in Euclid. Where such additional information is used once only, it is preferable to employ a less pretentious term.

Of course it may with good reason be here asked whether there is such fundamental difference between the *dictum de omni* and the other general propositions (say the axioms of quantitative mathematics) as to give such unique importance to the former. Are not those axioms, as De Morgan affirms,* "equally necessary, equally self-evident, equally incapable of demonstration out of more simple elements" with the *dictum*, and, if so, are not the two equally important? My view is that whatever may be the character of the two kinds of axioms as regards derivation and self-evidence, they are not of equal importance. For in all reasoning concerning quantities the *dictum de omni* is required, while in reasoning concerning qualities, where, of course, the *dictum* is also needed, the axioms of quantitative mathematics afford no assistance. De Morgan in another place† endeavours to show that questions of equality

* *Trans. Camb. Philosoph. Soc.*, vol. x, p. 338.

† *Syllabus of a Proposed System of Logic*, pp. 31, 32.

and of identity are formally on an equal footing, since "the word *equals* is a copula in thought, and not a *notion attached to a predicate*," and that "logic is an analysis of the form of thought, possible and actual, and the logician has no right to declare that other than the actual is actual." The answer to this appears to be that, though the individual does actually regard the "*equals*" as a copula, he does so only by a process of abbreviation: the form when fully expressed is one of identity. The logician is not bound to treat as of fundamental importance each kind of abbreviation that mankind has adopted. It is enough for him to deal with the fully expressed form, and to explain, as we have done above, that in other apparent examples of formal reasoning there is only a syllogistic process plus some material assumptions. In this discussion we have been considering cases in which only three terms are involved, and the matter has been regarded from the point of view of ordinary Formal Logic. In this narrower region the *dictum* is unique. But from such statements it is not to be concluded that we shall not when discussing the generalisation of logical processes reject the *dictum*. It will be rejected, however, not because it is not in a unique way of a formal character, but because it applies to only three terms, and we must adopt axioms that are "necessary and sufficient" for dealing with arguments of any degree of complexity.

At first sight the above statement of the case appears perhaps to agree with the view that Boole adopted. But there is really no such agreement. Boole held that general logic is quantitative mathematics with the quantity element left out, that is to say, class logic and quantitative mathematics participate in the nature of general logic, and have in addition their own special characteristics. It seems to me, on the other hand, that quantitative mathematics is a combination of the quantitative element and the principles of class or propositional logic. There are not two species of the genus general logic: there is one logic, and that is class or propositional logic, and

all that there is in mathematics is such logic, together with some material assumptions concerning quantitative objects. No argument whatever can be carried on in quantitative mathematics without the explicit or implicit application of class or propositional logic at every step. Certainly Boole appeared to establish two species of reasoning, when he applied the symbols of mathematics to the manipulation of arguments involving classes; but what he was really doing was to show how qualitative reasoning, if we employ in it symbols analogous to those that represent quantitative objects and processes, may be extended far beyond the limits of the old syllogistic arguments. To put the matter in a word, I recognise only the so-called specific logic of quality, and I regard quantitative reasoning as merely qualitative reasoning together with certain assumptions concerning the relations of quantities. As Dr. Shadworth H. Hodgson says,* formal logic "is a system wholly unrestricted in its range," or, as he adds, class Logic is "the Logic of the whole nature of any and every object of thought, of its *What*, *τί ἐστί*, of its *Quid*, which includes both its *Quale* and its *Quantum*." That is to say, class Logic has to do with the relation of classes whether qualitatively or quantitatively determined.

It need hardly be said that though Jevons speaks of the necessity of there being additional information, before the proposition that I have quoted from him can be manipulated, he does not make any general statement on the subject. And he evidently considers that all such arguments form a class distinct from the miscellaneous selection which he brings forward in illustration of his principle of Substitution. My view is rather that his illustrations are special cases of relative reasoning, and that this is not in general possible except on the lines that I have endeavoured to indicate.

When it is stated, as was the case at the commencement of this section, that the expression "Logic of Relatives," as now

* *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S., vol. ii, p. 135.

used, refers only to the operations performed upon propositions involving multiple quantifications, it is not meant to suggest that this investigation is not important. On the other hand, I think that we have here a development of the greatest interest. One problem that we have to solve in this part of the subject concerns the method of synthesizing these multiply-quantified propositions. Another problem is when we are given such a synthesis, and have to find the least determinate alternant that will explain the given synthesis, or the most determinate determinant that the synthesis implies.* An investigation of the principles, according to which these results may be reached, naturally follows the study of the subject-matter of ordinary Symbolic Logic, in which, of course, we are concerned with singly-quantified propositions.

THE UTILITY OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC.

A few words may be added as to the utility of Symbolic Logic. Of the educational advantages arising from the concentration of thought that the discipline demands, it is impossible to speak too highly. On all sides the educational utility of mathematical study is recognised, but I venture to state that Symbolic Logic takes no second place in this respect. Probably, also, everyone would allow that the generalised treatment of thought throws much light upon problems that appear in the special or syllogistic treatment. As regards the direct utility of the discipline, the question is somewhat complex. It may readily be granted that natural science cannot make any direct use of Symbolic Logic. Mathematics is absolutely necessary for an insight into Nature's laws, but natural science is not immediately furthered by the rules of the logical calculus. Jevons seems to think that the facts point in the other direction, for he held that science is advanced by means of the Substitution of Similars. But the truth is that science

* *Mind*, N.S., No. 3, p. 354.

must supply the premises upon which the symbolic logician may bring to bear his mechanical contrivances.

The position of Jevons on this subject is, I think, still at times somewhat misunderstood. Mr. E. C. Benecke, for instance, affirms that Jevons did not intend the symbolic system as developed in the *Principles of Science* to assist in the advancement of knowledge.* But surely this is not a correct view of Jevons' position, for he maintained that "the *Substitution of Similars* is a phrase which seems aptly to express the capacity of mutual replacement existing in any two objects which are like or equivalent to a sufficient degree,† and "in every act of inference or scientific method we are engaged about a certain identity, sameness, similarity, likeness, resemblance, analogy, equivalence or equality apparent between two objects."‡ Nothing could be clearer than these statements. Jevons thought and said that the principles of his symbolic calculus were applicable for the advancement of science. Mr. Benecke is apparently of opinion that Jevons in the *Principles of Science* first developed a symbolic calculus, and then proceeded to deal with scientific methods. But the whole book has to do with the methods of science (as Croom Robertson says, "the Methods, rather than the Principles, of Science, would, perhaps, be a more appropriate title for the book as it stands"), and the latter portion of the volume is engaged not upon an investigation quite distinct from that which occupies the former part, but with the work of ascertaining "when and for what purposes a degree of similarity less than complete identity is sufficient to warrant substitution." This substitution is all along held to be the fundamental process.

And here, by way of parenthesis, I may perhaps be allowed to make a few further remarks upon the logical position of Jevons. It is impossible for readers of Symbolic Logic not to

* *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S., vol. ii, p. 141.

† *The Principles of Science*, p. 17.

‡ *Loc. cit.*, p. 1.

give his views frequent consideration, and it will be useful to inquire how far he has contributed to the erection of the symbolic structure. Students of Venn cannot but be impressed with the fact that many of Jevons' proposals are of little or no value. I have drawn up as full a statement of the case as I have been able to reach. Jevons' doctrine of the superiority of the equation $x = xy$ to represent the universal affirmative is erroneous, for this form is immediately reducible to $x = \frac{0}{0}y$ or $x = v.y$. It is impossible to adopt his method of denoting particular propositions, for though he avoids the difficulty apparent in the Boolean system, where $\frac{0}{0}$ is taken to denote complete indefiniteness, such escape is effected by employing the postulate that no term whatever shall be equivalent to 0. This would exclude the possibilities of a calculus, for a collection of consistent propositions may eventually be found to have established the entire destruction of a certain term.* I should agree with this criticism of Venn's, but I do not think that Jevons would have done so; he would probably have replied that if such collection of propositions resulted in such a destruction then the group was not perfectly consistent. Again, we have already seen that Jevons' argument against using the exclusive notation in Logic is not valid, though since his time this method of dealing with alternatives has been largely adopted: his point was that we do often think in the non-exclusive manner, but this is no reason why we should do so in our symbolic reasoning. He certainly drew up a table by which a type of proposition may be reached for the solution of the inverse problem in the case of three terms, but he did little more than indicate the difficulty involved in solving the inverse problem in general. Moreover, his doctrine that Induction is to be identified with this inverse method is quite

* Venn, *Symbolic Logic*, p. 156.

erroneous, for, as Mr. Johnson has most perspicuously shown, the series of propositions that Jevons desires to reach are only determinants of the data—are, that is to say, neither more general nor more conjectural than the data. Jevons' conception of Boole's idea of the scope of mathematics was, previous to the second edition of the *Principles of Science*, altogether mistaken, and hence the attempts in the earlier edition to "divest his (Boole's) system of a mathematical dress" could not result in much that is useful.* But even in the second edition the inaccurate notion has only partially disappeared. Boole's is still a quasi-mathematical system, still requires "the manipulation of mathematical symbols in a very intricate and perplexing manner." Jevons, in holding the view that the process of subtraction is useless because the same operation can be represented as one of restriction, passes over the fact that each may be useful at times. His objection that, because he admits the Law of Unity into his system, Boole must necessarily have done the same, is without force, since Boole was not guilty of any inconsistency in the omission. Jevons declared that $\frac{0}{0}$ cannot be understood without reference to the mathematics of quantity, an assertion which is refuted from the simplest logical considerations. His statement that inverse operations are impossible is contradicted by the history of Symbolic Logic. I do not profess that this list is complete, but it must be confessed that, though Jevons stimulated logical thought much more extensively than most men are enabled to do, his actual contributions to the development of Symbolic Logic were few and relatively unimportant. His great powers were, in short, less successfully occupied in the logical than in the mathematical realm. In pure economic theory and in currency investigations, where in both cases the argument is almost entirely concerning quantities, his work is of the utmost value,

* G. B. Halsted, in *Mind*, No. 9, p. 134.

and has placed him in the very first rank of thinkers upon such subjects.

To resume the main discussion of this section, we have said that Symbolic Logic does not directly lead us to any new truths in natural science. It is, however, by no means the case that no new truth at all, but only a recognition in another form of the information contained in the premises is reached by means of the calculus. For what is a new truth? It is an accurate subject-predicate combination that an individual forms, but which has never till then been formed in the history of the race. Now such a combination may be reached deductively or inductively. It was a new truth when the conclusion of Euc. I, 47, was for the first time reached, just as it was a new truth when Adams and Leverrier discovered the planet Neptune. In a second sense a truth may be said to be new when, though well known to science, the full force of the subject-predicate combination is for the first time grasped by the mind of a student. Here again the above-mentioned combinations may take equal rank in their claims to be designated new. And, just as in pure Mathematics the results may constitute new truths in both of the above senses, so in Symbolic Logic we may be said in the same senses to reach a new truth. For instance, the difficult problem that was first solved by Boole* gave a result that was true and altogether new, and this solution, which is well known to all symbolists, is the occasion of the experience of a new truth in the mind of each student of the subject.

Moreover, though it be correct, as we have seen, to say that Symbolic Logic cannot directly assist the individual in his scientific pursuits or in his daily affairs, the indirect help of the discipline in each of these regions is by no means insignificant. Mankind is consciously or semi-consciously much occupied with questions that turn upon the relations of classes,

* Boole, *Laws of Thought*, pp. 146-148.

so that the manner of looking at things which the logical study makes habitual cannot fail to be of service in practical concerns. Instead of confining himself to things that are seen, the logician spontaneously is led to regard the things that are not seen. It has become a custom with him to consider the \bar{x} as of equal value with the x . The truth is not that his logically-developed habits are not applicable to the affairs of ordinary life, but rather that he will so weigh the pros and cons of a question that his active forces will be apt to suffer from a certain paralysis. The man of strong will, who has a more or less vivid idea of one aspect of a practical problem, is much more likely to achieve a great deal than the man who sees accurately both sides. Hence the dilemma faces us whether it is better to act vigorously, and accomplish much that has to be revised and largely undone, or to produce only a small amount, but such as needs little alteration.

Now, if the study of Symbolic Logic is thus indirectly of use in natural science and in practical affairs, then *a fortiori* the study is of service to the philosopher. For I take it that we philosophize rather in order to know than in order to act, and therefore in philosophy there is no danger whatever arising from seeing the other side of a question. I think, moreover, that the principles of Symbolic Logic point in a striking manner to the fact that in philosophical researches we shall always be left with a duality, however far we press our investigations. Attempts to reduce the world to unity—to God, to Self, to Nature, for instance—appear to be doomed to fail. In this extreme case our 1 means the totality of the existent, the universe in the common acceptation of that term. As before, $x + \bar{x} = 1$ of necessity, and with this necessity we are obliged to stop. We cannot establish the existence of x only, for there is no premise available with the information that $\bar{x} = 0$. For instance, let x stand for "God," then \bar{x} will stand for "not-God." Now, if we attempt to demonstrate the non-existence of \bar{x} , we shall be proceeding in an absurd manner, for

we shall be assuming, if not ourselves, at any rate our reasoning, which evidently is a part of the \bar{x} . An opponent of this argument might perhaps affirm that the human proof may well be regarded as a form of Divine reasoning. God would thus be proving His own exclusive existence. But it is obvious that the circumstances under which such Divine ratiocination would be taking place would be such that a human thinker was recognising the argument as his own construction. Hence the human mind and its reasoning would still be distinct from the Divine. And, similarly, in our other efforts to reach unity, the argument is based on the assumption of an ultimate duality.

The remarks that we have made with respect to the utility of the ordinary Symbolic Logic apply also to the so-called Logic of Relatives. In this further study we do not arrive at anything more general or conjectural than the multiply-quantified propositions with which we start. There is here, therefore, no instrument by which the problems of natural science may be solved. But the educational advantage and indirect assistance of the study, and the possibility of reaching new truths, in the sense that we have just mentioned, are the same as in the case of the Symbolic Logic that deals with singly-quantified propositions.

VI.—THE PERSONAL ELEMENT IN PHILOSOPHY.

By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

IT is a complaint not unfrequently brought against philosophy by those who are entering upon the study of it that, unlike the physical sciences and unlike history, it seems to add no certain and positive facts to our knowledge; that, while one is told much of what this or that thinker has said, one is never told plainly which view is right. There often goes along with this complaint a true perception that the seemingly vague and unprogressive character of philosophy is not unconnected with the importance attached (in some seats of philosophical learning at least) to the opinions of ancient thinkers, such as Plato and Aristotle, whose work or that of their contemporaries in the natural sciences would never be mentioned by teachers of those sciences except for their historical or antiquarian interest. The teacher of philosophy has to meet these complaints; and he will probably begin to do so by pointing out that in the method of every natural science there is a complete abstraction made from everything except that special part or aspect of experience with which that science deals, and that in particular the relation of this aspect to the knowing subject of experience (although without a knowing subject there could be no such science) is not brought under consideration at all. If we suspect that the peculiarities of the observer of natural phenomena affect his observations, then, it is true, these peculiarities are taken into account, but only in order to discount them, to eliminate them from the result. Science, in the sense in which we distinguish it from philosophy, is impersonal; it is concerned with *facts* which can be detached

altogether, or at any rate to a considerable degree, from the context in which they have first appeared to us. It is just for this reason that, while we reverence the names of the pioneers of scientific research—of Hippocrates or Aristotle, of Eratosthenes or Archimedes—we do not study medicine or biology, astronomy or mechanics, in their works; the progress to these sciences, which in their earliest days owed so much to them, has inevitably antiquated them. The apologist of philosophy may then, perhaps, point to regions of human thought in which this continually antiquating progress seems to be absent; and where also the mind, though nourished, is not nourished by *facts*. Homer and Æschylus, Virgil and Dante, Cervantes and Shakespeare are still read; and why? Just because what they contribute to our intellectual life is not to be expressed adequately in abstraction from its original context; what is worth our knowing of their works is not the plots or the arguments, it is the works themselves, as they stand, in matter and in manner, because only so do they manifest what we rightly call the immortal genius of their authors. The same is true (the advocate of philosophy may further point out) with religion; here, too, personality rather than abstract fact is important; and for that reason, as the years run on, the religious life of the world does not come to take a merely antiquarian interest in those great personalities whom the historic religions venerate as their founders or apostles. Rather it turns back to them again and again to drink more deeply of their spirit. No doubt in their teaching (just as in great works of imagination) there are some things which become obsolete and, without a learned comment, unintelligible; but these are only the accidents, the essentials are, like great poems, “not of an age but for all time.” Now, philosophy (it may be added), dealing, as it aims at doing, with experience as a whole, is in some respects to be classed rather with religion and poetry than with science. Like religion and poetry, it progresses

indeed, but not through the collection of new facts of its own so much as by the increase of the stock accumulated by the other sciences. For the same reason it is, like religion and poetry (we may conclude), unable to eliminate, as the sciences do, the personal element. The whole personality of Plato or of Aristotle, of Spinoza or of Kant, is revealed in their systems; their philosophies cannot be detached from their personalities as the hard facts or abstract laws of the sciences from the personalities of their discoverers. We should hasten, indeed, at this point to correct a possible misapprehension. We do not mean that it is essential to the comprehension of a system of philosophy any more than of a poem to know the "facts" of their creators' lives *outside* of their poems or their systems; but only that the system or the poem is itself the expression of its author's personality, and that the statements which they contain cannot be taken out of their context and put, comparatively unchanged, into other contexts, like the "facts" of botany or chronology; though even with those the process may have its limits, on which there is no need to dwell at present. The very misunderstanding which we have thus attempted to avoid may yet be of use to us; it has given us a glimpse of the difficulties and ambiguities attending the use of the word "personality." For we speak sometimes of the "personality" of a poet or philosopher, meaning what belonged to him *outside* of his poetry or his philosophy. By "personal details" about him we should most likely intend the name of his grandfather or the date of his birth, his taste in food or his party in politics; when, however, we speak of him as a "great personality," we do not think of these things, but of that which utters itself in his works, and with which we come into contact in reading him, though we may be very ignorant indeed of his private history, and may even doubt whether the name by which we designate him ever pointed to the real author at all. And, once more, any of such details of private history as have been mentioned above *may*

become important in a particular case for the understanding of the poetry or the philosophy: thus Dante's creed and politics enter into the substance of his work as Shakespeare's, for example, do not; and it may make a considerable difference to our judgment of a philosophic system to what date we assign it; for the presuppositions and the polemic will differ accordingly. Besides the ambiguity we have just mentioned, however, another similar one thrusts itself upon our attention. For, when it is contended that the point of view of philosophy is more concrete than that of the special sciences, because it does *not* abstract, as they do, from the knowing subject, we are often content to think of the knowing subject in general without reference to the differences between individual knowing subjects, and thereby to preserve to philosophy a genuine "objectivity" or validity for all, as over against individual "subjectivity" or idiosyncrasies; but when we went on to justify in this way our careful study of the particular philosophies originated by great thinkers in the past, we seemed to lay stress upon the peculiarities which stamp these philosophies each as the unique utterance of an unique individual; and we might doubt whether we were not now in danger of denying altogether the objective validity of philosophical results, and the possibility of applying to them at all the distinction of true and false.

And now we are met by many voices from various quarters which seem to make light of this danger. These voices are not all concordant with one another, but they all alike give utterance to what may be called by the vague name of "personal idealism." Some of them are chiefly concerned to protest that even in the sciences the elimination of the personal or "subjective" element, with the boasted "objectivity" which follows from that elimination, is merely provisional; that what we mean by the "truth" even here is that which fulfils some special need of human nature, some purpose of human thought; so that the test of the truth of a statement is not its agree-

ment with an independent reality, but rather its serviceableness in promoting our fuller vitality and effectiveness along some particular line of action. With those who speak in this vein—we may call them “pragmatists”—the “personality” meant is less the idiosyncrasy of this man or that, than what is common to the race, however little attention may be paid to the implications of this assumption of a common nature of which we can speak thus in general. The complaint brought by the “pragmatists” against the idealism of the past is not so much that it ignored the differences among men as that it isolated the cognitive side of human nature from the emotional, volitional, practical sides with which it is always in connection and to which (according to these protesters) it is even normally subordinate. Another set of voices is, on the other hand, less concerned to protest against the emphasis laid on cognition by the great idealists, or to deny that truth is an idea which neither requires nor admits of further definition, than to object to the assumption (which they are apt, perhaps, too hastily to attribute to the great idealists) that the common, universal element in thought is that which alone has abiding worth, while the diversities which exist among men have in comparison but a subordinate and transitory significance; and to protest, on the contrary, that this common and universal element is but an abstraction from a concrete reality, which always exists only as a multitude of persons, each fundamentally and ultimately separated from all the others by a gulf that cannot, except in figure and metaphor, be supposed passable either by other men or even by God. Of course, these two contentions may be combined and combined in various ways; and either the “pragmatism” or the “pluralism” (to use current phrases) may be more or less thorough going; but the protest of “personal idealism” against the tradition of idealistic philosophy seems to cover these two criticisms, which it will contribute to clearness to distinguish from one another.

Nor are those to which I have just referred the only voices which press upon us at the present time the problem of the personal element in experience and in the philosophy which would interpret experience. Many thoughtful theologians have sought of late in the notion of "personality" a clue to the better understanding of religious mysteries; and the word has come to be bandied about among their followers as though it expressed the solution rather than the propounding of a great problem.

In this situation it becomes a primary duty for those who would think clearly to discover what precisely we mean by "personality." Now I am far from pretending to accomplish this investigation in this short paper. But I should like to call attention to some points which may be found of value in our enquiries.

We often look upon "personality" as that which is unique in the being to which we ascribe it; which it cannot share with any other being; which defies exhaustive expression in language, just because language is always general. Thus Tennyson speaks of "the abysmal depths of Personality." Several everyday phrases seem to refer to this aspect of "personality." If we speak of "impersonal" philanthropy, for example, we mean a philanthropy which ignores the differences which make every individual distinguishable from every other; and we speak, in contrast with this, of a "personal interest" in so and so, which *does* attend to the unique characteristics or combination of characteristics which belong to that individual. If we refuse the title of "person" to the lower animals, it is, at least in part, because we usually regard one of them as quite adequately replaced by another which is like it and possesses the same describable (and therefore *not* unique) characteristics. So far as we pass beyond this and feel an attachment, say, to a particular dog which would not be satisfied if he were replaced by another of the same kind, we should quite naturally say that we felt towards that dog as towards a person.

Yet, though we say that it is this sense of the unique worth of an individual that entitles it to be called a "person," it is plain that so far "personality" is *not* unique, inasmuch as we ascribe it to a number of different persons, and therefore, presumably, by reason of something which they have in common. Nay, "uniqueness" is itself a common and even (as we shall soon point out) a universal predicate. Again, if we look at the matter not from without but from within, we shall find that we should, each of us, take himself to be a person not because he was shut up within his own self (as we may fancy a limpet or oyster to be), but because we are *conscious* of ourselves—conscious, that is, each of us, of himself as distinguished from and contrasted with others, who thus enter into the content of our experience, and form part of what constitutes ourselves. Sympathy, communication, scientific, æsthetic or moral agreement, love, all these increase, not diminish, we should say, the riches or fulness of our personality: lack of them would progressively diminish it, until to the idiot, who lives in a world of his own sick imaginings, we should hesitate, except in memory or in hope, to ascribe personality at all. At the opposite pole to the idiot is the "universal" genius, Plato or Shakespeare or Goethe, who seems to enter into so many points of view, and understand them as it were from within; and about whom we often, perhaps idly, wonder what he himself thought or felt, as distinct from the dramatic multiplication of himself in his works, wishing, it may be, to narrow him to our own measure. Such are the "great personalities" who are most original and characteristic because most universal; with an originality as much removed from the isolation of eccentricity as their universal comprehension is removed from the unsympathetic commonplaceness of a man whose thoughts are a mere echo of the conventions in which he has been bred.

Thus, "personality" is found to present a two-sided character which is presented less markedly by all reality. For all things

are describable, so far as they are describable, by general predicates: they have their being in the whole, and a complete account of them would give their relations to everything else; yet no less is everything (not only every person) unique, that thing and not another. The "generality" of scientific description is not indeed rightly to be looked upon as mere rough approximation. Unless all science be illusion, things must really have in common the predicates of which science takes account. They must be not merely "similar," but in very truth the "same," so far as science so treats them, if the statements of science be true. Error only comes in if the identity required by science be supposed to exclude the difference in which science is not interested. It is not that everything has a part of its nature which is common to it with its congeners, and another part which is peculiar to itself. Everything is *throughout both* universal and unique; a particular case (no other case than this) of a nature which is the same in it and in others; and, as a whole, it is this thing, this real element of Reality, not another, yet nothing apart from the Reality in which it has its being. It seems to me to be the true message of idealism that everything has significance, not that the many lose their significance because they are a many in one. Was it not the great achievement of Hegel (not the less a great achievement if it sometimes failed through being prematurely carried further than his data justified) to insist that the Absolute could never be conceived aright until every one of the elements of its unity was shown to be necessary to the whole? Thus it was he that gave history a standing, so to speak, in philosophy. The development of a thing was not for him accidental or extraneous, but the necessary process of its intrinsic nature.

We return to our original subject—the individual point of view, the personal element in philosophy. Let us acknowledge fully that the content of two minds, when two men agree, is so far the same; not figuratively but really; that, apart from such attribution of reality to the universal as this, all science (and

morality also) would be emptied of significance. But let us see also, that this conclusion, which seems to me the only one which does justice to our everyday common-sense convictions, in no way involves (as is sometimes suspected) the denial of the reality of the difference which exists between the two minds whose content is thus common to both. The difference is as real as the identity. To assert that two minds think the same content is not to assert that one mind thinks it (in the sense that we speak of one of these minds as "one mind"); to affirm that the unity of a soul through sympathy and love with another soul or with God is no mere metaphor, is a very different thing from affirming that there is no distinction between that soul and the other soul or God. Were there no distinction, there would be no justification for emphasising this unity; the whole reason for doing so lies in it being no mere undifferentiated unity, but a unity in and through difference, to which the difference is as essential as the unity.

Let us, finally, illustrate this from certain departments of life. At the beginning of this paper we spoke as though in science the personal differences between observers were completely eliminated. But this is not really true. Two astronomers study the same celestial phenomenon from different observatories. They do not really eliminate this difference of position from the result, they take account of it. Certainly neither says, "Mine is the right point of view, yours the wrong"; but each puts his own position into definite relation with the other's, considers it as a necessary part no less than the other's of the one objective space-world. The fact that the phenomenon appears different from the two observatories (so far as it does so) is *part* of the truth about it. Did it appear exactly the same, *that* would be inconsistent with the laws of optics. It is an illusion to suppose that the size of an object viewed close at hand is more *really* its size than its size as viewed from a distance. All our scientific conceptions would be upset, were it to look as large a mile off as it looks an inch

off. It cannot, therefore, be right to look on the distant view as though it were somehow deceptive, because the object looks a different size from what it would look nearer; we should rather suppose there were deception if it looked the same size.

It is not otherwise with morality. Kant's "law universal" has sometimes been criticised as though he held that everyone was bound to do the same thing under all circumstances. But he surely did not mean that what is right for the judge is right for the criminal, that what is wrong for the patient is wrong for the physician. What morality does require is that I should will to do what is right for me viewed as a member of a "kingdom of ends" or (if we prefer the phrase) a social organism; that I should not say, "This is what I want; I don't care about you," but "This is what I ought to do, I being I, as you are you." My point of view, even my likes and dislikes, are not to be left out of account: for they may indicate my duty; but they matter no more than *your* point of view, *your* likes and dislikes; they are to be placed in an intelligible or organic relation to them as the one astronomer's point of observation to the other's.

It is just so also in metaphysics. Here, too, the point of view of one thinker is not the point of view of another. But the whole needs them all, and each, if one knew all, would be found to involve all the rest. —Such, at least, would be the requirement of a complete idealism, which would give significance to experience alike in its entirety and in every part.

And what is true of reality throughout is just that, the consciousness of which is the essence of "personality." A person is aware of himself as unique, and also that he is a unique part of a whole which is all of it his concern and apart from which he would lose his own significance; while it would be a different whole apart from him. The more highly this consciousness is developed the greater (as we say) the personality; it is at once more "original" and more "universal." The greatest personality is most fully conscious

of its character as an organ of the universal and of the special and incommunicable or untransferable nature of the function which, in the economy of the universal life, it discharges and it alone.

I can imagine that a critic of this paper will say that my account of the relation of the individual person to the whole leaves no room for error or for sin. I would forestall this objection by the remark that these profound problems are, to my mind, no more a difficulty to this account than to any other ; though, perhaps, the real incidence of the difficulty may be more plainly seen from this point of view than from some others, which do not really diminish the difficulty of understanding the possibility of error and sin by minimising those demands of reason with which they appear to conflict.

VII.—THE METAPHYSICAL CRITERION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.

By H. WILDON CARR.

THE first difficulty in the attempt to make philosophy truly systematic is to find an initial certainty that can withstand criticism and admit a real advance in knowledge. The most notable of such attempts in recent philosophy is Mr. Bradley's argument, in *Appearance and Reality*, that we have a metaphysical criterion of reality in the logical principle of non-contradiction, and that this enables us to assert of ultimate reality, the Absolute, that it is a harmonious, self-subsistent system; that this positive knowledge of reality is assured to us beyond the reach of scepticism, because to doubt it is self-contradictory. This argument is worked out and presented in systematic form in the opening chapters of Prof. A. E. Taylor's *Elements of Metaphysics*.* The absolutely certain knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality which this criterion is held to prove is there made the basis of a science of Metaphysics. Prof. Taylor holds that we have absolutely certain knowledge that ultimate reality, the Absolute, is indissolubly one with actual experience, and that it is an internally coherent system, and that doubt of this is a logical self-contradiction. Ultimate reality, or the Absolute, is the subject-matter of the science of Metaphysics, and as such is not given or assumed, but self-constituted; and this character

* All the arguments dealt with in this paper will be found in Prof. A. E. Taylor's *Elements of Metaphysics*, chap. ii. I have chosen Prof. Taylor's work because the doctrine of ultimate reality, the Absolute, is there set forth in systematic form at the beginning of the book as the special subject-matter of a science of Metaphysics.

of its subject-matter distinguishes it from all the subject sciences. My object in this paper is not to discuss the nature of ultimate reality, but to examine the particular arguments on which this theory of reality is founded, and especially to contest the claim of these arguments to certainty on the ground that the denial of them involves a logical contradiction. I propose to examine (1) the proposition that the criterion of reality affirms the existence and nature of the Absolute, and to maintain that a criterion by its nature cannot itself constitute our positive knowledge of the existence and content of any object of experience whatever; (2) to examine the proposition that the Absolute is an individual experience, and to maintain that it is based on a meaning of reality quite distinct from that demanded by the criterion, and that the two positive characteristics of the Absolute, viz., that it is self-consistent reality, and that it is indissolubly one with experience, have no necessary connection with one another, and are arrived at by quite separate arguments; and (3) the proposition that there is a proposition, doubt of which is a logical contradiction, or that absolute scepticism is logically impossible. I maintain that so long as the problem of Metaphysics is the problem of the relation of knowledge to reality, ultimate scepticism cannot be excluded.

1. THE METAPHYSICAL CRITERION.

The argument from the metaphysical criterion is this: We have a criterion of reality in the principle that "what is real is not self-contradictory, and what is self-contradictory is not real." This principle is the basis of the distinction of Appearance and Reality; what is self-contradictory we declare to be Appearance, not Reality. Every negation is an affirmation. The negation, "Reality is not self-contradictory," is an affirmation that Reality is positively self-consistent or coherent, and this can only mean that Reality is a self-consistent, systematic whole. This is absolutely certain, inasmuch as to deny it

would be to deny the criterion and make meaningless the distinction between Reality and Appearance. This is the argument; the dilemma in it is to me so obvious that I cannot understand how it has apparently been overlooked. If a criterion gives me of itself positive knowledge of anything, it cannot be a criterion of the knowledge it has given me. It cannot, that is to say, be at the same time and in the same relation both positive knowledge of something and a criterion of that knowledge. Consequently, the positive knowledge that I have of reality is knowledge of which I have no criterion. If the principle of non-contradiction is in any sense positive knowledge of reality, it is at least in that sense not a criterion. It could not be used as a criterion of the positive knowledge it itself was, nor would a criterion of such knowledge be necessary. Positive knowledge of reality does not admit the question of appearance. I have some knowledge then of which I do not possess a criterion, or to which this metaphysical criterion does not apply. If I may have some knowledge without a criterion, the metaphysical criterion is not universal, and therefore a worthless criterion. Let me put it in another way: If there be knowledge of reality that it is impossible to doubt, it must be knowledge that is independent of a criterion and not subject to a criterion; for if it is subject to a criterion it cannot be free from possibility of doubt. But the knowledge so characterised is given by and entirely dependent upon the criterion. Therefore, my knowledge of reality is both entirely dependent upon and entirely independent of a metaphysical criterion. The metaphysical criterion itself on this view is shown to be a self-contradiction, and must therefore be condemned as appearance, not reality. But if the criterion itself is appearance, how can it give us positive knowledge of reality? I am not concerned, however, to bring the theory to such a *reductio ad absurdum*. I consider that the dilemma is a quite unnecessary one, and arises from a wrong interpretation of the idea of a criterion. A criterion

is purely formal, and is neither a negation nor an affirmation. You may deny or affirm of anything that it satisfies the test of the criterion, but the criterion is not that denial or affirmation. The possession of a criterion does not assure the existence or the content of any idea whatever. It is indifferent in its essential meaning, to all and every existence.

This seems to me the direct and complete answer to the proposition that the possession of the metaphysical criterion gives us positive knowledge of the existence and nature of ultimate reality, rather than either of the objections that Prof. Taylor has put into the mouth of his supposed sceptic. Yet these objections are forcible, and I do not think that they are to be got rid of very easily. They serve in any case to emphasise the criticism I have made. The first objection that he supposes the sceptic to make is that the criterion is simply the logical law of contradiction, and that the law of contradiction, like all purely logical laws, is concerned not with real things, but exclusively with the concepts by which we think of them. Prof. Taylor has a double reply to this objection. Firstly, that it is unjustifiable to assume that the law of contradiction, admitted to be a law of thought, is therefore *only* a law of thought. And, secondly, that this interpretation of the law of contradiction rests on a positive confusion of the meaning of a law of thought, which may mean either (*a*) a psychological law, a true general statement as to the way in which we actually do think; or (*b*) a logical law, a true general statement as to the conditions under which our thinking is valid. In effect, a logical law of thought is a law of true thinking. To think truly about things is to think in accord with their real nature, and therefore if non-contradiction is a fundamental condition of true thinking, it is a fundamental condition of real existence. The first of these answers charges the objector with making an unjustifiable assumption; but there is no assumption whatever, justifiable or unjustifiable, in question, and the appearance of one rests simply on a forced interpretation of

the word *only*. The law of contradiction is a law of thought *only* in that sense in which thought is distinct from reality. If there be no distinction, then an assertion about thought is an assertion about reality. If there be a distinction, then an assertion about thought is not necessarily an assertion about reality. Because I declare a law to be only a law of thought, I do not say that it is not a law of reality, but only that it is not *therefore* a law of reality. And this same distinction is ignored in the second answer. Our thoughts of things are thoughts and not things. If things be other than thoughts of things, then truth can only be of thoughts of things, not of things unthought of or things in themselves. The special problem of the thing-in-itself is not for the moment in question; I use the expression merely to designate one term of the distinction between thought and reality. If this distinction is an unreal one, if thought is reality and reality is thought, there is no metaphysical problem; or, if there is, it must be stated in a quite different way to any that we are accustomed to, and not as the problem of the relation of thought to reality.

The second objection that Prof. Taylor supposes the sceptic to make is to affirm the relativity of knowledge. "All our truth is only relatively truth, and even the fundamental conditions of true thought are only valid *relatively* and for us." And his reply to this is that such a doubt is meaningless and irrational when directed against the ultimate nature of reality as a self-consistent system. He claims that this must be so, because the knowledge of reality in question is actually given by the very test of consistency by which alone it can be disproved or its validity questioned, and that its truth is necessarily assumed in the very process of calling it in question. But Prof. Taylor does not seem to see that the doubt is founded on the very universality of the principle of non-contradiction itself. If it be universally true for our thinking that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same relation, then if the knowledge of anything be distinct from

the thing known, my knowledge of reality cannot be reality. I shall have to deal with this question further when I discuss the subject of the possibility of ultimate doubt. So far as this argument is concerned, the sceptic's reply is that the assertion of the relativity of truth makes no assertion, positive or negative, as to that which is not thought, viz., reality, but merely declares that what I am compelled to think true is true for me, but not necessarily true of absolute reality as distinct from and out of relation to my knowledge.

2. THE ABSOLUTE AND EXPERIENCE.

The theory we are considering affirms that we know two things about ultimate reality: (1) that it is a self-subsistent system, and (2) that it is indissolubly one with experience. These two propositions of absolutely certain validity enable us to affirm that the Absolute is an individual experience in which all appearances are harmonised. The first of these propositions is given us by the metaphysical criterion, an argument which we have just criticised. The second is apparently not so derived; the argument for it does not seem to rest on any logical principle at all. The criterion having established for us, beyond the possibility of doubt, that ultimate reality is a self-subsistent system, we know that it must be experience. We know this because we know that an ultimate reality independent of experience is meaningless and inconceivable. If, therefore, ultimate reality, the Absolute, is experience and is a self-subsistent system, this can only mean that it is an individual experience in which all contradictory appearances are reconciled and harmonised. This is what I understand the theory of the Absolute to be according to Mr. Bradley in *Appearance and Reality*, and Prof. Taylor in his *Elements of Metaphysics*. Now it seems to me that these two attributes of Reality are not merely mutually inconsistent, but unless the word experience when applied to the Absolute is to mean something quite different to what it means in ordinary use, then

even if there be an absolute experience it can afford no solution of the special problem that it is postulated to solve. There is, fortunately, no ambiguity in the use of the term experience by the writers whose metaphysic I am discussing. Experience consists of "psychical matter of fact." As this point is of great importance to my argument, I will quote the whole passage in which this definition occurs: "Reality, then, in spite of the sceptic's objections, is truly known to be a connected and self-consistent, or internally coherent, system. Can we with equal confidence say anything of the data of which the system is composed? Reflection should convince us that we can at least say as much as this: all the materials or data of reality consist of *experience*, experience being provisionally taken to mean psychical matter of fact, what is given in immediate feeling. In other words, whatever forms part of presentation, will, or emotion, must, in some sense and to some degree, possess reality and be a part of the material of which reality, as a systematic whole, is composed; whatever does not include as part of its nature this indissoluble relation to immediate feeling, and therefore does not enter into the presentation, will, and emotion of which psychical life is composed, is not real. The real is experience, and nothing but experience, and experience consists of 'psychical matter of fact!'"* And then follows the proof in which the reader is challenged to give any meaning to reality which does not imply actual experience or psychical matter of fact. And it is enforced by Kant's illustration of the imagined hundred dollars and the actual hundred dollars in the pocket. The curious thing about that proof is that the metaphysical criterion of reality forms no part of the argument. The imagined hundred dollars differ from the real hundred dollars only in the fact that the latter are psychical matter of fact. But surely, tried by the metaphysical criterion, the imagined

* *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 23.

dollars would stand the better chance of the two. In imagination I can free the dollars from contradictory attributes as successfully as I can the idea of the Absolute itself. What I cannot do is to make them exist or bring them into my experience as psychical matter of fact. But the real experienced dollars, though psychical matter of fact, are, in the ideas I form of them, riddled with contradictions; they are appearance, not reality. In them are involved the perceptions of space and time, motion, change, things, qualities, relations,—and these perceptions are psychical matter of fact. If to be experienced is to be real, they are certainly real; but tried by the metaphysical criterion, they are contradictory through and through—they are appearance, not reality. If you reply that the perceptions are indeed real in this sense of being experienced, but that the ideas to which they give rise exhibit self-contradiction and are therefore condemned as appearance, you do not touch the point at issue. The experience is contradictory; the knowledge that I obtain by my perceptions is knowledge of appearance, not of reality. I know this to be so, because the ideas which my perceptions give rise to are inconsistent. For example, I perceive matter in motion, but I know that the idea of motion is self-contradictory. It implies that a thing can be in two places at once, and this is impossible; and therefore motion, notwithstanding that I have experienced it, is merely appearance. What is it that these contradictions contradict if it is not experience? In this instance of motion I directly perceive an object moving; I see it, or I feel it, or both. As direct experience its reality cannot be challenged; it is so because I see it or feel it. When I try to express this experience as independently real, I find that every idea by which I can express it is inconsistent and self-contradictory. Motion, object, ego, relation will each be found to contradict itself and to contradict my experience. I know, therefore, that in my psychical experience a real object did really move; I also know that motion, object, self, and their relations, including

time and space, are not real, and cannot be thought to be real. I am in this dilemma: either what I experienced was not real, but an appearance of some reality which in itself is quite other than its appearance, or else what I experienced was reality, absolute, ultimate reality; but the ideas by which alone I can represent it are inadequate to do so. The contradiction, however expressed, is wholly within the experience, the psychical fact comprises everything, perceptions and the ideas which the perceptions give rise to and which contradict the perceptions which give rise to them.

This leads to the further question. If we grant that immediate experience when reflected on gives rise to logical inconsistencies which condemn it as appearance and not reality, notwithstanding its reality as experience, in what way is this particular difficulty solved by the theory of the Absolute? Let it be granted that there is an Absolute, an individual experience whose content is not inconsistent with its existence, how is its relation to the particular real experience conceived so that the postulate of the Absolute solves the contradiction in the particular experience? To appreciate the full force of this difficulty we must keep clearly before us the distinction between (*a*) the reality of experience and (*b*) the reality experienced. To doubt (*a*) the reality of experience, for me to doubt that my experience, whatever be its content, is real experience, is impossible, not because it involves a logical contradiction, but because it is quite meaningless. It is only in my interpretation of (*b*) the reality experienced that a metaphysical problem arises. Experience is not only real, but it is of reality, and it is this that gives rise to the problem of appearance and reality. Appearance is real as experience, but it is the direct contrary of reality in its ultimate meaning. Now, when it is said that the Absolute is an individual experience, if I have understood it, it means that the psychical matter of fact of which the Absolute experience is composed is the Absolute's own experience. My question is, How can such a postulate

remove the actual contradiction that arises in my actual experience? Let me grant that ultimate reality must be self-subsistent, and that the content of my experience is not self-subsistent, why must I also hold that this ultimate reality must be an individual experience? and how will that solve the difficulty even if I do? Return for a moment to Prof. Taylor's challenge to perform the experiment of thinking of anything whatever as real, and not meaning by such reality that the thing is indissolubly connected with psychical matter of fact. If I think of anything, any *where* and any *when* in the universe, if I think of it as real, I can only do so by imagining that under conceivable circumstances it would come into my actual psychical experience. But what I imagine is that it would come into my experience as part of the content of my experience. I mean no more than this when I speak of its reality. I am not compelled to represent it as independent experience with its own content. If, then, I think of the Absolute as real, I must mean that under conceivable circumstances which I can imagine it would enter into my experience as actual psychical fact. The self-subsistent content that I require to satisfy my criterion of reality I require for the content of my own experience.

This particular difficulty of the relation of the reality of the Absolute to the reality of my experience is not solved by postulating the all-inclusiveness of the Absolute. The Absolute, it is said, includes all finite experience. It is the whole of which all finite experiences are part, and the reality of each particular finite experience consists in its relation to the infinite whole. However true such an idea may be when applied to the nature of the ultimate reality that my thought is for ever trying to conceive, it is no solution of the problem presented by this immediate reality of experience as psychical fact. If every such reality is included in the Absolute reality, it can only be a numerical inclusion. The content of my experience when reflected on leads me to suppose that the

reality which I experience is a part of an infinitely greater whole. I think of my knowledge as merely bringing me in touch with that reality, and I regard it as passing out of my experience and reaching beyond it in every possible direction. But this is not true of my experience itself; this I must regard in its immediacy and directness as ultimate and absolute in the completest sense. No necessity of thought makes me regard my experience as part of a larger experience. It may be difficult to believe that my experience is the only reality, the only psychical fact that exists, and clearly it would be useless to try to convince anyone else of such fact; but there is nothing illogical, or in the logical sense inconceivable, in my holding such a view. If there is no *logical* objection to this extreme form of subjective idealism, it follows that there can be no logical necessity to relate my immediate psychical experience to a larger Absolute.

3. IS ABSOLUTE SCEPTICISM LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE?

The argument that absolute scepticism is self-contradictory occurs in some form in every idealist system. Absolute scepticism is the proposition that we never can know anything. The reply to it is that the assertion affirms the very identical thing that it denies. The sceptic cannot doubt that he is doubting, and therefore even doubt establishes one certainty. Either he is certain that nothing can be known, or he is not certain, and in neither case can the scepticism be absolute. Even if he confines the proposition to the possibility that nothing can be known, he must assert that the possibility can be known. In all doubt one proposition must remain that must be asserted and cannot be denied. The assertion "nothing can be known" is contradicted by the very fact that it is asserted, and this certainty that in the assertion "nothing can be known" we have an assertion, affords a practically impregnable position against absolute scepticism. Notwithstanding the apparent logical conclusiveness of this

argument, I maintain that absolute scepticism is perfectly reasonable as a philosophical position. The assertion that "nothing can be known" is a quite intelligible proposition founded upon the logical principle of contradiction. It is one of the horns of a logical dilemma which is a necessary consequence of the way in which the philosophical problem is presented, and has been presented since Descartes. It is involved in the very nature of this problem, and can only be avoided, if it can be avoided, by re-stating the problem in such a way that it does not arise. It may be possible to present this problem of philosophy in some other way than as the relation of knowledge to reality, or as involving the distinction of knowledge and reality. I know that there are some philosophical writers who think that they are able to do so, but I must confess to inability to grasp their standpoint. So long as the distinction between knowledge and reality is a fundamental distinction in philosophy, scepticism cannot be excluded. It rests on the fact that two contradictory propositions are true. First, knowledge is knowledge; whatever be the subject of knowledge, knowledge is not the thing known but knowledge of the thing. The thing known always remains distinct from and other than our knowledge of the thing which is always essentially our knowledge. But, on the other hand, knowledge is not knowledge unless the thing known be in itself what I know. This it never is nor can be, therefore there is no knowledge. The thing in itself is both the object of knowledge and distinct from knowledge, and must be so; therefore it is unknowable. But you say even to know this is to know something, and the reply is yes; this proposition is subject to the same dilemma, but that dilemma confirms and does not contradict it. So far as it is knowledge of something, it is my knowledge only and distinct from the reality known. This certainty, if I affirm it, that nothing can be known is my knowledge of reality and not the reality in itself that is distinct from the knowledge of

it. I am left with an infinite regress; there is no final negation, and no final affirmation, no absolute contradiction of contradiction, which alone can exclude scepticism.

The conclusions to which I am led by these arguments are:—

1. Experience as simple psychical matter of fact is real. This reality is immediate; it refers to nothing beyond itself; it is self-evident and final.

2. This immediate experience when reflected upon refers, or, at least, is interpreted by me to refer, to a reality beyond and independent of the immediate experience itself. This independent reality, even if I must in the most universal sense of the term experience include it in experience, is at least distinguished from immediate experience as its content. It is reality as the content of experience and not reality as the immediate experience that gives rise to a metaphysical problem. It is only as content that reality is to be distinguished from appearance.

3. The test of experience as applied by me means that whatever I represent as real must be an actual or conceivably possible content of my psychical experience. This is as true if the reality be the Absolute as it is if it be a hundred dollars in my pocket.

4. The metaphysical criterion is the logical test of consistency. It is purely formal. It is indifferent to content. It is not an affirmation nor a negation, though it may, for convenience of discourse, be thrown into that form.

5. Whether there be an Absolute in the sense of an individual experience whose content is a completely harmonised system, or whether such Absolute be an imaginary construction, it is not a solution of the problem of reality. It is impossible to get rid of its otherness. As object known it must affirm all the contradictions it is constructed to get rid of.

6. The ultimate reality that our ideas refer us to and attempt to express may be or may not be an individual

experience. No necessity of thought lays down this postulate, nor is it logically helpful. The reality that the metaphysical criterion demands shall be consistent is a content of experience, and not experience in its immediacy or as psychical matter of fact.

7. If the distinction between knowledge and reality is ultimate, if knowledge is of the real and not itself reality, if the real is always other than the knowledge of it, ultimate scepticism cannot be excluded. Ultimate scepticism is not a final negation that involves no affirmation, nor an affirmation that involves no negation, but an infinite regress of affirmation involving negation, and negation involving affirmation. There is no final contradiction of contradiction.

DISCUSSION ON MR. H. W. CARR'S PAPER.

MR. SHADWORTH H. HODGSON read the following remarks:—

We ought to be highly obliged to Mr. Carr for his paper, since he therein exhibits the utter futility of Dialectics as a philosophical method. Dialectics as Philosophy means Dogmatism. In the first and second divisions of his paper he administers a well-deserved corrective to the views of two of his fellow dialecticians, Mr. F. H. Bradley and Mr. A. E. Taylor (those of the former indeed only indirectly, as represented by the latter), and in the third and last division he administers an equally well-deserved corrective to his own, by his confession that "Things-in-themselves" are what he means by Reality, and that, since these are self-contradictory, "ultimate scepticism cannot be excluded"; so that his "initial certainty that can withstand criticism" (p. 1), on which his philosophy is founded, turns out to be itself a contradiction.

These three correctives he is enabled to administer, because all three Dialecticians stand on the common ground of making

the distinction between Appearance and Reality the primary question in philosophy, and expecting to get an answer to it from the law or laws of the Thinking Function. It is this interrogation of the abstract Thinking Function which changes philosophy into Dialectics.

Mr. Carr says in his third part (p. 127) that the assertion that "nothing can be known" is a perfectly intelligible proposition, and is "one of the horns of a logical dilemma which is a necessary consequence of the way in which the philosophical problem is presented, and has been presented since Descartes." And a few lines farther on, "So long as the distinction between knowledge and reality is a fundamental distinction in philosophy, scepticism cannot be excluded." In short, we have in the *reality* member of this distinction our old friend the *Thing-in-itself*. For, as Mr. Carr says (p. 128), "But on the other hand, knowledge is not knowledge unless the thing known be in itself what I know. This it never is nor can be, therefore there is no knowledge." Well, what follows? Obviously, I should say this: That to base your philosophy on a distinction, one member of which is Reality or the Thing-in-itself, that is, something wholly distinct from knowledge, is a mode of presenting philosophy which, however venerable, must be given up. It not only reduces philosophy to the rank of a mere Theory of Knowledge, *Erkenntnisstheorie*, but it arbitrarily introduces a logical contradiction into the basis of it;—as part of one of its fundamental distinctions. We have no *a priori* category, either of Reality or of Things-in-themselves; consequently no *a priori* knowledge of the philosophical distinction between Knowledge and Reality. These are simply common-sense terms. The first question for us therefore is, What do we *mean* by Reality? What and whence the idea of it? And this of course throws us back upon the further and ultimate question, What is the nature of Knowing? What do we *mean* by Knowledge? The result of this enquiry will be, I venture to think, to replace the idea of Thing-in-itself by

the idea of Object,—relegating that of Thing-in-itself to the domain of pure fiction.

But heartily as I welcome Mr. Carr's exhibition of the futility of dialectics when they pose as philosophy, I doubt whether his confutation of Prof. Taylor's mode of presenting the problem of philosophy (which at least gets rid of the fictitious Thing-in-itself) is so complete as he thinks it. I find Prof. Taylor calling non-contradiction an universal *characteristic* of Reality as we are compelled to think of it, and in that I cannot but agree with him. But I do not find him *excluding* other possible characteristics from our idea of Reality, characteristics which may be found in the perceptual *data* upon which thinking operates. The idea of Being or Existence (including, of course, *Real* Being and *Real* Existence) is not derived from the operation of Thinking, or from its law of non-contradiction, which, as Mr. Carr very truly says, is *purely formal*, that is, does not bring with it any *content*, any idea or category, however abstract or universal, such as the idea or category of Being. Consequently it does not bring with it the idea of "a systematic whole of some kind or other." Here I part company with Prof. Taylor, as, for instance, where he says: "Hence to say 'Reality is not self-contradictory' is as much as to say that we have true and certain knowledge that reality is positively self-consistent or coherent; that is to say, that whatever else it may be, it is at least a systematic whole of some kind or other" (p. 20 of his *Elements of Metaphysics*). The ideas of self-consistence, of coherence, and of a systematic whole, are, in my opinion, derived not from the logical law of non-contradiction, but from some of the perceptual *data* upon which thinking under that law operates.

Mr. Carr makes, I think, "a hit, a very palpable hit" at Prof. Taylor, when he says (p. 123), "The curious thing about that proof is, that the metaphysical criterion of reality forms no part of the argument" (in which Kant's 100 dollars figure as an illustration). Only, would not Prof. Taylor be ready to

admit, that the imagined dollars were equally "psychical matters of fact" with the real dollars? Mr. Carr takes him to mean that the real dollars only were psychical matters of fact [here, in the discussion, Mr. Carr ably defended his interpretation of Prof. Taylor's meaning]; and then proceeds to argue, that actual and immediate experiences are "riddled with contradictions."

Now here I join issue with Mr. Carr. He says (p. 124): "For example, I perceive matter in motion, but I know that the idea of motion is self-contradictory. It implies that a thing can be in two places at once, and this is impossible; and therefore motion, notwithstanding that I have experienced it, is merely appearance." The passage runs to greater length, and other so-called experiences are instanced; but this will perhaps suffice. My answer would be this: The self-contradiction in the idea of motion attaches to the *thought* of it, not to the *perception* of it. Instead of using thought instrumentally, to interpret perception, you set up some concept or concepts of thought, which are abstractions hypostasised, as the realities of which perceptions are supposed to be the appearances; but it is these concepts, these falsely-assumed realities, which are self-contradictory, not the perceptions falsely called appearances. In thinking of motion as perceived, we ideally *arrest* the motion from point to point of space, these *points* being themselves ideally introduced into perceived space by thinking, and then we can only conceive of motion as *rest* at one or other of these ideally introduced points; and motion being the contrary of rest in perception, and contradictory of it in thought, motion thus becomes self-contradictory. Suppose, however, that the points in perceived space are real points in real perceived space, as no doubt they are, still the motion of a body from one to another of them is only ideally arrested at any one of them, and even ideally arrested only by our ignoring (in our concept of motion) the time-element in the perception, the time required for the body's passing from point to point, the

time being equally divisible with the space into ideal points or instants, which are equally real with the ideal points of space. These points of space and of time we introduce into our perception of motion, by thought, for the purpose of better understanding the perception; and without the perception we could not conceive or imagine their coming into our thought at all,—unless, indeed, we adopted the adventurous hypothesis that they are *a priori* forms of Thought which are constitutive or creative of experience. It is the Dialectician's world of Reality which is "riddled with contradictions," since their world of Reality is a world of Thought-concepts.

Philosophy begins by provisionally doubting of everything; that is, it begins by excluding all unwarranted assumptions. Mr. Carr's paper once more shows that, if you begin your philosophy by taking a self-contradictory notion as your "initial certainty," which is Dogmatism, you cannot exclude self-contradictory notions from your conclusion, which is, that Philosophy is, no longer provisional, but ascertained Scepticism. But Mr. Carr has not shown, and I venture to think never will show, that Philosophy is ascertained Scepticism, when it is founded on simple analysis of experience, without the introduction of dogmatic assumptions.

Mr. CARR replied:—

The principal contention in this very valuable criticism is one that I am not concerned to refute. It is that in the *reality* member of the distinction between knowledge and reality I am simply introducing into philosophy an "old friend the Thing-in-itself." I must confess that in my opinion this old friend has never been satisfactorily got rid of, and it is quite fair to interpret my defence of ultimate scepticism as simply meaning that it never can be. At any rate, it certainly seems to me that if the Thing-in-itself is ever "finally relegated to the domain of fiction," it will not be in the simple and direct manner that Mr. Hodgson proposes. I do not think the result

of any enquiry will be to replace the idea of Thing-in-itself by the idea of Object, because to me the former represents an ultimate question. I am very far from denying the value of simple analysis of experience, and I recognise the importance and great extent of the work that philosophy may do without raising the ultimate question, but the question of the relation of knowledge to reality presents itself to me as an ultimate question in philosophy. If, as I think, it takes the form of a question that must be asked and cannot be answered, then the positive outcome of philosophy is "ascertained Scepticism."

VIII.—IDEALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE.

By G. DAWES HICKS.

"THE principle of all genuine Idealists, from the Eleatic School to Bishop Berkeley," says Kant in a well-known passage at the end of the *Prolegomena*, "is contained in the formula 'that all knowledge which comes to us through sense and experience is nothing else than mere illusion, and that truth is to be found only in the ideas of pure understanding or pure reason.' But the main principle which dominates and determines my Idealism is, on the other hand, that all conceptions of things derived from pure understanding or pure reason are nothing else than mere illusions and that truth lies only in experience."

It is difficult, and no doubt fruitless, to venture a guess as to the reasons which induced Kant to include Berkeley amongst those who accepted the principle here ascribed to "all genuine idealists." On the face of it, nothing seems to be farther from the standpoint of the *Principles of Human Knowledge* than the view that truth could only be found in the ideas of pure understanding. The famous polemic against abstract ideas, with which Berkeley begins his philosophising, is virtually identical in import with Kant's own criticism of the position that the objects of knowledge are things-in-themselves, and, throughout the treatise mentioned, Berkeley certainly seems to be repudiating, often in so many words, the doctrine Kant attributes to him.

There are, however, considerations suggested even by the course of argument in the *Principles* which Kant might have offered in justification of his statement. The philosophical conception, forming the termination of the line of thought there

pursued, leaves on Berkeley's hands a formidable problem, with which he never really attempted to grapple. A finite mind has, let us say, the perception a (simple or complex). This, according to the philosophical conception in question, indicates a way in which the finite mind is affected by the agency of the infinite mind. As an affection of the finite mind, a is a state or condition of the finite mind itself, and, although the finite mind would describe it as the perception of a thing, there is, so Berkeley would assure us, nothing distinct from the act of perceiving. In what relation, then, does the a in question stand to the infinite mind? Are we to imagine a mode of operation of the infinite mind, let us call it A , which is the producing cause of a and which is other than a ? It is, however, part of Berkeley's doctrine that things, whilst not objects of the finite mind, exist nevertheless as objects of the infinite mind, and existing as an object means existing as a state or modification of the mind. Are we, therefore, to say that, in the act of affecting the finite mind and causing the perception a , the infinite mind is percipient of a content A ? And if so, is A identical with a , numerically one with a , or is it different from a , numerically distinct from a ? In other words, is it possible for Berkeley to resist the conclusion that our perceptions are modes of the infinite mind, whatever that may mean, as well as modes of our mind? There can be little doubt that Berkeley himself would have chosen the other alternative and have replied that the ideas or objects of the infinite mind are numerically distinct from the ideas or objects of the finite mind. It was probably the pressure of this very difficulty that drove him later towards the metaphysical conception vaguely adumbrated in *Siris*,—the Platonic or Neo-platonic conception of an archetypal world of Ideas. In *Siris*, had it been known to him, Kant might have discovered abundant confirmation of the statement made in the above quotation. "Sensible appearances," are described in *Siris*, as "of a flowing, unstable, and uncertain nature," which "by an early prevention render

the after task of thought more difficult" (§ 264); "sense," it is declared, "knoweth not" (§ 306), for "there can be no knowledge of things flowing and unstable," and these flowing and unstable things cannot in strictness be said to *exist* at all (§ 304). "Till intellect begins to dawn, and cast a ray on this shadowy scene" we have no apprehension of the "true principle of existence" (§ 294). "Intellect and Reason are alone the sure guides to truth" (§ 264).

The wheel has come full circle and its movement is instructive for more reasons than one. Not only is it not true that in all arguments for Idealism the proposition *esse* is *percipi* is the fundamental premiss, it cannot be even said to be so in Berkeley's own case. Berkeley starts by assuming that the world of existence, the world of conscious experience, is twofold in character; on the one hand there are minds, and on the other hand there are objects. Objects are either the directly apprehended states of mind, or they are the copies, the reproductions, of such directly apprehended mental states. Minds are not known as objects; we have no "ideas" either of our own mind or of other minds. A mind is an agent or active power, and of agency or activity there can be no "idea." On this point Berkeley is emphatic, and his repeated reiteration of it indicates the importance it seemed to him to possess.* And the reason is sufficiently obvious. Logically the conclusion that the *esse* of sensible objects is *percipi* rested for Berkeley on the premiss that there was an *esse* the nature of which was *percipere* or *intelligere*. He makes no serious effort to deduce the truth of the second proposition from the truth of the first; probably he was not so blind as some of his

* See, for example, *Commonplace Book, Works*, ed. Fraser, 1871, iv, p. 447, "The unknown substratum of volitions and ideas is something whereof I have no idea" (*cp.* also p. 462), and *Principles*, § 27, "The words *will*, *soul*, *spirit*, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto or represented by any idea whatsoever (*cp.* § 135 *sqq.*).

critics have accused him of being to the hopelessness of that procedure, for had he started with *percipi* as the equivalent of existence, the inference would have been inevitable that no finite subject could ever be conscious of his own existence. At all events, Berkeley's position is clearly and explicitly stated, not once only but several times. He adopts, namely, from the outset the Cartesian dictum that the finite subject has a direct, an absolute, assurance of his own existence. "We comprehend our own existence," he declares, "by inward feeling or Reflection."* "I know what I mean by the terms *I* and *myself*," he insists, "and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound."† It is only on the basis of this assumption that he is able firstly to claim that when I apprehend an "idea" I apprehend it immediately, intuitively, as *mine*, and secondly, to make out any case for describing its existence as mental at all.

Now, the two meanings of the term "existence" which thus emerge are fundamentally distinct, no less distinct than had been the meaning of the term as applied to matter from the meaning of the term as applied to mind. The very being of an "idea" implied passiveness and inertness, it included in it nothing of power or agency; the very being of a "mind," on the other hand, consisted in its active, working, operating character. An "idea," not "subsisting by itself," cannot be a substance; a mind, being the "support" wherein unthinking beings or ideas inhere, is just exactly what we understand by substance. An "idea" cannot be said "to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything"; a mind, as an efficient agent, is a producing cause, and there can be no producing causes that are not minds. The antithesis, therefore, between these opposed species of existents is so violent and pronounced that the endeavour to

* *Principles*, § 89.

† *Works* (Fraser, 1871), i, 326.

work them together into one coherent system is evidently a task of no light nature. As a matter of fact, there is not a point in this conception of a twofold sphere of existence which is not the cause of endless trouble to Berkeley; the whole conception is untenable in itself, and is the source of almost all the irreconcilable contradictions that beset Berkeley's Idealism. And, inasmuch as the conception still lingers on in many current efforts of speculation, some useful purpose may be served in fixing upon one or two of the crucial stages in Berkeley's thought where its intrinsic weakness becomes apparent.

Having constructed his theory of ideas as subjective states of the individual mind, and having determined that the *esse* of sensuous things is *percipi*, it is incumbent on Berkeley to explain how we come falsely to assume a world of real material things, independent of our perceiving and different from our states of consciousness. And he disposes of the problem by means of his doctrine of the will as the only actual or efficient causal power. Some ideas, those of imagination, I can produce through the agency of my own volition; I soon, however, become aware that a large number of my ideas are not produced through the agency of my own volition, but come to me willy-nilly, whether I will or no. These latter ideas, argues Berkeley, I wrongly ascribe to the action of so-called external, material things, whereas a correct analysis would show that they must be produced by a will similar in kind to my own. But no one can fail to observe the ease with which Berkeley here passes from his general principle that all I can properly be said to know in regard to objects are ideas in my own mind to recognition of a distinction between the ideas that arise and the ideas that do not arise from my volition. That is a distinction depending confessedly on what is not part of the compared ideas themselves,* but on certain mental

* Ideas "cannot represent unto us by way of image or likeness, that which acts" *Principles*, § 27.

activities and the awareness of the same that lie entirely beyond the scope of the ideas compared. A perceiving mind, capable of discriminating its ideas in regard to their dependence or non-dependence on its own will is evidently a mind supplied with and using judgments and notions such as find no justification whatever on the theory that the mind knows only its own ideas or mental states. The force of this objection no doubt weighed upon Berkeley, and induced him in the later editions of the *Principles* to introduce an important modification of his doctrine. He then allows that, although we cannot be said to have an "idea" either of our own or other minds, we can be said to have a "notion" of them, by which I understand him to mean a content of thought, not capable of the concrete appearance peculiar to percepts or presentations. But this is, in truth, a case of letting in the waters that are destined to overflow the house. For let it be granted that in some way which Berkeley never succeeds in making clear, I have a "notion" either of my own or of another mind. In what relation, then, does the *existence* of that mind stand to the notion of it forming a part of my experience? Admittedly, they are entirely distinct—the existence of the mind in question is not due to the fact that it is recognised or apprehended in my notion of it. But if the *esse* of those realities which I am conscious of through the contents of "notions" does *not* consist in my being conscious of them, what ground have I for supposing that the existence of the objects I am conscious of in sense perception *does* consist in my being conscious of them? Driven by this line of reflection from his original Nominalism, Berkeley would presumably take refuge in his ontological theory that ultimately the reality of a sense perceived object consisted in its existing as an "idea" in the infinite mind. But, here again, Berkeley has himself supplied us with the dialectic that renders this last resort unavailing. For, we ask, does the so-called "thing" possess, as existing in the infinite mind, those characteristics

which distinguish it as a percept in the finite mind, and by means of which we discriminate it from a mere representation or an image? If so, then it must be assumed that the mode of perceiving on the part of the infinite mind is exactly similar to the mode of perceiving on the part of the finite mind. Berkeley would have recoiled from such an admission, for it carries with it the conclusion that the infinite mind is qualitatively and sensuously limited after the fashion of the finite mind. "God knows or hath ideas," he maintains, "but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are."* Evidently, therefore, it follows that much in our perception of objects is due to the transitory, accidental, imperfect character of our finite minds, and that these features cannot belong to objects as ideas in the infinite mind. But if so, this ultimate reality ascribed to objects is liable to the very objection Berkeley himself urged, for example, against Locke's account of substance. For what is a perceived thing which has lost just those individualising, particularising marks that give it determinateness within the range of our experience? It is an *abstract* idea.

This result carries with it momentous consequences for Berkeley's theory, upon which it may be interesting for a moment to dwell. If pressed, Berkeley, I take it, would have been forced to the admission that ideas in the infinite mind possessed a reality and ultimate significance, which could not be claimed for ideas in the finite mind. The former could not be described, after the fashion of the latter, as "marks or signs," as together making up "the language of the Author of Nature"; they must themselves constitute the very being of nature. Indeed, in *Siris*, Berkeley is to be found insisting upon the fact that our perceptions are gross and delusive, that sensuous objects are merely appearances, and that only the divine ideas can truly be said to

* *Works*, i, p. 337.

exist. But if this be so, the entire ground is cut from under the contention, advanced at the beginning of the *Principles*, that the being of ideas consists in their dependence upon mind. For the whole point of that contention was that the sensuous qualities of a thing, the qualities, that is to say, which gave to it concreteness and determinateness of character, were impossible apart from mental apprehension, and this was coupled with the further contention that the supposed existence of unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, rested upon the doctrine of abstract ideas. It follows, therefore, that unless some independent reason can be given for the existence of a supreme mind, the logical outcome of a critical examination of Berkeley's philosophising would be to land us back into the Objective Idealism of a certain stage, at all events, of Plato's thinking, according to which Ideas were regarded as thoughts neither of God nor man, but as separate, self-existing, eternal essences, which might, indeed, be objects of intellectual apprehension, but were in no way constituted thereby.

Berkeley's idealism, then, hovers in a state of unstable equilibrium between two radically incompatible positions. On the one hand, it may well be described in Kant's language as "dogmatic," for it *assumes* at the outset two orders of real existence, the finite and the infinite mind, and in order to account for a third, that of sensuous objects, a mechanical determination of the former by the latter, all of which assumptions prove to be unwarranted when tested by the principles Berkeley prescribes for his own procedure. On the other hand, it may well be described as "subjective," for it identifies the objects of our experience with the particular modes of our subjective activity, and thereby precludes itself from offering any explanation of how we come to be aware of ourselves as existing, and as forming part of the world known to us in experience.

Kant called his own idealism "critical," and the signification which that title always had for him indicates at once a point of

departure fundamentally different from Berkeley's. It was the essence of his critical method that it should undertake as its first problem an analysis of knowledge for the purpose of determining the range and legitimacy of the notions which in knowing we actually and perhaps necessarily employ in determining the nature of the object known. For when we apply, as perfectly representative of the nature and relations of existing realities, notions which perchance have no significance except as connecting links in the relative experience of a thinking subject, it was not, Kant thought, surprising that utterly unintelligible results should emerge. If, for instance, we start by assuming that objects are somehow given to the mind from without, it is not of the slightest consequence philosophically whether we say that material substances are the causes of our ideas, or whether we say, with Berkeley, that God is the cause. In both cases we have left entirely unexplained how from these subjective modes of the mind's activity there arises the wholly different fact expressed in the phrase knowledge or experience of an object. In other words, Kant's problem, in contradistinction to Berkeley's, is not an examination into the constitution of *existence*, but an examination into the constitution of *knowledge*; and his answer to Berkeley largely consists in showing that there are no notions, such, for example, as that of causality, which can be taken as furnishing a criterion of truth superior to knowledge itself, and as capable of being used to explain the way in which knowledge comes about.

It has been of late abundantly demonstrated by numerous writers on the Critical philosophy that, notwithstanding his efforts to the contrary, Kant does not succeed in freeing himself from the assumptions of the dogmatic method, and that, in consequence, he is constantly to be found maintaining a view of the conscious subject and its experience which differs in no essential respects from the idealism of Berkeley. And I am not here concerned in the least to dispute the justice of that

criticism. Frequently enough the language of Kant can bear no other interpretation than that the individual concrete mind is to be taken as an ultimate entity, endowed with a certain structure not further explicable, that its function consists in operating upon the materials supplied to it from without, and arranging them into forms in virtue of its own peculiar inherent constitution. In so far as that assumption is made by Kant, all the objections urged against Berkeley's idealism are valid against his also, and the mere fact that Space and Time and the Categories are conceived as forms of mind does not, in that case, justify the warmth with which he repudiated the idea of having presented a new version of Berkeley's system for the benefit of German readers. The really valuable portion of Kant's work, however, is based upon the entire rejection of that assumption, and in it he is occupied in developing a view of experience upon lines totally at variance therewith. In what follows, I propose first briefly to indicate what appears to me to be the outcome of the deeper line of thought pursued by Kant, and then to discuss the bearing it seems to have upon some current forms of idealistic doctrine.

As the result, then, of an analysis of a fact of knowledge, Kant reaches the conclusion that the world of nature is a world for consciousness, that the characteristics of such a world can only be interpreted as features that find expression through mind or intelligence. But, in the first place, the grounds on which this conclusion is based differ *in toto* from those advanced by Berkeley in support of his thesis that the *esse* of sensible objects is *percipi*. Berkeley rests his case upon what seems to him the self-evident truth that we perceive nothing "besides our own ideas or sensations." "Colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, &c.," are "sensible qualities," and these make up "the things we see and feel;" the latter are "so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense."*

* *Principles*, §§ 4, 5, and 7.

For Kant, however, this, so far from establishing idealism, would have made for its direct opposite. "If all that the idea contains is simply the mode in which the subject is affected," then, he had declared in his pre-critical period, "we may easily understand how it should correspond to the object as an effect to its cause"—that is to say, the ordinary dualism of popular belief would occasion no insuperable difficulties. It was just because he had convinced himself that the things we see and feel are *not* "so many impressions on the sense" that he was led to the idealism formulated in the *Critique*. Analysis had revealed that there were constituent elements in every known object that could not be assigned to sense affection, and it is on this account that Kant considers himself justified in asserting its dependence upon mind. The fact that the object known occupies a position in time, or in both space and time; the fact that it is always a complex whole, the parts of which are combined or related in systematic order; the fact that it, as that which is known, stands over against the act of knowing, seeming, in Kant's peculiar phraseology, to "detach itself" from the latter and "hover outside of it"—these are the characteristics which in Kant's view prevent us from supposing that an object known is simply a copy or an image of something existing in a realm external to the realm of consciousness. Whatever mode of reality may have to be allowed to objects known, it is certain, so the Kantian argument may be expressed, that the awareness of Time and Space, of Synthesis or Relatedness, and of the circumstance of *Entäußerung* or (to use Simmel's word) *Entfernung*, cannot come about through a process of stimulation from without. Even though we grant that things in themselves do exist in time, or in space and time, that the elements of such things are combined and related, that they do stand over against the knowing subject, still, the mere fact of their existing in this way would not and could not account for our awareness of the same. In the second place, however frequently Kant may speak as though, after the manner

of Berkeley, he identified self-consciousness or intelligence with the concrete existence of a particular human subject, there is nothing in his mode of proof that need in the least imply such identification. Quite the contrary. The criticism of knowledge was entirely independent in its terms of any individuality in the subject of reference. It merely warranted the assertion that whatsoever conception we form of experience as being antecedent to or subsequent to the existence of empirically conditioned individual minds, no world of reality at all can be known except as involving features possible only for intelligence. Kant is fully alive to the consideration, which Berkeley wholly ignores, that the awareness of individuality on the part of the finite subject is one part of the total world of experience, and is itself dependent upon those very conditions that seem to him to be involved in the awareness of any fact whatsoever. No one has insisted more strenuously than he upon the necessity of regarding Berkeley's "unthinking things" and finite subjects as being, in this respect, upon exactly the same level,—both alike, as known objects, must find a place not as supremely determining the world of experience but as themselves determined therein. As facts of experience, both were dependent on the unity of Mind or Self-consciousness, but the unity here in question was not that unity which each thinking being may find exhibited in his own inner life, but the unity which is implied as a prior condition in making even of the inner life an object of contemplation. The unity of the finite empirical consciousness was "wholly contingent" (*ganz zufällig*), and whatever clothing it, as such, might give to the given data of sense would be, therefore, arbitrary and subjective; it was alone the "fundamental unity of consciousness," the "permanent and abiding Ego," to which "each and every empirical consciousness stood in relation" that furnished those principles of universal and necessary validity in virtue of which the world of experience was one systematic whole, and the same for all rational beings.

Briefly, and expressed in current terminology, the Kantian position amounted to this. When it is said that experience can only be interpreted in terms of mind, the reference is not to "mind" as an existent, in which sense knowing is doubtless an act or a modification of some finite individual subject. The reference is to the content of knowledge, and so far as it is concerned nothing is advanced beyond the bare general principle that no element can be admitted as an element of experience which in its nature is out of relation to the unity of consciousness, the "objective unity," namely, which Kant expressly distinguishes from the "subjective unity," or "form," as he calls it, "of the inner sense." *

If this be so, it is obviously a misrepresentation of Kant to ignore the central principle of his theory, and to interpret his idealism as summed up in the statement that objects of experience are composed entirely of mental elements.† For the expression "mental elements" is woefully ambiguous, and carries with it the inevitable implication that the objects of experience are merely states or events of finite individual minds. To fasten this implication upon Kant's analysis is to do it grievous injustice. It is true that he is repeatedly to be found describing objects as *Vorstellungen*, and that he applies this same term *Vorstellungen* to mental processes considered as constituent states of the concrete empirical subject. But the term *Vorstellung*, it is scarcely needful to mention, has in German the twofold significance that attaches likewise to the English term "idea." By *Vorstellung* may be meant a particular phase of or occurrence in the individual's mental life, arising under particular conditions and calling for explanation by reference to the circumstances under which it has arisen. But it may also mean that which the subject is aware of, the presentation or content apprehended by him,

* Kant's *Werke*, iii (Hartenstein), p. 120.

† See, for example, Sidgwick: *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations*, p. 102.

through the process of knowing. I do not think it can be seriously questioned that Kant uses the word sometimes in one sense and sometimes in another.* For instance, numerous passages might be cited from the Kantian writings in which *Vorstellung* is expressly defined as a modification of the soul (*Modification des Gemüths*), and in one of the chief sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason* a distinction is explicitly made between the *Vorstellung*, understood in this sense, and the object, of which in and through the former the subject is aware.† But even within the compass of that very paragraph the phenomenon or object is said to be a combination of *Vorstellungen*, where, unless we are going to credit Kant with the most absurd and palpable contradiction, we are bound to assume he is employing the word in the second of the two significations referred to above. Indeed, the whole argumentation of this section of the *Critique*, as of numerous others, would be altogether meaningless if the object known be taken as equivalent to a state, or a group of states, of the individual mind. For Kant is here engaged in pointing out, with reference to the problem of causality, the difference between a *subjective* sequence, the successive stages of which depend upon the arbitrary determination of a finite subject, or upon the accidental way in which his apprehensions are directed, and sequence in the *objective* order of phenomena, which is entirely independent of the sequence of events in the mind of a particular individual observer. The application of the category of causality, in other words, does not come about through the subjective mechanism of any individual consciousness. The phenomena of nature are *themselves* subject to the causal law, otherwise there would be no such thing as objective sequence in contrast to the subjective sequence of

* If it be objected that the same might be said in favour of Berkeley, my reply is that Berkeley's entire argument rests upon the assumption that content and process are identical.

† Kant's *Werke*, iii (Hartenstein), p. 176.

our mental states, and the latter, in that case, could never be *recognised* as a sequence at all. Nay, further, what Kant is here saying comes to this, that natural phenomena are only phenomena in so far as they are thus causally connected,—they “all lie in *one* nature and must lie therein,”—and *one* nature is possible in virtue of those universal and necessary principles which are constitutive features of it as related to Self-consciousness in general. So far, then, from the objective order of sequence being due to our mode of apprehension, the exact reverse is true,—our apprehension of the objective sequence of phenomena is dependent upon the *already* determined relations of the phenomena themselves. The individual subject, in so far as he apprehends the true relations of objects, is constrained by those relations and they are not constrained by him. “Only on this account,” says Kant, “can I be justified in asserting of the phenomenon itself and not merely of my apprehension, that in it a succession is to be discerned, and this is tantamount to asserting that I cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in that very succession.”* In other words, the objectivity of phenomena, and of their order in time, means that they are not dependent upon the individual subject, but form a part of that system to which they and the individual subject alike belong. And this result is strictly in accordance with the argument of the “Deduction of the Categories,” wherein it is shown that self-consciousness on the part of the individual is conditioned by the very objective experience, which, according to the interpretation of Kant as a Berkeleyan idealist, that self-consciousness would itself create.

That the view here taken of the transcendental standpoint represents Kant's real meaning is confirmed by the fact that the whole of the latter part of the *Transcendental Analytic* is taken up with the presentation of a conception of nature which is as wide as the poles asunder from the conception of nature

* Kant's *Werke*, iii (Hartenstein) p. 177.

to be met with in Berkeley's *Principles*. The points of contrast are so striking that it may be worth while to bring them into prominence. According to Berkeley, perceived objects cannot be said to be substances; the permanence we ascribe to such objects indicates no more than the regular recurrent ways in which sense qualities or ideas are grouped together in our perception; and any substratum or support of those qualities is not discoverable in the objects themselves. "There is not any other substance than Spirit, or that which perceives." According to Kant, on the other hand, experience of an object would be impossible were there not something in the object that was permanent, something, that is to say, which enables us to distinguish the said object from our changing modes of perceiving it. For apprehension on our part of temporal relations, whether of sequence or of co-existence, involves that we have given to us in the object a substratum that changes not, and in reference to which that which changes can be determined. Spirits or minds, on the contrary, are not substances; no permanent substratum is discoverable in the sequence of states that constitute the mental existence of the individual, for the pure unity of self-consciousness cannot be determined as existing in time, and is in fact related in equally direct fashion to the experience of nature and to the experience of the inner life. According to Berkeley, again, perceived objects cannot be said to be connected by any such link as that of causality. One object may succeed another, and the presence of the one may by dint of custom or association become a sign from which we may infer that the other will be present, but they exercise upon one another no real influence. According to Kant, on the other hand, if objects were not in themselves necessarily connected, if they could change their qualities without being acted upon by each other in definite ways, then we should be precluded from recognising any order of succession amongst them, and that the presence of one should suggest to us the appearance of

which distinguish it as a percept in the finite mind, and by means of which we discriminate it from a mere representation or an image? If so, then it must be assumed that the mode of perceiving on the part of the infinite mind is exactly similar to the mode of perceiving on the part of the finite mind. Berkeley would have recoiled from such an admission, for it carries with it the conclusion that the infinite mind is qualitatively and sensuously limited after the fashion of the finite mind. "God knows or hath ideas," he maintains, "but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are."* Evidently, therefore, it follows that much in our perception of objects is due to the transitory, accidental, imperfect character of our finite minds, and that these features cannot belong to objects as ideas in the infinite mind. But if so, this ultimate reality ascribed to objects is liable to the very objection Berkeley himself urged, for example, against Locke's account of substance. For what is a perceived thing which has lost just those individualising, particularising marks that give it determinateness within the range of our experience? It is an *abstract* idea.

This result carries with it momentous consequences for Berkeley's theory, upon which it may be interesting for a moment to dwell. If pressed, Berkeley, I take it, would have been forced to the admission that ideas in the infinite mind possessed a reality and ultimate significance, which could not be claimed for ideas in the finite mind. The former could not be described, after the fashion of the latter, as "marks or signs," as together making up "the language of the Author of Nature"; they must themselves constitute the very being of nature. Indeed, in *Siris*, Berkeley is to be found insisting upon the fact that our perceptions are gross and delusive, that sensuous objects are merely appearances, and that only the divine ideas can truly be said to

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Berkeley's idealism, then, hovers in a state of unstable equilibrium between two radically incompatible positions. On the one hand, it may well be described in Kant's language as "dogmatic," for it *assumes* at the outset two orders of real existence, the finite and the infinite mind, and in order to account for a third, that of sensuous objects, a mechanical determination of the former by the latter, all of which assumptions prove to be unwarranted when tested by the principles Berkeley prescribes for his own procedure. On the other hand, it may well be described as "subjective," for it identifies the objects of our experience with the particular modes of our subjective activity, and thereby precludes itself from offering any explanation of how we come to be aware of ourselves as existing, and as forming part of the world known to us in experience.

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pretation, I am quite aware, is beset with difficulties of its own, but, at all events, it enables some explanation to be offered of the fact, which has often seemed to critics inexplicable, that Kant is frequently to be found speaking of objects of sense as though they were given in their completeness before the Categories had been applied. This, however, is a digression. The main feature which characterises Kant's view of nature, as contrasted with Berkeley's, is that he describes the "matter" of the phenomenal universe, not in terms of the secondary qualities, but in terms of force and motion. Matter is that which is capable of moving in space, that which occupies space, that which is constituted by the two opposite forces of repulsion and attraction, and which possesses, therefore, mass and inertia. So conceived, it is still phenomenal, but the incongruity of regarding it as composed of mental elements, in the Berkeleyan sense, is, at all events, apparent. Kant himself is strenuous in insisting that to such mental elements none of the attributes just mentioned can be assigned. He goes further. For he is clearly of opinion that sensations as mental states, are "effects," due to the influence of the "moving forces of matter" upon the individual subject and his sense organs. Especially in the posthumous writings is the position in question emphatically and repeatedly maintained. "The aggregate of the moving forces of matter," he declares, "is itself only phenomenal," and these forces, "which affect the senses," constitute a "system in one whole of experience."* Such passages are only more decisive expres-

of objectivity, and not themselves objects. It would be no argument against the theory of Association of Ideas to insist that when I say "that is a chair," what I am conscious of is *not* that certain sensations of mine awaken a train of mental images or representations, which coalesce with the present sensations, but that a certain *object* of sensation, which I recognise as a chair, is really before me.

* *Uebergang von den metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik*, published by Reicke in *Altpreussische Monatschrift*, xix, pp. 283 and 291, and in numerous other passages.

sions of the view that is continually coming to the surface in the works that are recognised as canonical. I select here one instance of it out of a large number that might be quoted. "The fundamental character of anything that can be an object of the outer senses must," says Kant in the Preface to the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe*, "be motion, since through it alone can these senses be affected."* It would be difficult to find a conception of nature more radically opposed to Berkeley's than that to which the line of reflexion I have been following tends, and anyone who has ever taken the trouble to compare Berkeley's little tract *De Motu* with Kant's *Anfangsgründe* and his *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* would hesitate, I think, in supposing that two such divergent results can rest upon similar philosophical premisses.

I conclude, therefore, that so far as he is consistent with his transcendental theory of knowledge, Kant is justified in drawing the contrast, contained in the passage with which we started, between his idealism and Berkeley's. For Berkeley, in the last resort, experience can furnish no reliable criterion of truth. Experience, as he conceives it, is dependent on the contingent, accidental character of finite individual agents, and from the reality which is in the mind of God it would seem to be as widely separated as the realm of Opinion was separated from the realm of Ideas in the philosophy of Plato. For Kant, on the other hand, experience is constituted by universal and necessary principles that are sharply contrasted with the chance vagaries of the finite individual thinker. "Aristotle," remarked Kant, in one of his earlier treatises, "says somewhere — 'When we are awake, we have a common world, but when we dream, everybody has his own.' It seems to me," Kant adds, "that it ought to be possible to reverse this latter proposition and to say, if among different human beings, every-

* Kant's *Werke* (Hartenstein), iv, p. 366.

one has his own world, it may be supposed that they dream."* To assert the universality and necessity of the principles constitutive of experience is, indeed, *ipso facto* to assert that those principles are not mental facts, or events in my mind, but principles to which the mental facts, or events in my mind, must conform, if, in and through them, I am to share in the experience which the principles in question render possible. One of Kant's chief claims to rank as a great discoverer in the field of metaphysical speculation is based upon the ground that he was the first philosophical thinker who shewed himself to be fully alive to the consideration that the possibility of a knowledge of what is subjective is just as much a problem to be solved as the possibility of a knowledge of what is objective.

I submit, then, that the distinctive place of the Critical philosophy in the history of thought is altogether lost sight of unless account be taken of those features of it which I have been trying to bring into prominence. It is not a question of attempting to get from the Kantian writings a self-consistent system which anyone could now accept. That admittedly would be a futile business. To me, at any rate, the judgment recently expressed by Dr. Caird, that Kant's philosophy "may rather be regarded as a pathway of transition between two disparate views of the world and of man's place in it" seems altogether just and well-founded. Such an estimate is not, however, to be considered as detracting from the real worth and significance of Kant's philosophising as a whole. What is best in Kant can only be exhibited in the form of general principles, which when closely followed out show themselves to be incompatible with other features of his system, but which retain their value even though he did not succeed in combining them into a coherent body of doctrine. The results, for instance, which I have here been indicating, having been

* Kant's *Werke*, ii, p. 249-*sqq.*

reached, the subsequent philosophical development, which culminated in the Absolute Idealism of Hegel, appears to us, looking back upon it, almost a logical necessity. When once the phenomenal world had been conceived as Kant, in however wavering a fashion, had conceived it, the step to the further position, that the phenomenal world is the real world, or at least the real world regarded from a certain limited point of view, could hardly fail to suggest itself. The essence of the Hegelian Idealism is contained in the contention that "the things of which we have immediate knowledge are mere phenomena, not only for us, but in their own nature, and that the true determination of these finite things is to have the ground of their being founded not in themselves but in the universal divine Idea."* It was inevitable that an effort should be made to interpret reality on the lines of a thorough working out of the principle thus enunciated. To retain, in addition to phenomena and their transcendental ground, a circumambient region of things-in-themselves, seemed naturally enough to the immediate followers of Kant to be encumbering the transcendental theory with a perfectly superfluous and unmanageable assumption.

The Hegelian Idealism is not, however, the only terminus to which the considerations I have been emphasising must necessarily lead, although, perhaps, it is requisite that the full bearing of Hegel's effort should be realized before any "return to Kant," or any fresh advance from the Kantian standpoint, is likely to yield a profitable result. Be that as it may, I believe that the Critical philosophy has put into our hands an effective method of criticising not merely the idealism of Berkeley, but much of the idealism that is prevalent amongst us at the present time. It is not my purpose in this paper to attempt any resuscitation of the doctrine of things-in-themselves. But in order to prepare the way for the position I propose to main-

* Hegel's *Werke*, vi, p. 97.

tain, I wish to draw attention to one mode of argument adopted by Kant in defence of this doctrine of his, for whilst I hold the doctrine to be false, I find in the argument not a little that is sound. The argument in question may best be approached by noting briefly the several lines of reflexion which Kant pursues in the effort to make clear why he regarded phenomena as indicating something which is non-phenomenal. In the first place, he points to the fact, for such he takes it to be, that the realm of determinate knowledge is limited, and that in two ways. It is limited, on the one hand, by the general forms of connection constitutive of experience as such; it is limited, on the other hand, by the circumstance that the significance of these forms vanishes in the absence of sense qualities to which alone they are applicable. But to draw a limit at all, even though within its boundaries may be said to lie all that can enter into knowledge proper, implies a distinction, a ground for which must be sought somewhere within the realm of intelligence itself. And in every case in which he had been compelled to assign certain features in the object known to the fundamental character of apprehension, there had necessarily arisen, so he thinks, the idea of a contrast between the objects so apprehended *and* real things (perhaps even those same objects of apprehension conceived as real) which, in regard to their mode of being and their relations to one another, were freed from the formal conditions of apprehension. In the second place, he unites with the consideration just indicated a perfectly different line of reflexion. For he falls back upon the very contention that Berkeley himself had used, namely, that the given contents of sense intuition are not spontaneously produced by the apprehending subject, and infers from this that what is apprehended as a determinate content with definite space and time relations must be regarded as merely phenomenal of what in itself is real. And in the third place, there gradually comes to the front in the course of the investigation what in the long run was perhaps for Kant the most

important consideration of all, viz., that the world as known falls short of that unity which reason prescribes as a demand or as an ideal, and by which it gives direction to the process of knowing. Not only do all parts of the world of experience exhibit marks which indicate that something more is wanted in order fully to satisfy the effort inevitable on the part of a self-conscious being to work together his experience into one connected whole, but the significant fact that the pure Unity of Self-consciousness is other than and distinct from the empirical subject can receive from the point of view of experience itself no intelligible explanation. Recognition of the problems for which the Categories are inadequate is only to be accounted for, so Kant maintains, on the supposition that reflective self-consciousness in some way contemplates a world of existence lying above or beyond the phenomenal world of our ordinary experience. All these lines of reflexion, even if taken together, would justify no more than the conclusion, far from being all that Kant desires, that the reality possible in our conception of it is not exhausted in that which can be presented in the form of phenomena. For Kant they appeared to justify the conclusion that the phenomenal world as such, taken in itself, contained an inevitable reference to a realm of ultimate being higher in rank than the realm of experience and the source of the latter. Now, I think it is scarcely doubtful that this reference to the thing-in-itself will be found to rest for Kant in the long run upon the ground which is enunciated most explicitly perhaps in his treatment of the Ontological Argument. Existence, he there insists, is never a part of the content of any idea whatsoever. There is nothing in the content of an idea as such which entitles us to assert the existence of anything corresponding to it; "whatever our idea of an object may contain, we must always advance beyond it, in order to attribute to this object existence;"*

* Kant's *Werke* (Hart), iii, 410.

the existence is outside, external to (ausserhalb), the content of the idea. The act of positing the existence of anything is invariably an act of judgment, and although in such judgments no addition is made to the content of the subject idea,—the idea of a hundred possible thalers is not less rich in content than the idea of a hundred actual thalers,—yet such judgments are synthetic in the sense that the predicate is not included in the idea of the subject. What an existential proposition really asserts is that its subject is given through sense and occupies a determinate place in concrete perceptive experience. In other words, Kant is here struggling to give expression to the thought, which forces itself so repeatedly upon him in the course of his inquiry, that the reality of what is presented in sense-perception is not, and cannot be exhaustively taken up, so to speak, in the content apprehended. Such phrases as “given,” “affection,” “impression,” and the like, are no doubt crude and deceptive enough, and carry with them implications wholly irreconcilable with Kant’s transcendental theory, but they point at least to the fact that Kant is throughout resisting the temptation,—with but partial success, it is true,—of ascribing to knowledge or truth an existential character, and of treating contents known as independently existing entities.* I say that Kant’s success in this respect is but partial, because the sharp antithesis he draws between phenomena and things-in-themselves defeats the very purpose that really lies at the root of this particular procedure of his. When once phenomena and things-in-themselves were regarded as two distinct and separate realms, it became inevitable that phenomena, or the contents of knowledge, should be dealt

* No one, perhaps, has ever made a more explicit avowal of doing both than Fichte. In his lectures on the *Thatsachen des Bewusstseins* (*Werke* ii, p. 698), for example, Fichte writes: “Knowledge is truly independent and self-existing; it is a free and independent Life. . . . We require no bearer of Knowledge, but Knowledge is to be regarded as bearing itself (sich selbst tragend).”

with as existent entities, and then be pictured as constituting collectively a sort of *tertium quid* between the knowing subject and the unknowable realities outside the sphere of consciousness and its objects. Indeed, as we have seen, Kant treats material bodies as, on the one hand, *wholly* phenomenal, and yet, on the other hand, as interacting substances that occasion by their influence on the empirical subject the mental states or processes in and through which they are apprehended.

We have, then, now, so far as Kant is concerned, the data in our hands for attacking the problem presented to us by idealism of the Hegelian type, and the thesis I have to defend may at first be concisely and dogmatically stated in some such way as the following. Ultimate reality is wrongly conceived either after the manner in which Kant tends to conceive it, as a plurality of unknowable things *per se*, or after the manner in which the Post-Kantian idealism tends to conceive it, as solely the synthesis of knowledge and its objects. Both these conceptions are as such abstractions, although no doubt the second is infinitely less so than the first, and in approaching the problem we have before us, an endeavour should be made to avoid the severance of aspects, which, on the lines of either of the metaphysical theories in question, it will be found impossible to retain together. The terms one can here employ are deceptive, but if one may use the word "aspect" without any implication of psycho-physical parallelism or allied notions, I would say that knowledge and existence are, according to the view I am trying to indicate, two aspects of one interconnected reality, both being ultimate in the sense that neither can be regarded as a product arising from, or evolved out of, the nature of the other. It is just as futile to attempt to derive existence from essence as it is to derive essence from existence. The contents of knowledge are not existents; existents are not as such contents of knowledge. I can perhaps bring out my meaning by referring in this connection to a well-known contention of Lotze. Lotze points

out, on the one hand, that whether with Idealism we deny the existence of an external world of things, and regard the contents of our ideas as alone reality, or whether with Realism we maintain the existence of things outside the mind which act upon it, in either case knowledge can only be knowledge; as little on the latter theory as on the former can existing things pass into our knowledge; the utmost extent of the powers possessed by an apprehending subject could not enable that subject to do more than to *know* as perfectly as possible. He points out, on the other hand, that a very simple consideration enables us to see that the contents of knowledge which appear in our mature co-ordinated experience cannot possibly have corresponding to them anything precisely identical in the nature of real existence. For example, in the concept or notion that relation which we call the relation of general to particular is implied. But obviously there is no exact equivalent of the relation we assume to subsist between universal and particular to be met with in the sphere of what actually exists, nor does the sequence of thought by which we form the concept representing such relationship resemble any actual sequence of events in the nature of existent reality. An individual horse exists, but horse in general does not; nor does the existent horse pass through a series of processes analogous to that by which we come to have a presentation of it. In like manner the judgment unquestionably places concepts in a relation to one another which cannot anyhow be supposed to hold in the same sense in the realm of real existence. Still less can it be asserted that the content of thought we call the syllogism is an exactly faithful representation of actually existing relations. We are bound, then, to recognise in the contents of thought or knowledge a mode of reality wholly dissimilar to that mode of reality we describe as Existence, and we may distinguish the former as the reality of Validity or Truth. It was, in Lotze's view, one of the misfortunes that hampered the Platonic theory,—and

what he says of the Platonic theory may be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to most modern systems of Idealism,—that the Greek language had no term to express the reality of simple Validity as contrasted with the reality of Existence. The Platonic Ideas are intelligible when regarded as eternally valid Truths; they become wholly unintelligible if, owing to the fact that Plato had no other general denomination under which to bring them than *οὐσία*, we think of them as actually existent entities. Now, what Lotze here says with reference more especially to the contents of *thought*, may readily be extended to the contents of *perception*, and quite generally to the contents of all modes of conscious apprehension whatsoever. Lotze, in the sections of his treatises I have been referring to, emphasizes, for example, the characteristic of timelessness that attaches to the contents of thought. Time relations may, of course, be represented in the content; but, as such, any content of thought, being universal, is timeless, self-identical, untouched by change. But it is equally true that any distinct content of perception is as such also independent of time and change. Undoubtedly the *act* of perceiving is dependent upon temporal conditions, and so too, for a matter of that, is an act of thinking, but the *content* perceived differs not at all, as regards timelessness, from a content of thought. In fact, wherever we have truth we have that which is as such independent of vicissitude and in so far timeless.* When, however, this characteristic of the contents of apprehension is assigned to ultimate reality, whether conceived after the manner of the Platonic Ideas, or the Atoms of the physicist, or the Absolute of Hegel, or the Reals of Herbart, the confusion has been made between Validity and Existence, and the consideration has been lost sight of that ultimate reality must somehow be inclusive of both.

* Cf. Adamson, *Development of Modern Philosophy*, vol. i, p. 314-5, and vol. ii, p. 288-9.

At this point the demand will probably be made for some explanation of what is meant by Existence, and for some account of how we come to have a conception of that which, as such, forms no part of a content of apprehension. That which is ultimate is, of course, unique, and any definition of the term "Existence" is, therefore, precluded. But we can point to features in concrete reality as exemplifications of what is denoted by this abstract expression. The moment we advance from the position of attempting to determine *what* a content of knowledge is *known as* to the further position of attempting to determine *that* which has conditioned its appearance, or, using Dr. Shadworth Hodgson's apt phraseology, when we are concerned not merely with the *nature* of a content but with the question of its *genesis*, philosophical analysis enables us at once to say that the *appearance* of a content *at any particular moment* is dependent upon conditions which are not part of the content itself. We are, in fact, confronted with the whole problem of Time and Change; one content succeeds another in our experience, although each content, as such, contains no ground either for its own appearance or disappearance. The fact, then, that the contents of experience change, whilst any specific content is as such changeless, furnishes in itself a logical justification for the transition from the *ordo cognoscendi* to the *ordo existendi*, to the existence, that is to say, on the one hand of what we call "external things" (although that conception may have in the light of further criticism to undergo radical transformation), and, on the other hand, of the mental states in and through which apprehension of a content on the part of a conscious subject comes about. Analysis of what we mean by the term "existence" will always, I believe, yield as a result, that existence implies agency, mechanism, instrumentality: that the existent is, in short, that element of the concrete whole of Reality which is the medium in and through which, process, becoming, change, is possible. As such it determines the *occurrence* of any specific content here and

now: it does not determine its *character* or *whatness*, which, equally with existence itself, is unique, ultimate and, therefore, not further explicable. It is undoubtedly from an analysis of knowledge or experience that metaphysical construction must proceed. The problem of metaphysics may be expressed in the form: of what nature must ultimate reality be, in order that experience, constituted as analysis shows experience to be constituted, should be possible? And it seems to me that towards the elucidation of this question no step can be taken which does not oblige us to admit the reality of elements that as such do not and cannot enter into the contents of experience. In other words, the epistemological argument by which the reality of an *esse* that is neither *percipi* nor *intelligi* may be established is similar in kind to the argument by which Kant sought to establish the presence of *a priori* principles in knowledge. That there should be a real succession of events is a necessary presupposition to account for the way in which our experience comes about, and an event cannot hang in the air but must take place *between* existent things or *in* an ultimately existent reality.

When Mr. Bradley succeeded in putting beyond reasonable dispute the distinction between ideas as psychical events or occurrences and ideas as contents or meanings,* he had, in fact, undermined the main contention of the idealism no less of Hegel than of Berkeley. It is true the full import of this distinction is not apparent from Mr. Bradley's mode of presenting it; there still clings to his use of the word "idea" not a little of the unfortunate implication that led to the contradictions we have noted in the speculation of Berkeley. For Mr. Bradley, the content is still part of the psychical state in and through which it is apprehended, and the act of judgment consists in

* The distinction had, of course, been insisted on by previous writers, notably by Lotze, in his *Logic*, and by Dr. Shadworth Hodgson, in his *Philosophy of Reflection*, and in his earlier Addresses to the Aristotelian Society.

the process of divorcing the content from the psychical state and attaching it to an existent other than and wholly distinct from the psychical state, namely, the subject of the judgment. So that *before* the act of judgment the psychical state is more or less a copy of that which is to be judged about, —the idea of a blue flower is itself blue, the idea of an extended thing is itself extended, whilst *in* and *after* the act of judgment the psychical state loses this character of likeness to that which is judged about, and the latter can now be apprehended through means of a process that bears no resemblance to it. But it would be difficult to extract from Mr. Bradley's analysis any conclusive ground for supposing that the nature of a psychical state goes through this curious transformation. On the contrary, that analysis seems to yield abundant reason for holding that the nature of the psychical process *qua* psychical process is from first to last wholly distinct from the nature of the content *qua* content, apprehended through or by means of it. And, in that case, the logical outcome of the analysis would be that whilst the psychical state is an existent, and whilst the content *may* in an act of judgment, be referred to another existent, yet the content as such is not an existent nor part of an existent, no part, therefore, either of a psychical state or of a thing external to the psychical state. As such, it would be a way in which a conscious mind has its experience; it would be a part of the whole to which we give the name of knowledge or truth, in the wider sense, within which, of course, the distinction between truth, in the narrower sense, and error would fall.

That the term "content" is well chosen for expressing what is here intended, I am not concerned to maintain. Strictly, no doubt, it would be more accurate to speak in this connection of a content of knowledge than of a content of a psychical state, but the latter phrase has obtained currency, and I fail to see why it should not be used, like other terms adopted from the vocabulary of ordinary language, in a technical sense. There is

surely no imperative necessity that the philosophical significance of a term should be fixed by the significance it bears in popular parlance; if there were, it would fare badly with a large number of philosophical expressions. It has been lately argued, for example, that since 'blue' would be "rightly said" to be part of the content of a blue flower, therefore, when we speak of blue as the content of the sensation of blue, we cannot mean to assert that it has to the sensation in question any relation which it does not have to the blue flower, that what we do assert is that it has to the other element in the sensation of blue,—namely, 'consciousness'—the same relation which it has to the other parts of a blue flower, the relation, that is to say, of a quality to a thing.* It is perhaps worth pointing out that even if appeal is to be made to popular usage, popular usage supplies no uniform sanction for the interpretation just referred to.† We speak, for instance, of the 'contents of a glass of water,' when we certainly do not mean that the water has to the glass the relation of a quality to a thing; we speak, again, of the 'contents of a book,' when still less do we intend to imply a relation of thing and quality. I am far from wishing to suggest that in either of these cases we have anything like an adequate analogy,—there can be no analogue to an absolutely unique relation,—yet in the second example, at any rate, we have a much nearer approach to one than in the thoroughly false parallel of thing and quality.

According to the usual psychological doctrine, the individual's point of contact with existent reality as such is to be found on the one hand in the fact of sense-perception, and on the other

* G. E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," *Mind*, N.S., xii, p. 447 *sqq.*

† Strange to say, Mr. Moore uses, further on in the same article, an illustration which confirms this statement. The image in a looking glass, although it may be said to be a content of the looking glass, is certainly not related to the latter as a quality to a thing. I think the comparison of an image in the looking glass with an image in the mind utterly erroneous; but that is not the point with which I am here concerned.

which distinguish it as a percept in the finite mind, and by means of which we discriminate it from a mere representation or an image? If so, then it must be assumed that the mode of perceiving on the part of the infinite mind is exactly similar to the mode of perceiving on the part of the finite mind. Berkeley would have recoiled from such an admission, for it carries with it the conclusion that the infinite mind is qualitatively and sensuously limited after the fashion of the finite mind. "God knows or hath ideas," he maintains, "but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are."* Evidently, therefore, it follows that much in our perception of objects is due to the transitory, accidental, imperfect character of our finite minds, and that these features cannot belong to objects as ideas in the infinite mind. But if so, this ultimate reality ascribed to objects is liable to the very objection Berkeley himself urged, for example, against Locke's account of substance. For what is a perceived thing which has lost just those individualising, particularising marks that give it determinateness within the range of our experience? It is an *abstract* idea.

This result carries with it momentous consequences for Berkeley's theory, upon which it may be interesting for a moment to dwell. If pressed, Berkeley, I take it, would have been forced to the admission that ideas in the infinite mind possessed a reality and ultimate significance, which could not be claimed for ideas in the finite mind. The former could not be described, after the fashion of the latter, as "marks or signs," as together making up "the language of the Author of Nature"; they must themselves constitute the very being of nature. Indeed, in *Siris*, Berkeley is to be found insisting upon the fact that our perceptions are gross and delusive, that sensuous objects are merely appearances, and that only the divine ideas can truly be said to

* *Works*, i, p. 337.

exist. But if this be so, the entire ground is cut from under the contention, advanced at the beginning of the *Principles*, that the being of ideas consists in their dependence upon mind. For the whole point of that contention was that the sensuous qualities of a thing, the qualities, that is to say, which gave to it concreteness and determinateness of character, were impossible apart from mental apprehension, and this was coupled with the further contention that the supposed existence of unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, rested upon the doctrine of abstract ideas. It follows, therefore, that unless some independent reason can be given for the existence of a supreme mind, the logical outcome of a critical examination of Berkeley's philosophising would be to land us back into the Objective Idealism of a certain stage, at all events, of Plato's thinking, according to which Ideas were regarded as thoughts neither of God nor man, but as separate, self-existing, eternal essences, which might, indeed, be objects of intellectual apprehension, but were in no way constituted thereby.

Berkeley's idealism, then, hovers in a state of unstable equilibrium between two radically incompatible positions. On the one hand, it may well be described in Kant's language as "dogmatic," for it *assumes* at the outset two orders of real existence, the finite and the infinite mind, and in order to account for a third, that of sensuous objects, a mechanical determination of the former by the latter, all of which assumptions prove to be unwarranted when tested by the principles Berkeley prescribes for his own procedure. On the other hand, it may well be described as "subjective," for it identifies the objects of our experience with the particular modes of our subjective activity, and thereby precludes itself from offering any explanation of how we come to be aware of ourselves as existing, and as forming part of the world known to us in experience.

Kant called his own idealism "critical," and the signification which that title always had for him indicates at once a point of

exists only in *being felt*, the existence of pain consists in our being conscious of it. I reply, the contention, if intended as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the proposition we are considering, simply begs the whole question at issue. No one dreams of disputing the palpable truism that a pain is felt: the question is whether the felt pain is identical in nature with the psychical state *in and through* which it is felt. And I cannot see that those who apparently wish to maintain that it is, have advanced the slightest argument in support of their contention. Many psychological theories have been formulated of the psychical conditions giving rise to pleasure and pain. Mr. Bradley, for example, has attempted to connect pleasure with the expansion or harmony of the self, pain with repression of the self or with the tension that arises in consequence of such repression. Now, I do not suppose that anyone would venture to assert that what is actually experienced in our feeling of pain is tension or strain, that tension or strain *is* the experience of which we are directly and immediately aware. But if, admittedly, we are not directly aware of *this* assumed quality of the psychical states in and through which we experience pain, why should it be supposed that we are directly and immediately aware of the nature of that which is in a condition of strain or tension? Again, so far from landing us in the position maintained by Dr. Ward, which Mr. Bradley criticises, that pleasures and pains can never be objectified, it seems to me that in order to conceive of such objectification as in any sense possible, we must necessarily admit that in being aware of feeling we are aware of a content, however vague and ill-defined that content may be. In the second place, it is objected that our proposition virtually amounts to a denial of the fact of self-consciousness, that, if the nature of the psychical states which constitute the self cannot be directly experienced, the logical consequence would be to deny the possibility of an awareness of self altogether. But what, I would ask, are we to understand by an "awareness of self?" Is the "self," which

is here referred to, merely a succession of psychical states, regarded in abstraction from the contents on account of which alone those states have any *raison d'être* in the realm of reality? Obviously not. But if by "self" be meant, as apparently is meant, that relatively permanent background of feelings and thoughts and desires, which gradually comes to be differentiated from the experience of what we call "external things," I fail to see where the difficulty is supposed to lie. The former no less than the latter are admittedly, so far as we are aware of them, experienced contents, and the refusal to identify the contents in either case with the existent psychical states through which they are apprehended, does not, so far as I can discover, affect the question of the knowability of such contents in the slightest degree. It might as well be argued that we can have no experience of our own bodily organism, if the nature of the material of which it is composed is not directly apprehended by us. Surely, what we really mean by the "self" is never the merely psychical mechanism through which experience of any sort, whether of self or not self, is mediated. If to know "the self as knower, the self as experient" means to be directly aware of the nature of the processes through which it knows or experiences, then certainly I admit such self-knowledge to be impossible; but inasmuch as it is nowhere to be found, the admission does not seem to be a very damaging one. "Unknowable," in any ultimate sense, there is no reason for supposing such processes to be, any more than there is for supposing the nature of what we call physical processes to be unknowable,—the point is, that, such knowledge of them as may conceivably be obtained will not in either case be direct, immediate, intuitive. Moreover, there is surely no means of reconciling* the Cartesian position that states or activities of mind are known directly, immediately, as such, and as the self, with

* See Mr. Boyce Gibson's paper in the present volume, with which cf. his *Philosophical Introduction to Ethics*, p. 116 sqq.

the position, insisted on by Mr. Bradley, that "every soul either exists or has existed at a stage where there was no self and no not-self, neither ego nor object in any sense whatever." Is the soul, before the appearance of the self, devoid of mental states? If so, in what does its 'existence' consist? And if not, how does it happen that there is any period in the life of the soul when mental states, whose existence consists in being experienced, are not experienced? In the third place, it is argued that if it be laid down "that we can observe nothing except as an object," then "we are logically cut off from self-knowledge." The ambiguous use of the word "object" is one of the great scandals in philosophy, and I do not think that anything profitable is to be gained by discussing the question whether or no the self is experienced wholly, or in part, or not at all, as an object, until we have definitely settled what we mean by "object." If by 'object' be signified what it usually signified for Kant, namely, a centre of reference for sensuous predicates, it is unquestionably true that "the felt presence of a self" is "not experienced wholly as an object," but, in that case, as Kant pointed out, there is a good deal else in our experience besides the self of which the same must be said. If, however, 'object' be defined as "whatever consciousness in any way cognizes, or, cognizing, feels any kind of interest in" (*Dictionary of Philosophy*, ii, 192), then it is difficult to see how the self can be experienced, even on the Cartesian theory, except as an 'object.'*

As regards the latter of the two propositions laid down above, it has been maintained recently,† that in being aware of anything, whether of material things in space or of our own

* It seems to me, I confess, a mistake to identify 'content apprehended' with 'object,' and in my previous paper I did not intend to imply any such identification. I tried, at all events, to reserve the term 'object,' for such contents as carried with them specific reference to an existent reality.

† *Vide* Mr. Moore's article in *Mind*, N.S., xii, already referred to.

sensations, or of what not, we are directly aware of objects, which when we are aware of them are precisely what they would be if we were not aware, in other words, that our subjective modes of apprehension are not responsible for any features in the object apprehended. Objects of knowledge, or concepts, are not contents of psychical states: 'blue,' for example, "is as little a mere content of my experience, when I experience it, as the most exalted and independent real thing of which I am ever aware." Consciousness, that is to say, stands face to face with its object, and simply knows; the fact of its being known in no way affects the character of the object. We are not yet in a position to criticise this theory to any advantage; we need to be informed as to the way in which its author would deal with some obvious psychological facts; how, for example, he would account for the different appearances of what is usually taken to be the same object to different minds, or for differences in the same object due, as usually supposed, to varying degrees of attention, what reality he would attach to objects of memory, of imagination, and of dream states, and particularly the explanation he would offer of feeling, before the whole bearing of the theory can become apparent. Here I desire only to press one consideration. Whatever else may be implied by the attitude of *being aware* of an individual object, it would generally be admitted that it involves at least a process of discriminating, comparing, relating. To discriminate or to compare or to relate at all implies, of course, a certain plurality of what we will call, in the language of the theory in question, given objects. But it implies just as certainly some common point of reference. Two objects, A and B, can only be compared or discriminated if they be somehow related in common to the discriminating or comparing Consciousness, the unity of which is an indispensable condition for the recognition of any connectedness in the objects cognized. If, now, we assume the objects known to be separate from the act of apprehension, we shall find it a hopeless business to offer any explanation of how

it comes about that as the process of discriminating and comparing proceeds, the object known presents different appearances to the apprehending mind. If, for instance, we say that apprehension of a particular object as A has resulted in the recognition of its resemblance to other objects, the reference of A to a class, clearly the object A *after* being referred to a class presents features which were not originally given to be apprehended. Moreover, on account of such reference, characteristics before unnoticed will now become apparent, others that before were vague will now become definite and distinct, and so on. Are not these differences in the apprehended object clearly due to our subjective mode of apprehension? And, if so, is the conclusion to be avoided that the ways in which the object A is apprehended must be distinguished from the object A, as it may be supposed to be apart from such apprehension? Now, the case here cited is but a familiar instance of what holds quite generally in conscious experience. Not even the simplest, crudest apprehension of an object can be accounted for psychologically without bringing to our aid in the exposition the notion of a discriminative activity which is in kind identical with the more mature acts of what it is customary to call thinking. Instead of assuming isolated single objects as originally given, we are bound to insist that any singleness or definiteness is the result of discrimination which enables us to relate one object to an increased number of its surroundings. The original datum from which we start in conscious experience is not that of a multiplicity of separate objects, by comparison of which we attain to ideas of their relation, but an undefined, ill-differentiated whole, out of which by successive acts of discriminating there gradually emerge for consciousness definite objects. In the light of this consideration, a theory that would separate the apprehending act from that which is apprehended and consequently deny that any features in the latter are dependent upon the former, renders, I should say, both terms of the antithesis not only inexplicable but unintelligible.

I revert, in conclusion, once more to Kant. Compelled though we be to reject the notion of things-in-themselves, the foregoing lines of reflexion point to the conclusion that it was a true instinct which restrained Kant from the attempt to regard knowledge as a self-existent whole, and thus to make the identification of Truth with Existence, which, as a matter of fact, is *the* characteristic trait of Idealism in all its forms. Kant saw that Reality could not be exhausted in knowledge or experience, although he made the mistake, which the subsequent idealistic systems have at least taught us to avoid, of supposing that that which knowledge or experience could not take up into itself was richer, or at least higher in worth, than anything which could be comprehended within its range. His fatal sundering of the ultimately real from its appearances led him enormously to undervalue the significance of experience, and to overvalue in equal measure the significance of mere existence. He did not fall, indeed, into the error of ascribing to intellectual apprehension the "trifling business" of *copying* as best it could the interplay of existent realities; but his Copernican idea did not extend to the abandonment of the ancient prejudice that the realm of intelligence and its objects must needs be of inferior rank to that which lies beyond. And yet, as we have seen, the tendency of Kant's thought is to draw more and more of that assumed external reality into the sphere of the known and knowable, until, when the phenomenal world is treated from the point of view of *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, the separation of phenomena from so-called things-in-themselves is on the verge of breaking down. One is almost inclined to say that, then, phenomena, even for Kant, could be nothing less than the knowable aspects of real things, and that the noumenal aspect of these same things could be nothing more than that refractory element which remains, so to speak, behind or beneath the knowable. Not the appearance of reality, but the reality of appearance is the logical outcome of this trend of thought.

What gradually issues forth into the fabric of our experience we have no reason for wishing to exchange for that which exists outside. The being of things, as Lotze points out, only comes to its full reality in that as which they appear to us; all that they are before such manifestation is but the mediating preparation for this final realization of their meaning. "The fact that the influence of the existent and of its changes condition within rational minds the appearance of a world of sensation is no vain addition to the connection of things, as if the import of all existence and action would be complete without it; on the contrary, it is itself one of the greatest, or rather the greatest, of all events, beside whose depth and importance all else that could take place amongst the constituents of the universe sinks into insignificance." "Instead of complaining that in sensation the existing properties of things outside us are not represented, we should rejoice that something so much greater and fairer comes in its place."

According, then, to the view here taken, existence is not that to which truth must correspond; it would be nearer the mark to say that truth is that to which existence must correspond. The existent is not as such the ultimately real; it is only that part of the real which is subservient to, or the instrumentality by means of which, apprehension of truth comes about. It is the mechanism, or, to use Lotze's word, the *Gerippe*, of reality, whilst experience or truth is the essence, the meaning, the life of reality. Reality is not merely the mechanical world, but the mechanical world filled out and amplified with the richness of complete experience. And experience or truth is not to be conceived as a resultant, or product, thrown up by, or generated out of, the mechanism that conditions the circumstance of its apprehension on the part of conscious subjects. It is true that what we call the same object is variously apprehended by different minds, and such variation is due no doubt to differences in the conditions whereby apprehending in finite centres comes about. It is

true also that to describe the contents apprehended as though they were so many given facts, upon which the operations of the mind are directed, is to confer upon them a substantive character which they do not possess; they are not entities flitting about in the void, like the *εἰδωλα* of Democritus and the Epicureans; it is only in and through acts of apprehension that contents are possible at all. But it is one thing to say that they are possible only in and through acts of apprehension; it is quite another thing to say that they are caused or created by those activities. The specific qualities we discriminate as colours and sounds, as pleasures and pains, and so on, are *sui generis*; they cannot be deduced as effects from the processes which serve as the medium of their appearance. In the light of these considerations, the question whether what exists is to be conceived as ultimately material or psychical in nature seems of quite subordinate importance. We know as little of the existent structure of what we call matter as we do of the existent structure of what we call mental states. On the one hand, no result of physical science would have violence done to it by the hypothesis that the mechanical processes of nature bear to the complete system of Knowledge or Truth a relation similar to that which the mental states of a finite mind bear to knowledge or truth as apprehended by it. On the other hand, no serious human interest would be really imperilled by the theory which Dr. Adamson was inclined to adopt, that an act of apprehending is a mode or process of change of a certain complex configuration of matter in space.* The resemblance to materialism here is only a superficial resemblance; for the essential point is, as Dr. Adamson himself fully allows, that the mechanical substratum, whatever its nature, forms merely, so to speak, the skeleton of the real, and is misrepresented until due account be taken of the fact that it is subservient to the life of mind. Mind lives only through the apprehension of

* *Development of Modern Philosophy*, vol. i, p. 355.

truth, and an investigation of the nature and conditions of knowledge or truth must always remain the chief requisite for any philosophical determination of ultimate reality. I will simply add that the validity of the reasoning by which Kant endeavoured to prove that the possibility of knowledge implies a transcendental ground does not seem to me to be impaired by anything I have been contending in this paper.

ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE
TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION.

Meeting, November 7th, 1904, at 8 p.m. Dr. Hastings Rashdall, President, in the Chair.—The President delivered the Inaugural Address on “Moral Objectivity and its Postulates.” The President invited discussion, and the following members took part: Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, Dr. Stanton Coit, Mr. Shearman, Mr. Carr, Dr. Goldsbrough, Mr. Boutwood, Mr. Kaibel, and Professor Boyce Gibson. The President replied.

Meeting, December 5th, 1904, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—Mr. T. Percy Nunn was elected a member. Professor G. Dawes Hicks read a paper on “Idealism and the Problem of Knowledge and Existence.” A discussion followed, in which the Chairman, Mr. Carr, Mr. Spiller, and Dr. Goldsbrough took part. Professor Dawes Hicks replied.

Meeting, January 2nd, 1905, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—A paper was read by Mr. H. Sturt on “The Line of Advance in Philosophy.” A discussion followed, in which the Chairman, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Spiller, Mr. Nunn, Mr. Finberg, Mr. Shearman, and Professor Lutoslawski took part. Mr. Sturt replied.

Meeting, February 6th, 1905, at 8 p.m. The President in the Chair.—Mr. F. C. S. Schiller was elected a member. Professor W. R. Boyce Gibson read a paper on “Self-Introspection.” A discussion followed, in which the President, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, Mr. Solomon, Mr. Carr, Dr. Goldsbrough, Mr. Nunn, Mr. Shearman, and Mr. Benecke took part. Professor Boyce Gibson replied.

Meeting, March 6th, 1905, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—Mr. J. Solomon was elected a member. Dr. J. L. McIntyre read a paper on "Value Feelings and Judgments of Value." A discussion followed, in which the Chairman, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Boutwood, and Mr. Carr took part. Dr. McIntyre replied.

Meeting, April 3rd, 1905, at 8 p.m. The President in the Chair.—Mr. A. T. Shearman read a paper on "Some Controverted Points in Symbolic Logic." A discussion followed, in which the President, Mr. Bertrand Russell, Mr. Hodgson, Mr. Benecke, Dr. Goldsbrough, Mr. Spiller, Mr. Nunn, and Mr. Carr took part. Mr. Shearman replied.

Meeting, May 1st, 1905, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—A paper by Mr. Clement C. J. Webb on "The Personal Element in Philosophy" was read. A discussion followed, in which the Chairman, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Carr, and Mr. Boutwood took part.

Meeting, June 5th, 1905, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—The Report of the Committee for the Twenty-Sixth Session was read. Dr. Hastings Rashdall was elected President for the ensuing Session. Professor G. Dawes Hicks, Mr. G. E. Moore, and Professor Sorley were elected Vice-Presidents. Mr. Boutwood was elected Treasurer and Mr. H. W. Carr, Honorary Secretary. Mr. Kaibel and Dr. Goldsbrough were elected Auditors. A paper was read by Mr. H. W. Carr on "The Metaphysical Criterion and its Implications." A discussion followed, in which the Chairman, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Shearman, Mr. Boutwood, and Dr. Goldsbrough took part. Mr. Carr replied.

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION.

(Read at the Meeting on June 5th, 1905.)

THE Session was opened on November 7th, 1904, with the Presidential Address by Dr. Hastings Rashdall on "Moral Objectivity and its Postulates." Papers have been read by Professor G. Dawes Hicks on "Idealism and the Problem of Knowledge and Existence"; Mr. H. Sturt on "The Line of Advance in Philosophy"; Professor W. R. Boyce Gibson on "Self-Introspection"; Dr. J. L. McIntyre on "Value Feelings and Value Judgments"; Mr. A. T. Shearman on "Some Controverted Points in Symbolic Logic"; Mr. Clement C. J. Webb on "The Personal Element in Philosophy"; and Mr. H. W. Carr on "The Metaphysical Criterion and its Implications." These papers have all been printed and form Volume V of the "Proceedings."

We deeply regret to record the loss, by death, of two of our members—Mr. C. C. Massey and Mr. G. S. Rhodes. Mr. Massey became a member of the Society in 1883, and though not able to be a regular attendant at our meetings, he took great interest in our work and was himself a devoted student of Philosophy.

Three new members have joined during the Session, and we have lost two of our number by resignation.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT—26TH SESSION, 1904-1905.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURE.		
	£	s. d.		£	s. d.
Subscriptions—			Printing—		
61 Members ..	64	1 0	“Proceedings,” N.S., Vol. IV	41 16 2
Less—Unpaid..	18	18 0	Proofs of Papers—25th Session	2 0 7
			Proofs of Papers, Notices, &c.—28th Session	4 19 2
Arrears of previous Session	24	3 0	Rent of Rooms—25th Session	8 8 0
			Advertisements	0 16 0
Less—Unpaid ..	3	3 0	Gratuities to Attendants	1 2 6
Written off ..	4	4 0	Postage	2 2 6
	7	7 0	Balance carried to Publication Fund Account	..	0 14 1
		16 16 0			
		<u>£61 19 0</u>			<u>£61 19 0</u>

The Publisher's account for Sales, the payment of Rent for the present Session, and the printing of the current number of the “Proceedings” are not included in this Statement.

PUBLICATION FUND ACCOUNT.

	£	s. d.		£	s. d.
Balance brought forward from last Session	97 4 8	Post Office Savings Bank Deposit Account	69 1 6
Interest on Deposit Account, 1903	2 13 4	Cash in hand	33 19 0
” ” 1904	2 8 5			
Balance of General Account	0 14 1			
		<u>£103 0 6</u>			<u>£103 0 6</u>

Examined and found correct—

(Signed) F. KAIBEL.
GILES F. GOLDSBROUGH.

RULES OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

NAME.

I.—This Society shall be called “THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY,” or, for a short title, “THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.”

OBJECTS.

II.—The object of this Society shall be the systematic study of Philosophy; 1st, as to its historic development; 2nd, as to its methods and problems.

CONSTITUTION.

III.—This Society shall consist of a President, Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, a Secretary, and Members. The Officers shall constitute an Executive Committee. Every Ex-President shall be a Vice-President.

SUBSCRIPTION.

IV.—The annual subscription shall be one guinea, due at the first meeting in each session.

ADMISSION OF MEMBERS.

V.—Any person desirous of becoming a member of the ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY shall apply to the Secretary or other officer of the Society, who shall lay the application before the Executive Committee, and the Executive Committee, if they think fit, shall nominate the candidate for membership at an ordinary meeting of the Society. At the next ordinary meeting after such nomination a ballot shall be taken, when two-thirds of the votes cast shall be required for election.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

VI.—Foreigners may be elected as corresponding members of the Society. They shall be nominated by the Executive Committee, and notice having been given at one ordinary meeting, their nomination shall be voted upon at the next meeting, when two-thirds of the votes cast shall be required for their election. Corresponding members shall not be liable to the annual subscription, and shall not vote.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS.

VII.—The President, three Vice-Presidents, Treasurer, and Secretary shall be elected by ballot at the last meeting in each session. Should a vacancy occur at any other time, the Society shall ballot at the earliest meeting to fill such vacancy, notice having been given to all the members.

SESSIONS AND MEETINGS.

VIII.—The ordinary meetings of the Society shall be on the first Monday in every month from November to June, unless otherwise ordered by the Committee. Such a course shall constitute a session. Special meetings may be ordered by resolution of the Society or shall be called by the President whenever requested in writing by four or more members.

BUSINESS OF SESSIONS.

IX.—At the last meeting in each session the Executive Committee shall report and the Treasurer shall make a financial statement, and present his accounts audited by two members appointed by the Society at a previous meeting.

BUSINESS OF MEETINGS.

X.—Except at the first meeting in each session, when the President or a Vice-President shall deliver an address, the study of Philosophy in both departments shall be pursued by means of discussion, so that every member may take an active part in the work of the Society.

PROCEEDINGS.

XI.—The Executive Committee are entrusted with the care of publishing or providing for the publication of a selection of the papers read each session before the Society.

BUSINESS RESOLUTIONS.

XII.—No resolution affecting the general conduct of the Society and not already provided for by Rule XIV shall be put unless notice has been given and the resolution read at the previous meeting, and unless a quorum of five members be present.

VISITORS.

XIII.—Visitors may be introduced to the meetings by members.

AMENDMENTS.

XIV.—Notices to amend these rules shall be in writing and must be signed by two members. Amendments must be announced at an ordinary meeting, and notice having been given to all the members, they shall be voted upon at the next ordinary meeting, when they shall not be carried unless two-thirds of the votes cast are in their favour.

LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION, 1905-1906.

PRESIDENT.

REV. HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

SHADWORTH H. HODGSON, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1880 to 1894).

BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1894 to 1898).

G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1899 to 1904).

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., PH.D.

G. E. MOORE, M.A.

W. R. SORLEY, M.A., LL.D.

HONORARY SECRETARY.

H. WILDON CARR, 22, Albemarle Street, W.

HONORARY AND CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

Elected.

1885. Prof. SAMUEL ALEXANDER, M.A., 13, Clifton Avenue, Fallowfield, Manchester (elected hon. member 1902).

1899. Prof. J. MARK BALDWIN, Princetown, New Jersey.

1889. J. M. CATTELL, M.A., Ph.D., Garrison, New York.

1880. Prof. W. R. DUNSTAN, M.A., F.R.S., 30, Thurloe Square, S.W. (elected hon. member 1900).

1891. M. H. DZIEWICKI, 21, Szpitalna, Cracow, Austria.

1881. Hon. WILLIAM T. HARRIS, LL.D., Washington, United States.

1883. Prof. WILLIAM JAMES, M.D., Cambridge, Mass., United States.

1899. EDMUND MONTGOMERY, LL.D., Liendo Plantation, Hempstead, Texas.

1880. Prof. A. SENIER, M.D., Ph.D., Gurthard, Galway (elected hon. member 1902).

1899. Prof. E. B. TITCHENER, Cornell University, United States.

MEMBERS.

Elected.

1898. Miss DOROTHEA BEALE, Ladies' College, Cheltenham.
 1893. E. C. BENECKE, 174, Denmark Hill, S.E.
 1888. H. W. BLUNT, M.A., 183, Woodstock Road, Oxford.
 1886. Prof. BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., *Vice-President*, The Heath Cottage, Oxshott.
 1890. A. BOUTWOOD, Bledlow, Bucks.
 1889. Prof. J. BROUGH, LL.M., University College, Aberystwyth.
 1895. Mrs. SOPHIE BRYANT, D.Sc., 6, Eldon Road, Hampstead.
 1883. Prof. S. H. BUTCHER, M.A., 6, Tavistock Square, W.C.
 1881. H. W. CARR, *Hon. Sec.*, Bury, Pulborough, Sussex.
 1895. STANTON COIT, Ph.D., 30, Hyde Park Gate, S.W.
 1884. P. DAPHNE, LL.B., 9, Roseleigh Avenue, Highbury.
 1896. E. T. DIXON, M.A., Racketts, Hythe, Hants.
 1899. J. A. J. DREWETT, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
 1893. W. H. FAIRBROTHER, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford.
 1901. A. J. FINBERG, 52, Beversbrook Road, Tufnell Park, N.
 1897. Prof. W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A., 9, Briardale Gardens, Platt's Lane, Hampstead.
 1900. G. F. GOLDSBROUGH, M.D., Church Side, Herne Hill, S.E.
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 1902. Mrs. HICKS, 9, Cranmer Road, Cambridge.
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 1896. Miss L. M. JACKSON, 29, Manchester Street, W.
 1904. F. B. JEVONS, M.A., Litt.D., Bishop Hatfield's Hall, Durham.
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Elected.

1900. Rev. G. E. NEWSOM, M.A., King's College, London.
 1900. R. G. NISBET, M.A., 13, Nelson Terrace, Hillhead, Glasgow.
 1904. T. PERCY NUNN, M.A., B.Sc., 5, Lichfield Road, Cricklewood, N.W.
1903. Miss E. A. PEARSON, 129, Kennington Road, S.E.
1903. GEORGE CLAUD RANKIN, M.A., The Settlement, Tavistock Place, W.C.
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1895. ARTHUR ROBINSON, M.A., 4, Pimlico, Durham.
 1896. Hon. B. A. W. RUSSELL, M.A., 44, Grosvenor Road, S.W.
1905. F. C. S. SCHILLER, M.A., Corp. Chr. Coll., Oxford.
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1892. ALEXANDER F. SHAND, M.A., 1, Edwardes Place, Kensington, W.
 1901. A. T. SHEARMAN, M.A., 67, Cranfield Road, Brockley, S.E.
 1905. J. SOLOMON, M.A., 75, Holland Road, Kensington, W.
1900. Prof. W. R. SORLEY, M.A., LL.D., *Vice-President*, St. Giles, Chesterton Lane, Cambridge.
1901. GUSTAV SPILLER, 54, Prince of Wales Road, Battersea Park.
 1888. G. JOHNSTONE STONEY, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S., 30, Ledbury Road, Bayswater, W.
1887. Prof. G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., *Vice-President*, Craigard, St. Andrews, N.B.
1893. HENRY STURT, M.A., 5, Park Terrace, Oxford.
1904. FR. TAVANI, 53, Glengall Road, Kilburn, N.W.
1900. Prof. C. B. UPTON, M.A., St. George's, Littlemore, near Oxford.
1886. FRAMJEE R. VICAJEE, High Court of Judicature, Bombay.
1902. JOSEPH WALKER, Pellcroft, Thongsbridge, Huddersfield.
 1890. CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
 1896. Prof. R. M. WENLEY, M.A., D.Sc., East Madison Street, Ann Arbor, Mich., U.S.A.
 1897. EDWARD WESTERMARCK, Ph.D., 8, Rockley Road, Shepherd's Bush, W.

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